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Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East has generated increased anger in the 
region. The U. S. war against Iraq has sharply increased the level of anti-Americanism 
in regional terms. That is not to say that anti-Americanism was caused by the events 
following 9/11. Anti-Americanism is a result of attitudes and perceptions toward what 
many Arabs and Muslims call the "anti-Arab and Muslim" foreign policy, especially 
in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that has existed over a longer period of time. Of 
course, the Bush Administration is aware of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic 
world and has admitted that it has reached an unprecedented level. 
This study attempts to understand the debates over U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East from a Middle Eastern perspective. Mainly it is a case study of the Saudi 
perspective. It aims to find whether the conduct of U. S. policy has exacerbated the 
discontent and radicalism which underpins the actions of terrorist groups. 
Of the Saudi elites interviewed for this study, 90% believe that U. S. foreign 
policy has contributed to the growth of terrorism. Most of the participants (90.5%) 
agreed that U. S. support for Israel is the main reason for anti-Americanism. 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis sets at to explore why American foreign policy is so controversial 
in the Middle East. It is perhaps the key question in contemporary international 
relations. I hope to ask and answer this question. 
America policy in the Middle East after the events of 9/11 has been described 
by many Middle Eastern commentators as representative of unprecedented activity in 
the region. This action actually is consequence of a uni-polarity resulting from the end 
of the Cold War and the attacks on America on 9/11 and the subsequent `war on 
terror. ' The Bush Administration has reshaped foreign policy, especially in the 
Middle East, to obtain new objectives. In reaction, may countries in the Middle East 
have reviewed and re-structured their policies in order to conform to the aims of the 
United States. However, conformity with U. S. foreign policy has become difficult for 
some governments in the Middle East for a variety of reasons. 
The literature on 9/11, the United States, and the war on terror are varied and 
broad. Books and journals present different views and represent different schools of 
thought. For example, Worlds in Collision (Booth & Dunne, 2002) presents 31 essays 
written by some of the most distinctive thinkers, intellectuals, and academics in the 
world, examining world affairs after the 9/11 attacks. The book assesses the major 
issues of terror, world order, and international security. As a major turning point, 
another book, Fighting Back: the War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush White 
House (Sammon, 2002) illustrates in chronological order the war on terror since 9/11 
and up until the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001. This provides the Bush 
Administration's preparations for the `war on terror' and how plans evolved leading 
up to the decision to wage war in Afghanistan. Probably another book like America 
Unbound: the Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003) explore 
what the authors called a revolution in foreign policy by the second President Bush, 
who came to office with a littlie knowledge about the world affairs, but pursued very 
controversial policies. Another influential book is Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: 
How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025 (Palmer, 2003). The book has been 
considered one of the most important and controversial books published since 9/11. 
Mark Palmer was the one who wrote President Bush's speech on the State of Union in 
January 2004, which highlighted the issue of democracy in the Middle East. 
There have also been attempts to understand mechanics of the war on terror 
and American foreign policy against a broad backdrop of the shifting patterns of world 
politics and the broader dimension of how and why states clash in the international 
arena. Perhaps the most important book on this subject is the Clash of Civilizations by 
Samuel Huntington (2002). Huntington diagnoses anti-Western sentiment in Muslim 
societies. He argues that `an overall trend in Islam has been in an anti-Western 
direction. In part, this is the natural consequences of the Islamic Resurgence and the 
reaction against the perceived `gharbzadegi' or Westoxication of Muslim societies' (p. 
213). Of course, Huntington's thesis proved controversial and evoked a range of 
critical responses. Booth and Dunne (2002), for example, believe that there is no clash 
of civilizations between America and Islam. Rather, they have speculated that the 
2 
notion of the clash of civilization is all about `A confusion of misunderstandings, 
crude stereotypes, and parallel absence of self-knowledge' (p. 5). 
For global politics, the problem is obviously not one of Islam and the Western 
world. It may be, and this forms part of the backdrop of my thesis, that the current 
problems among civilizations are the result of a clash between U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East and what might be termed the more militant or radical face of the 
Muslim world. It is important to point out that a clash of civilizations can be inflamed 
by the elements mentioned by Booth and Dunne when members of one culture attempt 
to force their values and beliefs on another culture, disrespecting and belittling the 
values and beliefs of that culture. Matters worsen when communication between 
cultures lacks a minimum level of knowledge and respect. Let us look at what I see 
the central problem. 
A Statement of Problem 
The Bush Administration's foreign policy in the Middle East, both before and 
after 9/11, has generated increased anger in the region. This has resulted in two 
features: the second Palestinian uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000, and after 9/11, 
increased more expressions of anger and outrage by elites, middle class, and street 
people throughout the Arab world. The Bush Administration is aware of anti- 
Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world and has admitted that it has reached an 
unprecedented level (Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab 
and Muslim World, 2003). The U. S. war in Iraq has increased the level of anti- 
Americanism in regional terms. However, that is not to say that anti-Americanism 
was caused by the events following 9/11. Anti-Americanism is a result of attitudes 
and perceptions toward what many Arabs and Muslims call the `anti-Arab and 
Muslim' foreign policy, especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, has existed 
over a longer period of time. 
The anti-Arab/anti-American conflict took root in 1917 when the United States 
supported and financed the Jewish migration to Palestine and then later played a major 
role in the creation of the state of Israel in 1947. Since that time, the United States has 
been perceived as conducting a series of policies against Arabs in the region, 
especially in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A general concern over these 
strategies, which may be genuine, has been utilized by some militant and other 
terrorist organizations (like Al-Qaedah) to justify actions against the United States and 
to recruit followers who are willing to conduct attacks on American targets. I try to 
understand how perceptions of U. S. foreign policy have evolved to understand the 
problem of the United States. 
Purpose of the Study 
So, this study attempts to understand the debates over U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East from a Middle Eastern perspective. Primarily, it is a case study of the 
Saudi perspective. It aims to find whether the conduct of U. S. policy has exacerbated 
the discontent and radicalism which underpins the actions of certain terrorist groups. 
However, this study is not a general review of American-Saudi relations. Rather, 
Saudi perceptions are used as an example of how people in the Arab and Muslim 
world (in the Middle East) have perceived and reacted to aspect of U. S. foreign policy. 
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The one unique character of the Arab world is a sharing of the same ethnic, cultural, 
and religious bases. It is of no small consequences that this region plays an important 
and vital role in the world, not least because of its oil. 
As part of this research, I conducted interviews with intellectuals and 
policymakers from Saudi Arabia who have direct knowledge of U. S. foreign policy in 
the region. The first purpose was to strengthen the understanding of Saudi 
perceptions. The second purpose was to examine whether U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East had contributed to the growth of radical terrorist groups. The 
methodology section explains in detail the way interviews were conducted. The thesis 
asks: 
1. What are the reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab/Muslim world? 
2. Has U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East provoked and contributed to an 
asymmetric response from what may be described as radical or terrorist groups like 
Al-Qaedah? Specifically, has American over-reliance on military power instead of 
diplomacy and nurturing of the balance of power meant that certain groups in the 
region have come to believe that they have little recourse except violent actions? 
3. When the George W. Bush Administration pursued strategies radically 
different from those of the Clinton Administration in foreign policy in the Middle 
East, did this exacerbate tension and anti-Americanism? Specifically, has the U. S. 
foreign policy toward the Middle East has become a target of Islamic militants, 
radicals, and terrorist groups? 
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Definitions of Terms 
The Middle East 
The definition of the studied region, the Middle East, varies from one 
institution to another. For example, the United Kingdom Parliament (2003) defines 
the Middle East as the states of Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
Other institutions, such as the Middle East Institute in Washington (2003), define the 
Middle East broadly as `those countries stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, 
including Turkey and the countries of Central Asia. ' According to Ambassador 
Mohammad Al-Tayeb (author's interview, 2004), the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs defines the Middle East as the countries from Morocco in west Africa to the 
Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran (see Appendix A for Middle East map). For the purpose 
of this thesis, the definition of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most 
appropriate definition with consideration to include Afghanistan and Pakistan as they 
correlate to U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Terrorism 
The controversy over the definition of `terrorism' is not a new issue. It has 
been discussed internationally for a long time without any significant agreement. 
Wardlaw (1998) mentioned the history of the international community's efforts to gain 
cooperation in terrorism prevention dating from 1934 after the assassinations of King 
Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in 
Marseilles on 9 October 1934, but, without an agreement on a definition for terrorism, 
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cooperation was a challenge. The international community's disagreement on a 
definition of terrorism has been the `central problem' crippling cooperation in the 
prevention of terrorism. Treaties rely on legal terms, and it has not been possible to 
find a definition of terrorism to which all parties can agree. 
Terrorism knows no boundaries- crossing cultural, religious, and national 
lines. No one group of people can be singled out as terrorists. Terrorism is not based 
on building something new. Instead it seeks to destroy what exists. Perhaps people 
resort to terrorist acts when they believe that there is no hope. Desperation takes a 
terrible toll on the human spirit- the Palestinian case is a tragic example (The Paper 
Presented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia- Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
Counter-Terrorism International Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 2005, 
which was attended by the author). 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the controversial issues that has 
made it difficult to agree on a definition of terrorism. The United States and Israel 
consider the Palestinian `resistants' to be terrorists; Arab and Muslim states consider 
them to be freedom fighters who have the right of self-defense against Israeli 
occupation. Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) believes that there is no international 
controversy over the definition of terrorism but rather disagreement between America 
and other countries, mainly Arab and Muslim, over the acts of freedom fighters and 
so-called state sponsored terrorism. The United States considers the acts of freedom 
fighters, such as those conducted by Hamas to be terrorism. On the other hand, some 
Arab and Muslim states consider military operations conducted by Israel against the 
Palestinian civilians as act of terrorism. Ambassador Mohammed Al-Tayeb (author's 
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interview, 2004), from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speculates that if the 
Arab-Israeli conflict ended, the term `terrorism' could be defined because the 
international controversy surrounding the word hinges on the concept of freedom 
fighters. Kolko (2002) asserts that `The problem of who is a `terrorist' and who is a 
`freedom fighter' exemplifies the core of the United States' dual standard and is the 
heart of its present grave dilemma in the Middle East. ' (p. 14). 
Even though there is agreement regarding the denunciation of terrorism, there 
is a complex controversy over the definition of terrorism and the appropriate means to 
prevent it. Controversy over the definition of terrorism has caused the United States to 
develop a `double standard' policy. Noam Chomsky (2002), a well known liberal 
intellectual, claims that the United States applies the definition of terrorism to its 
enemies, but when the United States commits acts that fall within the definition of 
terrorism, the definition never applies. Chomsky thinks that terrorism is not only the 
weapon of the weak, as many believe. It is also a weapon that has been used, 
sometimes excessively by powerful states. When used by the powerful, it is redefined 
as `counter-terror, or law-intensity warfare, or self defense, and if successful, rational 
and pragmatic, and an occasion to be united in joy' (p. 134). 
Bruce Hoffinan (1999), an expert in terrorism and global security and Vice 
President of External Affairs at Rand's Washington D. C. Office, believes that the 
current definitions of terrorism are too broad to be applied to current terrorist acts. He 
stakes that the definition of the U. S. Department of Defense- `the unlawful use of- or 
threatened use of- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or 
intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological 
objectives' (p. 38)- lacks a social dimension. This is an example of a definition that 
reflects the interests of the defining organization or government without awareness of 
the interests of others. 
Hoffman (1999) made a distinctive illustration by describing 109 elements 
found on all definitions of terrorism. He emphasized the differentiation between 
terrorists and criminals. Despite his efforts to arrive at a long definition, he was 
unable to overcome the problems of previous definitions. For example, in his 
definition, terrorism is `the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts 
involve violence or the threat of violence' (p. 43). Arguably, there are different kinds 
of terrorist acts that do no necessarily involve violence. For instance, in Sri Lanka, tea 
crops are considered one of the most important sources of national income. Several 
years ago, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka announced that they had 
poisoned the tea crops that were ready to be sent to Europe. The European Union 
immediately responded by embargoing tea crops from Sri Lanka. This terrorist act 
was not violent. 
Having one definition of terrorism is practically impossible unless terrorism is 
divided to different types, such as political or economic terrorism. Finding agreeable 
definitions for each type would be easier. Al-Sayad (author's interview, 2004) argues 
that it is methodologically and academically impossible to define terrorism unless the 
term is categorized. To the contrary, Merdad (author's interview, 2004) believes that 
cultural, religious, social, and customs differences between nations around the world 
make it impossible to define terrorism. 
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The definition of terrorism is the central problem, and before reaching an 
international agreement on this matter, two things need to be done. First of all, break 
down the elements of all the proposed definitions of terrorism. This will allow for 
clarification of the points of disagreement between all parties. Secondly, to avoid the 
pitfalls of a definition that is too broad, terrorism must be categorized into different 
types, such as political terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, and economic terrorism. 
For the purpose of this study, I will use the definition approved as a part of the Arab 
League Treaty on Terrorism Prevention. (All members of the Arab League are located 
in the Middle East- Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). According to the 
Arab League Treaty, terrorism is any act of violence or threat committed by an 
individual or group of people, regardless of its motivation, which causes fear, loss of 
life, or property damage in society (Al-Jahni, 1998). 
In the section on `state-sponsored terrorism, ' Hoffman (1999) states, 
`Certainly, governments have long engaged in various types of illicit, clandestine 
activities- including the systematic use of terror- against their enemies, both domestic 
and foreign' (p. 185). Unlike in the other sections (definitions, history of terrorism, 
religious terrorism), where he tried to present comprehensive information, Hoffman 
presented only the American point of view, mentioning all the countries that the 
United States considers to be engaging in state-sponsored terrorism. There are some 
countries, however, not listed by Hoffman which are considered by other countries to 
participate in state-sponsored terrorism, including the United States and Israel. For 
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example, until the mid 1970's and before the U. S. Congress prohibited the 
assassination of U. S. enemies, the CIA was involved in sponsoring and conducting 
such activities. According to Corn and Russo (2001), some former CIA officers have 
justified such activities, saying that `the CIA conspirators were not rouges but loyal 
civil servants following orders' (p. 1). U. S. attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro are a 
case in point regarding U. S-sponsored terrorism. Israel has used similar strategy 
assassinating enemies with the (Mussad) being responsible for such terrorist acts. The 
assassinated Yahya Al-Mashad, an Egyptian scientist, in France 1980. He was the 
director of the Iraqi nuclear reactor (Heikel, 1993). 
Even though Hoffman (1999) considers the United Nations' resolution in 
December 1997 defining indiscriminate attacks on civilians, such as bombings, as 
terrorist acts is `clearly a step in the right direction, ' he said nothing about such actions 
by Americans and Israelis. Instead, he referred to countries on the American list 
(Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). He mentioned the U. S. 
attack against Libya, the attempt to assassinate President Al-Gaddafi in 1986, stating 
`Despite the particularly careful selection of military targets for the US fighter- 
bombers, thirty-six civilians were killed in the air strike and ninety-three other 
wounded' (p. 193). Hoffman also used the American and Israeli point of view when 
referring to relationship between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah organization as evil 
relations. During the Soviet-Afghani War, the U. S. government had a relationship 
with the Mujahidins, training and supplying them with weapons in a manner similar to 
Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hartman, 2002). 
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What is the standard that legitimates American actions and makes illegitimate 
similar actions taken by other countries? Is it U. S. interest? Is it true that the United 
States does not want terrorism to be defined, so it can expand or narrow the definition 
to benefit its own interests? Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004) believes that 
`vagueness is a big advantage in politics. ' The United States wants to retain a broad, 
loosely defined concept of terrorism as it serves American interests. 
In his assessment of states that seek to obtain WMD, Hoffman (1999) did not 
mention Israel, who refused to sign a treaty banning WMD. Instead, he mentioned the 
American list of Middle Eastern countries seeking to obtain WMD. The American list 
excludes Israel, which refuses any inspection of its reactors. The United States wants 
the Middle East to have no WMD with the exception of the state of Israel. This is an 
example of the U. S. double standard regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East. 
In regards to state-sponsored terrorism, Wardlaw (1998) has tried to present a 
point of view different from Hoff van's. He stated that the U. S. list of countries found 
guilty of state-sponsored terrorism represents U. S. interests. `The list of such 
countries continually grows and changes, with the changes often appearing to be 
related directly to the political needs of the U. S. ' (p. 176). All the Arab countries 
disagree with the U. S. definition of state-sponsored terrorism, considering the frequent 
attacks by the Israeli Army against Palestinian civilians as a type of state-sponsored 
terrorism. Hasn't the United States been involved in state-sponsored terrorism when it 
invaded Panama and Grenada or attempted to assassinate Libya's President Al- 
Gaddafi? 
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In his prediction about the future of political terrorism, Wardlaw (1998) raised 
three questions. `How can terrorists be identified and their bases targeted without 
causing innocent civilians to suffer? Where can the strikes be launch from? How can 
the launch-site be protected from counter-attack? ' (p. 204). 
Wardlaw (1998) argues that military retaliation in countering terrorism is `both 
difficult to justify morally (because of the problem of accurate targeting and avoiding 
unconnected casualties) and difficult to implement practically (because of the logistic 
and planning difficulties or because of its negative side effects)' (p. 206). In any war 
against terrorism, it is of utmost importance to convince the countries around the 
world to cooperate, and that is possible only through the United Nations. Thus, any 
war against terrorism must gain its legitimacy through U. N. resolutions. However, in 
a world of unilateralism this seems increasingly unlikely. 
Paul Wilkinson (1977) is one of the classic scholars on terrorism. Many, who 
have followed him, such as Hoffman and Wardlaw, have been influenced by his work. 
Wilkinson defined political terrorism as `The systematic use of murder and 
destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorize individuals, 
groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorists' political 
demands' (Wardlaw, 1998, p. 16). Wilkinson also characterized three types of 
political terrorism: revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, and 
repressive terrorism. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I found the definition of Brian Jenkins as the most 
appropriate. He defined terrorism in the following manner: 
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The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence 
designed primarily to instill fear to terrorize may be called terrorism. 
Terrorism is violence for effect; not only, and sometimes not at all, for the 
effect on the actual victims who may be totally unrelated to the terrorists cause. 
Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended 
effect, not the by-product of terrorism (quoted in Mullins, 1998, p. 16). 
In his book, Terrorism and the Liberal State (1977), Wilkinson described 
common terrorist goals. One of the distinctive goals was `to push the liberal state into 
authoritarianism, and hence into denying its constitutionalism, into dropping all 
humane restrains and checks on power, and ultimately into becoming a paramilitary or 
police state' (p. 80). In the United States, the Secret Evidence Law was passed and 
signed by former president Bill Clinton and strengthened by the Bush Administration. 
This law allows the U. S. government to detain any suspect for an open-ended period 
of time. This law was one of the main issues brought up during the U. S. presidential 
elections in 2000, when President Bush promised voters during the race that he will 
seek to abrogate the law. However, after 9/11, he did the opposite, establishing even 
more restrains on the people's rights. 
The definition of terrorism has been and continues to be subject of wide 
debate. However, this thesis claims, as do the majority of Saudi elites who were 
interviewed by the researcher, that the Bush Administration has abused the issue of 
terrorism, taking advantage of the controversy over the term's definition. 
Organization of the Thesis 
This review of U. S. foreign policy is not of course comprehensive, but it does 
outline and explore the major themes and debates surrounding the war on tenor. 
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Chapter one provides a backdrop to the events of 9/11. What led to the tragedy? How 
did it occur? How did the Bush Administration receive and react initially? 
Chapter two presents a background of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
dating back to its engagement in politics in that area. Also, Chapter two together with 
Chapter three (oil and the American-Saudi relationship) attempts to evaluate the 
broader contours of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East through Saudi eyes, 
providing a case study of how U. S. actions contributed to the growth of terror in the 
style of that which has been witnessed since 9/11. While there is a significant amount 
of literature on the subject of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East, it is apparent that 
scholars are divided on the reasons as to why terrorism has emerged in its 9/11 
context. 
Chapter four discusses U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the 
George W. Bush Administration, focusing on the U. S. war on terror, specifically, 
attempting to tie together issues surrounding the emergence of the war on terror and 
the contours of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Chapter five examines the roots of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict is considered a major aspect of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East and the main reason for anti-Americanism according to the Saudi elites 
interviewed by the researcher. This was confirmed by the Report of the Advisory 
Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), which mentioned 
U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and the policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in particular, as the basis for anti-American sentiment. Further, the U. S. war on terror 
has intensified anti-Americanism, with the U. S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and 
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what has been described by many Arabs and Muslims as the anti-Islamic position 
taken by the Bush Administration. The last section of the chapter provides an in depth 
examination of the real roots of anti-Americanism. 
Chapter six presents interpretations of the outcome of the interviews with the 
Saudi elites as data was statistically generated. The results are presented on tables 
followed by interpretations. Overall, the thesis offers the opportunity to reflect on 
Saudi views of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
The last section of this thesis (Chapter seven) presents the reflections of Saudi 
elites on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The reflections include perspectives 
on Bush's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bush war on terror (including the war 
on Iraq), and anti-Americanism as they all are key themes in U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East. 
Methodolo Qv 
The focus of this thesis is on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the 
Bush Administration, especially in regard to what has become known in Western 
literature as the `war on terror. ' The hypothesis underlining the research is that U. S. 
foreign policy has contributed to the growth of anti-Americanism and provided a 
substantial boost to the size and strength of what may be described as radical groups in 
particular states in the Middle East. This is not to argue that this was ever the primary 
intention of U. S. foreign policy or a grand strategy, but rather the unintended 
consequence of a series of decisions made by successive U. S. administrations after the 
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end of the Second World War. The key questions for the thesis are how and why 
Middle Eastern groups have responded as they have to U. S. hegemony. 
This thesis relies on `contemporary historical sources. ' The originality and 
contribution of the thesis rests on understanding the literature and perspective of 
Middle Eastern sources. The main perceptions are Saudi. The thesis uses Arabic 
sources along with American and international sources. Information has also been 
obtained through face-to-face interviews. Secondary sources, such as the internet, 
newspaper, and magazines have been reviewed to provide additional support. 
One of the main problems encountered in this study has been the lack of 
published material in the Arab world and difficulty finding literature that covers 
contemporary issues. To tackle this problem, 24 interviews were conducted with 
intellectuals, academics, and policymakers in Saudi Arabia who have direct 
knowledge of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
The thesis pursues several themes on which there is substantial literature- the 
war on terror; and what may be regarded as a unilateral U. S. approach; the Arab- 
Israeli conflict; democratization; and the public role of intellectuals in the U. S. war on 
terror. There is much literature that focuses on international factors that have affected 
the shape of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This has been helpful to my 
research. Discussing the international determinants of U. S. foreign policy in terms of 
unilateralism and the use of military force provides a better understanding of U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East. In a uni-polar world, the United States is more 
likely to confront terrorism as it is, perhaps, the only power with the economic, 
political, and financial power to withstand its onslaught. The crux of the thesis is 
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disentangling the literature on terrorism which tends to be very specific and 
integrating it into the literature on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East and starting a 
new literature on the Saudi case perception. 
The first section of the research, Chapter one, focuses on the series of terrorist 
attacks against the United States leading up to 9/11. During the period between the 
Second Gulf War (The Desert Storm) in 1991 and 9/11, there was a more assertive 
U. S. foreign policy and the emergence of terrorist organizations like Al-Qaedha. 
There was also an increase in terrorist operations against American targets. This 
section also discusses debate within the Bush Administration regarding preparation for 
the U. S. war on terror. The second chapter provides historical background on U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East before 9/11- focusing on the central themes of 
regional politics between 1945 and 9/11. The history of the U. S. role in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict covers the period beginning with the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948 to the present. The thesis makes the claim that in order to understand the roots 
of Osama Bin-Laden (an example of anti-Americanism that shifted to terrorist 
activities against U. S. targets in the world), it is necessary to understand how U. S. 
actions taken before 9/11 were perceived in the Arab and Muslim world of the Middle 
East. Chapter three diagnoses oil as central issue of American Saudi relations and as a 
major pillar of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Also, the chapter presents 
perceptions of Saudi elites toward the American foreign policy toward the region and 
their country in particular. Chapter four is the most substantive part of this research. 
In it, U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East during the George W. Bush 
Administration is examined, especially in the post 9/11 period. Chapter five explores 
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what may be considered the roots of anti-Americanism, which the Bush 
Administration has failed to address. Chapter six presents the findings of interviews 
conducted with Saudi elites. The information is presented in tables with elaboration. 
In conclusion, Chapter seven reflects on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East, 
providing a Saudi perspective. 
Research Design 
The researcher conducted in-depth interviews. The method was most 
appropriate given the number of interviews used for the case study- 23 interviewees 
from the Saudi elite. This is a reasonable number of interviews when those 
participating are elites (Hagan, 2000). In-depth interviews served the purpose of this 
study- its attempt to evaluate the broader contours of U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East from the Saudi perspective and how it contributed to the growth of 
terrorism. It allowed the researcher to ask probing questions covering many sub- 
issues, especially when more details were required and the information given was not 
enough (Vickers, 2005), (Hagan, 2000). 
There were advantages to the use of an interview methodology. First, 
interviews provided personal contact with the participants, enabling the interviewer to 
generate more information than might have otherwise been obtained. For example, 
among the interviews I conducted, there was one participant who apologized because 
he did not have a time for me to interview him (due to a trip business), but he called 
me said he had emailed me answers to all the questions that I sent to him prior to our 
proposed meeting. Ten out of the thirteen questions were answered with only one 
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sentence. When I compared the outcome of this interview with the other personal 
interviews, I found an approximately one-to-five. However, these short answers were 
utilized in the tables of findings as they clearly provided Yes/No answers and, for 
example, description of what the interviewee believed to be the roots of anti- 
Americanism. 
Interviews as method prevent misunderstandings by participants. The 
interviewer was able to explain questions when necessary. and that happened several 
times during the interviews I conducted. Face-to-face interview enables the 
interviewer to probe for more information on issues or comments raised by the 
interviewees, and that is subject to the flow of the interviews. For the convenience of 
most participants who did not want to be taped, I did not use a taped record of 
interviews, making it possible to obtain less reticent answers (Hagan, 2000). Perhaps 
most importantly, elite interviews provide information not available from other 
sources (Vickers, 2005). 
There are also some disadvantages to interviews. Since tape-recording was not 
used, notes had to be taken while thinking about answers and generating questions. 
Keeping eye-contact with interviewees to show attention was somewhat challenging. 
Immediately after interviews, questions and answers had to be reviewed and missed 
information had to be added (Hagan, 2000). Finally, it was difficult to compare the 
outcome of the interviews, especially categorizing answers to key questions. 
There were difficulties with actual interviews. Since the interviews were 
conducted with Saudi elites, much preparation was needed for the meetings and it was 
not easy to schedule time for interviews, which in some cases had to be conducted in 
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two sessions. To even reach the elites, it required a network of connections. It was a 
somewhat a daunting task to interview people who have direct knowledge of U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East (Vickers, 2005). 
In his book, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, Bruce Berg 
(2001) presents what he calls `The Ten Commandments of Interviewing. ' They are 
the following: 
1. `Never begin an interview cold. ' The interviewer must chat for few 
minutes with the participants in order to `warm up' before starting. 
2. `Remember your purpose. ' Keep the focus on the subject. 
3. `Present a natural front. ' The interviewer should be natural, memorizing 
the questions to avoid reading from a paper. 
4. `Demonstrate aware hearing. ' Interviewer should offer some verbal and 
facial expressions in response to interviewee answers. For example, if the answer is 
humorous, smile. 
5. `Think about appearance. ' The interviewer should be dressed. 
6. `Interview in a comfortable place. ' Conduct the interview in a convenient 
place. 
7. `Don't be satisfied with monosyllabic answers. ' When the interviewer 
begins to receive inadequate information or short answers, probe by asking questions 
that as for explanation. 
8. `Be respectful. ' Show respect for participants. 
9. `Practice, practice, and practice some more. ' The interviewer should be 
knowledgeable and well-prepared before the interview. For example, in the case of 
21 
this study, the elites who were interviewed have direct knowledge to U. S. foreign 
policy; therefore, practice and preparedness, especially for in-depth questions was 
extremely required before the interviews. 
10. `Be cordial and appreciative. ' Express gratitude and appreciation to the 
subjects for their participation (p. 99-100). 
Interviewees were asked 13 semi-structured questions, the answers to which 
generated more questions and answers. These interviews allowed for direct contact 
with interviewees, making it possible to get clear answers and prevent 
misunderstanding. Also, this type of interview provided flexibility in questioning. 
For the convenience of some of the interviewees, the interview questions were 
sent to them ahead of time. The interviewees were offered time to become acquainted 
with the questions and prepare their answers. An important part of the research 
process was the use of Arabic language interviews and materials (only one participant 
preferred to be interviewed in English). This provided information, which on the 
whole, has not been utilized by Westerns researchers. Note that some statements will 
be quoted in Arabic and explained in English. The most complex part of the process 
was translating the Arabic interviews into English. The right words had to be selected 
as inaccurate translation would have resulted in distorted answers. Much time was 
spent on the translation and revision processes and consultation was conducted with 
two specialists in Arabic-English translation. 
It is important to note that as these interviews were conducted between January 
2004 and February 2005, some of the answers were subject to the actions and situation 
during that time. For example, the attitudes toward the United States have been 
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negatively affected by series of actions in Iraq, which have deepened anti-American 
sentiments in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For example, scandals like Abu-Gharib 
prisons torture, the raising number of casualties among Iraq civilians, and the chaotic 
situation, which has given an indication of civil war, have all impacted the Middle 
Eastern perceptions and attitudes toward the American invasion and occupation of 
Iraq. Therefore, I argue that if the interviews of this study had been conducted now, 
the answers of the questions regarding Iraq would have generated different outcome to 
the 2004-2005 interviews. 
Subjects 
The target population for the proposed study was represented by 23 members 
of the Saudi elite. One of the main objects was to have participants representing 
academia and political sectors in Saudi Arabia. The interviews were used to explore 
the puzzle of the failure of U. S. strategy in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia was 
selected to represent the Arab states in the case study. The Arab world has almost the 
same ethnic, cultural, and religious background. There are many political parties in 
the Arab world conducting political discourse that addresses the people of the region. 
Public opinion in the Arab states is in agreement on many vital issues and shares 
similar attitudes about many things, especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim 
World that was submitted to the U. S. Congress in June 2003 supports that claim. The 
report indicated that in a survey in 2002 only 6% in Egypt `had a favorable view' of 
the United States. In the same year, according to the Report of the Advisory Group, a 
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survey conducted by Gallup found that only 7% in Saudi Arabia had a `very favorable 
view' of the United States. These show a strong similarity percentages between Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia and is evidence supporting the claim that Saudi perceptions can be 
taken as a valid representation of perceptions throughout the Arab world and a valid 
case study. 
The 23 interviewees included Saudi academics from King Saud University in 
Riyadh, King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, and Naif University for Security 
Science in Riyadh. There were also Saudi Ambassadors and experts from the Saudi 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Saudi Diplomatic Institute. Other interviews were 
conducted with the Chairman ofMajlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament), four 
members of Ash'shura, the Governor of the Saudi Monetary Agency, a former 
Principal (Minister) for Girls Education, the Deputy Minister of Information, and the 
Co-editor in Chief of the Riyadh daily newspaper. 
Due to the fact that the interviews were made with Saudi elites, the number of 
participants that the researcher was able to interview was 23 people. However, not all 
the interviewees were asked to answer all the 13 questions because some of the 
questions were made especially for those who are specialists in U. S. foreign policy: 
Questions 2,6, and 11 (See appendix C). 
Question Design 
The interview constituted of 13 questions (see Appendix B). There were, 
however, a number of snowball questions. The snowball questions varied according 
to who has been interviewed, based on the flow of the interview and the knowledge 
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differences among interviewees. There were also different questions that were 
addressed to specialists. For example, it was necessary to ask the former Principal of 
the General Presidency for Girls Education (both girls and boys education was united 
under one Ministry of Education in 2002) a question about U. S. media attacks on the 
educational system of Saudi Arabia and the accusations that intolerance and hatred 
were being taught. Other questions could be answered only by experts in U. S. foreign 
policy, and that was subject to the researcher's discretion. All 13 questions were 
designed to address the themes of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East that are 
discussed in this study and to answer the core questions of the research. Findings 
based on answers to questions 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11, and 12 are presented in 
Chapter six. 
Question I explores the pillars of Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East 
from a Saudi perspective. Of course, knowing the pillars of American foreign policy 
in the Middle East, from a Saudi point of view, enables us to understand the basis of 
which U. S. actions and policies move from. This is probably a key question in 
exploring U. S. foreign policy from Middle Eastern point of views. Each pillar that 
was mentioned by the interviewees is discussed in this study as a major theme in the 
politics of the Middle East. 
Question 2 considers the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War and the impact of theses events on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The 
purpose of this question was to differentiate between the impact of the end of the Cold 
War and the later actions of the Bush Administration on foreign policy in the Middle 
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East. The approach of Bush's foreign policy can be explained as a consequence of the 
impact of the end of the Cold War and is discussed in Chapter four. 
Question 3 addresses the Bush Administration's role in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, a major theme of Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East. America is 
traditional role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been described by many Middle Eastern 
and Western foreign policy experts as one of the main reasons for anti-Americanism. 
This question was designed to probe the Saudi penreptions and assessments of this 
matter. 
Question 4 reveals how Saudis look at the U. S. war on terror and its focus on 
the Middle East. The outcome from this question will not be utilized in the findings of 
Chapter six but will be incorporated in Chapters one, three, four, and five. With the 
problem of lack of publishing in the Arab world, it was impossible to get this variety 
of elites' views in present issue like the war on terror without interviews. The 
outcome of this question boosted the Middle Eastern perceptions of the U. S. war on 
terror in this study especially that all the 23 interviewees were asked to address this 
issue. 
Question 5 addresses the controversy over the definition of terrorism and 
America's use of the term. The U. S. war on terror has evoked a controversy over the 
definition of terrorism with claims of American abuse of the term's vagueness by 
Middle Eastern commentators and intellectuals. It was important to probe the 
controversy over the definition of terrorism as perceived by Saudi elites as it relates to 
advantages or disadvantages for U. S. foreign policymakers and the short and long- 
term consequences resulting from America's use of the term. 
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Question 6 was designed for those who are specialists in U. S. foreign policy. 
They were asked for their assessment of the Bush Administration's use of 
unilateralism in the war on terror. Like Question 4, the responses to Question 6 will 
not be utilized in the findings of Chapter six but will be used in the body of the thesis, 
especially in the section on the Bush Administration and the use of unilateralism. 
In Question 7, interviewees were asked for their assessments of the Bush 
Administration's success in the war on terror. More than three years after 9/11 (when 
the interviews were conducted), it has became increasingly debatable whether the 
Bush Administration has succeeded or failed in its campaign. The interviewees also 
discussed the impact of the war on terror upon anti-American sentiment in the Arab 
and Muslim world. 
Question 8 was designed to ask Saudi elites if the United States has succeeded 
or failed to justify its invasion of Iraq and the war that has followed. The Bush 
Administration's efforts to show this war to be legitimate was meant to convince other 
governments to support the United States and participate in the war. The United 
States has had an ethical dilemma and has sought to avoid being seen by people in the 
world as an outlaw state and by Arabs and Muslims as crusaders against Islam. 
Question 9 explores Saudi perceptions regarding post-war Iraq. Since the 
Bush Administration's announcement of the end of military operation in Iraq in April 
2003, the post-war situation in Iraq has witnessed various actions and events. 
Authority was passed to Iraqis and elections took place. So, the interviewees were 
asked about their assessment of the U. S. post war situation. This outcome of this 
27 
question will be used to support the section on the U. S. war in Iraq in Chapters four 
and seven, which presents reflections on U. S foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Question 10 investigates the roots of anti-Americanism in the Arab and 
Muslim world constitutes a pivotal section of this study. There are many reasons for 
anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world, as discussed in Chapter five. This 
question and its answers allow for the reasons for anti-Americanism to be categorized 
in a table in Chapter six. 
Question 11, like Question 6, was designed only for interviewees who are 
specialists in U. S. foreign policy. The answers will be utilized in the section on, 
Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East (Chapter four) and in the findings in Chapter 
six. It was important to examine if the George W. Bush Administration pursued 
radically different strategies from the Clinton Administration to see, for example, how 
the increasing use of its unilateralism evolved. 
Question 12 (together with Question 10) are the most important questions in 
the study. They address the core issue of this study as it examines the claims that U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East has provoked and contributed to an asymmetric 
response from what may be described as Islamic militants or terrorist groups like Al- 
Qaedah. Does U. S. foreign policy and terrorism have an action/reaction relationship? 
Finally, Question 13 asked the interviewees to reflect, speculate, or comment 
on U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Because the purpose of these interviews 
was to explore Saudi perceptions of American foreign policy in the Middle East, it 
was important to ask them such an open question. 
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Data Analysis 
All data will be presented in tables with interpretation in Chapter six 
(Findings). The data analysis is primarily descriptive. A bi-variate relationship 
between anti-Americanism in the Arab-Muslim world and U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East will be examined. Again, the hypothesis of this study states that the 
conduct of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East has exacerbated discontent and 
radicalism, which underpins the actions of terrorist groups. To examine the core 
questions of this thesis, the answers will be categorized in tables according to the 
interviewees' responses. 
This thesis contributes to the overall materials available on this subject by 
introducing the perceptions of Saudi elites on American foreign policy in the Middle 
East. It is enhanced by the author's ability to read both Arabic and English, gaining 
information and insight into Middle East politics and U. S. foreign policy. The 
originality of this thesis rests on the interviews conducted with the Saudi elites, 
providing information not available in other sources. Interviews were with elites from 
all spectrums in Saudi Arabia (See Appendix Q. 
Before 9/11, there were a series of actions taken by the United States dating 
since the end of the Second World War, which have had accumulative effect leading 
to the current negative perceptions of the United States in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds. The foreign policy actions taken by the United States will be discussed in 
Chapter two. It would be difficult to understand the current problem relative to 
American foreign policy without knowing the history of American foreign policy in 
the Middle East and the roots of anti-Americanism, which the Bush Administration 
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has failed to address. Chapter five presents the perceptions of Saudi elites on the main 
themes believed to be the reasons for anti-Americanism. Reflections on the future of 
American foreign policy, a variety of visions and thoughts expressed by Saudi elites 
who have direct knowledge of American foreign policy, is presented in Chapter seven. 
Many interviewees agreed that if the United States wants to seriously address the 
problem, it must start a dialogue with people in the region. This dialogue must not 
seek to merely explain U. S. foreign policy. Instead, it must discuss the concerns the 
interests of the nations of the Middle East along with American interest. 
Findings 
This chapter presents and interprets the findings of the interviews that were 
conducted with Saudi Arabian intellectuals and policymakers who have direct 
knowledge of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The findings are original and 
not available by any other sources. The interviews represent a snapshot of Middle 
Eastern views, mainly Saudi. The interviewees were selected to represent various 
spectrums of elite in Saudi Arabia. Academics, policy makers, intellectuals who some 
are columnists in distinguished Arabic and Saudi newspapers. 
Of course, it is important to mention that there is no practice of political parties 
in Saudi Arabia. Also, elites in Saudi Arabia do not use right/left wing terms to 
identify themselves. However, some of them tend to describe themselves as liberals or 
moderates, for example. Saudi elites, in some cases, have different definitions for 
their liberal, moderate, or conservative affiliations. Therefore, it was hard for the 
researcher to predetermine the affiliation of the interviewees. However, there were 
30 
some indications of the attitudes of those elites toward some cases, which can be 
implied from their writings. The main factor considered in selecting the interviewees 
was their knowledge of American foreign policy in the Middle East. As there were 
some interviewees who are critical of U. S. foreign policy, there were also some 
interviewees who described themselves as pro-Americans (see Chapter three, 
America-Saudi relations). 
The purpose of the interviews was two fold: (1) to examine the claim that U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East has contributed to the increase in anti-Americanism 
and the growth of fundamental terrorist groups, and (2) to determine the Saudi 
perspective on U. S. policy and actions. The findings involve answers to all the 
questions, except numbers 4,6, and 13, which were incorporated into the text in other 
sections of this study, and are presented in tables following interpretations of the 
findings. Each table is categorized according to the interviewees' answers. 
The Pillars of Bush's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
`Pillars' refers to the main issues that shape the Bush Administration's foreign 
policy in the Middle East. Understanding the pillars of American foreign policy in the 
Middle East from a Saudi point of view provides the basis for understanding the 
motives behind U. S. policies and actions. This is probably the key to exploring U. S. 
foreign policy from a Middle Eastern point of view. Each pillar mentioned by the 
interviewees has been discussed in this study as a major theme in the politics of the 
Middle East. 
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Table I shows that all of the interviewees asked about the pillars of the Bush 
foreign policy in the Middle East agreed that the `security of Israel' and `oil' were the 
most important pillars. Additionally, 57.1 % added the `war against terrorism' as an 
important pillar and 35.7% included the `maintenance of stability in the region' as a 
major pillar for the Bush Administration. 
TABLE 1. The Pillars of Bush's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The The War Maintaining 
Security of Oil against Stability in 
Israel Terrorism the Region 
f % f % f % f % 
What are the pillars of 
U. S. foreign policy in the 14 100 14 100 8 57.1 5 35.7 
Middle East? 
The Impact of the End of the Cold War on U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The interviewees were asked about the impact of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War upon U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. All 
participants 100% agreed that the end of the Cold War did impact American foreign 
policy in the region. The purpose of this question was to differentiate between the 
impact that the end of the Cold War had on American foreign policy and the impact of 
9/11 and later actions by the Bush Administration. 
TABLE 2. The Impact of the End of the Cold War on U. S. Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East 
Yes No 
f % f % 
Did the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War have an impact on the strategy of U. S. foreign policy in 13 100 0 0 
the Middle East? 
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The Bush Administration's Role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
In answer to the question regarding the Bush Administration's role in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as a major theme of Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East, 
none of the participant described Bush's role as `positive. ' Only 6.7% described 
Bush's role in the conflict as both positive and negative, with the majority (93.3%) 
describing the role as `negative. ' 
TABLE 3. The Bush Administration's Role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Positive Negative Both 
f % f % f 
How do you assess the Bush Administration's 
role in the-Arab Israeli conflict? 0 0 14 93.3 1 6.7 
The Controversy over the Definition of Terrorism 
The U. S. war in terrorism has created controversy over the definition of 
`terrorism' with claims of American abuse of the term's vagueness. The claims of 
American `abuse' of the term terrorism have been sounded mainly by Middle Eastern 
commentators and intellectuals. The U. S. definition of `terrorism' has justified the 
Bush Administration's wide-ranging targets and military threats/actions. It was 
important to probe how the controversy over the definition of terrorism is perceived by 
Saudi elites (as an advantage or disadvantage for U. S. policymakers). Table 4 shows 
that the majority of interviewees (77.8%) described the controversy over the term 
terrorism as advantageous for U. S. policymakers; 11.1% described it as 
disadvantageous. Another 11.1 % of the participants described it as both advantageous 
and disadvantageous for U. S. policymakers. 
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TABLE 4. The Controversy over the Definition of `Terrorism' 
Advantage Disadvantage Both 
f % f % f % 
Is the vagueness over the definition 
of `terrorism' an advantageous or a 14 77.8 2 11.1 2 11.1 
disadvantageous for U. S. foreign 
policymakers? 
Assessments in Regard to the U. S. War on Terrorism 
After conducting the U. S. war on terror for more than three years, it has 
become increasingly debatable whether the Bush Administration has succeeded or 
failed in its campaign. When interviewees were asked between January 2004 and 
January 2005 if the United States has succeeded in its war on terrorism, only 7.3% of 
them considered the U. S. successful. The majority (56.6%) believed the Bush 
Administration had been relatively successful in its campaign, describing various 
reasons for success and failure. There were 37% who believed (for different reasons) 
that the United States has actually failed in its war on terrorism. 
TABLE 5. Assessments of the U. S. War on Terrorism 
Success Relative Failure 
Success 
f % f % f % 
Approximately three years after 9/11 and the 
beginning of the U. S. war on terrorism, has the 1 7.3 9 56.6 6 37.8 
Bush Administration succeeded in its campaign? 
Opinions in Regard to U. S. Promotion of the War in Iraq 
According to the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the 
Arab and Muslim World (2003), as a result of the U. S. war in Iraq, `Hostility toward 
America has reached shocking levels' (p. 15). This raised the question of whether the 
34 
Bush Administration had succeeded or failed in its promoting of the war in Iraq. The 
Bush Administration had sought to justify going to war against Iraq and tried to 
convince many countries to participate by joining the `coalition forces. ' Table 6 
reveals that only 6.3% of the interviewees believed that the Bush Administration 
succeeded in promoting the Iraq war, and onlyl2.5% described it as a `relative 
succession. ' On the other hand, the majority of participants (75%) believed that the 
Bush Administration had failed in its efforts to promote the war. Interestingly, 6.3% 
of the participants claimed that the Bush Administration had not really promoted the 
war because it did not need so. 
TABLE 6. Opinions Regarding U. S. Promotion of the War against Iraq 
Was Did Not 
Succeeded Relatively Failed Need To 
Successful Promote 
f % f % f % f 
Has the United States succeeded 
in promoting the war in Iraq? 1 i 6.3 2 12.5 12 75 1 6.3 
Assessment of the U. S. Situation in Post-war Iraq 
Since the end of military operations in Iraq in April 2003, the post-war 
situation in that country has been chaotic and deadly. There have been positive 
events, like the elections and subsequent passage of authority to the Iraqis. However, 
for the United States, the post-war situation in Iraq has been one of escalated violence 
and death. Iraq has become an arena in which terrorist organizations, anti-American 
militants, and anti-occupation militants have targeted United States and coalition 
forces. The Iraqi resistance has increased the number of casualties among U. S. troops 
(139 during the war compared to 2,729 as of October 8,2006) which has placed the 
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Bush Administration under increasing pressure from within the United States. When 
the interviewees were asked (see table 7) for their assessment of the U. S. post-war 
situation in Iraq, all of them (100%) agreed that it was negative. 
TABLE 7. Assessment of the U. S. Post-war Situation in Iraq 
Positive Negative 
f % f % 
How do you assess the U. S. situation in Iraq after the war? 0 0 15 100 
Reasons for Anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim Worlds 
The roots of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world constitute a 
major aspect of this study. The many reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab and 
Muslim world were discussed in chapter four. Table 8 lists those reasons mentioned 
by the Saudi elites in order of significance. The majority of interviewees (90.5%) 
attributed anti-American sentiment among Arabs and Muslims to American support of 
Israel. In addition, 42.9% of them mentioned what they call `U. S. anti-Arab and anti- 
Muslims policies and actions. ' Another 28.6% attributed anti-American ism to their 
frustration with U. S. intervention in their countries' internal affairs. Interestingly, 
only 23.8 % had mentioned U. S. wars against Afghanistan and Iraq as reasons of anti- 
Americanism. Finally, 14.3% attributed anti-Americanism to what they called 
`American arrogance, ' excessive use of power, and American policy double standards. 
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TABLE 8. Reasons for Anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim World 
To what do you attribute anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim 
world? f % 
1- American support of Israel 19 90.5 
2- U. S. anti-Arab and anti-Muslim policies and actions 9 42.9 
3- Frustration with U. S. intervention in their states' internal affairs 6 28.6 
4- U. S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 5 23.8 
5- American arrogance; excessive use of power; unilateralism 3 14.3 
6- American policy double standards 3 14.3 
Has Bush Pursued Strategies Radically Different from the Clinton Administration? 
It was very important in this study to determine if the Bush Administration 
has actually pursued radically different strategies than those of the Clinton 
Administration. Of course, 9/11 had a significant impact on the Bush Administration. 
However, the Bush Administration has, as many have argued, pursued radically 
different strategies than the Clinton Administration, starting before 9/11. The majority 
of interviewees (86.7%) believed just that while 13.3% believed it has not. 
TABLE 9. Has Bush Pursued Strategies Radically Different from the of the Clinton 
Administration? 
Yes N o 
f % f % 
Has the Second Bush Administration pursued 
Middle Eastern foreign policy strategies radically 13 86.7 2 13.3 
different from the William Clinton Administration 
thus exacerbating tension and anti-Americanism? 
Has U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East Provoked Militants or Terrorist Groups? 
This is probably the most important question in this study as it seeks to 
examine claims accusing U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East of provoking and 
contributing to an asymmetric response from what may be described as Islamic 
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militants or terrorist groups, like Al-Qaedah. In other words, is the relationship 
between U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East and terrorism an `action/reaction' 
relationship. The majority (90%) of interviewees answered `yes, ' 5% said that there is 
a `relative' relationship; and 5% said that no such relationship exists. 
TABLE 10. Has U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East provoked militants or terrorist 
groups? 
Yes Rela tively N o 
f % f % f % 
Has U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
provoked and contributed to an asymmetric 
response from what may be described as Islamic 18 90 1 5 1 5 
militants or terrorist groups, like A1-Qaedah? 
The next chapter, (chapter seven) presents reflections on U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East made by Saudi elites. The reflections will be made on the Bush's role 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bush's war on terrorism including the war on Iraq, and 
reflections on anti-Americanism as they all are key themes in U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
9/11 AND THE `WAR ON TERROR' 
This chapter examines themes and issues which have characterized George W. 
Bush and the `War on Terror. ' Specifically, it will try to tie together issues of how we 
understand the emergence of the war on terror after the events of 9/11 and its 
consequences. It is, therefore a study of the conduct of American foreign policy in the 
Middle East and the perceptions within that region which have developed in reaction 
to the President and the war. Other aspects of Middle East politics, such as the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, are central as they influence American foreign policy in the Middle 
East region and more broadly U. S/Arab relations. As Richard Crockatt (2003) has 
stated, 
September II must be understood in the light of the interaction between 
America's dominant international position since the end of the Cold War, the 
rise of political Islam, and the complex set of phenomena that comes under the 
heading of globalization (p. I). 
I use Saudi Arabia as a case study to be representative of Arab feelings and 
perceptions and as the motor for my primary research work. 
9/11 and the War on Terror 
9/11 was a major turning point in American and some would say global 
politics. At the very least, the attacks of 9/11 represented the beginning of a new 
chapter in terrorist activity and ambitions. A terrorist organization, Al-Qaedah, 
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succeeded in utilizing technology and communications (such as the internet) to 
prepare for the 9/11 attacks, which were of a spectacular nature and, of course, took 
place on U. S. soil as opposed to the usual attacks in the third world. It proved seminal 
moment for the Bush Administration and altered the course of American foreign 
policy, especially as it turned out in the Middle East. Before 9/11, the Bush 
Administration had focused on NMD (National Missile Defense) and a robust 
disinvests. Post 9/11, the administration's position was transformed into a bid to 
counter any possibility of terrorist in alliances on attacks on the United States again. 
To do this required a reassessment of global politics and international organizations by 
the Bush Administration and a restructuring of the course of the United States in world 
affairs (Cox, 2002). 
Let us return to the events of what became known as 9/11. On September 11, 
2001, at 8: 45 a. m. (ET), the American people and government faced one of the most 
critical events in U. S. history. The World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington, D. C., were attacked by `hijacked' airplanes. First, American 
Airlines flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Eighteen 
minutes later, United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the south tower of the World 
Trade Center. Forty minutes later, American Airlines flight 77 crashed into the 
Pentagon in Washington, D. C. At 10: 10 a. m., another United Airlines plane headed 
toward Washington, D. C. crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of 
Pittsburgh. The four flights were hijacked by terrorists; three of those aircrafls 
successfully hit their intended targets. The crash in Pennsylvania killed all of the 
passengers but seems to have missed its target. It was believed that more than 3,000 
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people died in the September 11 attacks on New York, Washington and Pennsylvania 
(CNN, 2001). 
The U. S. Government investigation placed responsibility for the terrorist 
attacks on Osama Bin-Laden and his organization, Al-Qaedah. (In a released 
videotape in December 2001, Bin-Laden talked about the plan for the 9/11 attacks and, 
in later speeches, praised the perpetrators of the attacks). To counter any further 
terrorist activity, the Bush Administration declared a so-called `war against terror. ' 
On September 14,2001, all but one member of Congress voted to give President Bush 
the authorization to use force against those responsible for the attacks. The 
congressional resolution stated the following: 
Authorization for Use of Military Force - Authorizes the President to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11,2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. (The Library of 
Congress, September, 2001) 
On October 7,2001, an international coalition led by the United States 
launched a war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the country that had 
harboured Bin-Laden. Then was the first stage in the war on terror. The attack on the 
base of the Taliban and the Al-Qaedah organization in Afghanistan was called 
`Enduring Freedom. ' In early October 2001, the United States notified the United 
Nations that its war against terror would be extended to other states when it is 
required, and therefore to request authority from the United Nations to such actions. 
The second stage in the war on terror was launched against Iraq on March 19,2003. 
This action toppled the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein (Crockatt, 2003). 
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An Naim (2002) links the events of 9/11 directly to the conduct of U. S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East. He argued that the U. S. policies helped increase a general 
sentiment of anti-Americanism. `It is relevant, indeed necessary, to consider the 
relationship between the attack of September 11 and US foreign policy. This 
perspective applies to US policy in relation to particular regions of the world - the 
Middle East' (p. 168). This is, of course, the focus of this study. 
Bin-Laden and Al-Oaedah 
In Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush White House, 
(2002), Bill Sammon details George Bush's war on terror from the attacks on 9/11 
through to the end of May 2002. Also, and perhaps more importantly for the purpose 
of this chapter, Sammon outlined the factors that he believes led to the tragedy of the 
twin towers. He begins from the date that Al-Qaedah leader, Osama Bin-Laden, 
publicly announced his support for the people who perpetrated the bombing of the 
World Trade Center in New York in 1993. Bin-Laden praised them, saying `God has 
blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America' (p. 
149). 
That was the first time that Bin-Laden, who had been supported by the United 
States during the Soviet-Afghani war, had released an anti-American statement 
(Mosili, 2004). Bin-Laden's attitude toward the United States became increasingly 
negative after U. S. involvement in the Second Gulf War in 1991. He began to 
publicly to denounce American foreign policy in the Middle East, especially in regard 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Reitman, 1998). After a series of released videotapes by 
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Al-Qaedah, in which Bin-Laden claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks and 
explained the processes of the operation, the United States and the world were 
convinced that Al-Qaedah had indeed been behind the 9/11 attacks. 
Bin-Laden's relationship worsened with the Americans and with his own 
country of Saudi Arabia. Friction between Saudi-born Osama Bin-Laden and the 
Government of Saudi Arabia had begun during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. 
The Saudi Government accepted an American offer to send American troops to defend 
Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. For Osama Bin-Laden, who publicly opposed the 
allowance of American troops to land in Saudi Arabia, the idea of having any non- 
Muslims troops in the Arabian Peninsula was something completely unacceptable 
(Reitman, 1998). 
In Sudan in 1996, Bin-Laden spoke out against the Saudi Government and the 
American presence on the Arabian Peninsula. While he was not against the liberation 
of Kuwait or the defense of Saudi Arabia, he opposed stationing non-Muslim troops 
on the Arabian Peninsula- the home of the two Holy Muslim cities of Mecca and 
Medina. However, this public face is too simplistic as an explanation for Bin-Laden's 
disaffection from the United States and Saudi Arabia. Bin-Laden's attitude has to do 
with what he calls `Western imperialism. ' He believes that the governments of Arab 
and Muslim countries have deviated from the right path of Islam and blames Western 
influences, especially that of the United States, for this (Mosili, 2004). 
It is important to mention that some of the most despicable acts of terrorism 
have been committed in the name of a God. It can be particularly bewildering to non- 
believers of any sect unable to understand the mix of passion, hatred, and violence 
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which contributes to many terrorist acts. The use of religion as a motivational base 
has increased tremendously since 1968. In 1968, none of the l1 international terrorist 
groups identified were religiously motivated; in 1994, a third of49 international 
terrorist groups were identified as religious (Stern, 1999). Bin-Laden's organization, 
Al-Qaedah, is one of the groups using religion to justify its actions. It has justified its 
operations against American targets as a reaction to the stationing of non-Muslim 
troops on the Arabian peninsula and American support of Israel, which seems a more 
political than religious act. Othman Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004), a former 
member of Ash Shura (Parliament) in Saudi Arabia, argues that the issue of Palestine 
is actually a minor issue on the agenda of Al-Qaedah. However, Al-Rawaf believes 
that the issue of Palestinian is essential to other groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood 
Party in Jordon, and its attitude and actions toward the United States (the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. The 
party is active religiously, politically, and socially and has branches in many Arab and 
Muslim countries. The Muslim Brotherhood advocates the creation of Islamic 
government, applying Islamic law `Shariea' as the primary source of governing) 
(Mosili, 2004). Asaad Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004), from the Institute of 
Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agrees with Al-Rawaf 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been utilized and abused by some groups, like Al- 
Qaedah, which then portray it as main issue in their agenda when, in fact, it is not. 
After the U. S. involvement in the Gulf War, Bin-Laden left Saudi Arabia for 
Sudan in 1991, taking with him $250 million of his wealth. In 1994, the Saudi 
Government revoked Bin-Laden's citizenship because of his terrorist activities 
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(Mosili, 2004). Two years later, Bin-Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan after the Saudi 
government put pressure on the Sudanese regime to expel him. The Taliban regime 
came to power in Afghanistan the same year and Bin-Laden found a haven (Fandy, 
December 2002). 
In 1992, Bin-Laden began anti-American operations by financially backing the 
Somali militias against U. S. troops. In an operation against Somali militants in the 
streets of Mogadishu, eighteen U. S. rangers were killed and 77 were wounded. For 
Bin-Laden, this was his first real victory against the United States. The debacle in 
Somalia ultimately led to the resignation of U. S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin after 
less than a year in the office (Weber, 1993). After the failure of the U. S. operation in 
Mogadishu, Aspin was called for an emergency briefing on the Capitol Hill where he 
failed to brief Members in how the administration planned to proceed in Somalia. On 
28th October, 1993,39 Republicans in the House of Representatives signed a letter to 
President Clinton calling upon him to ask Secretary Aspin to resign because of his 
failure in Somaila. He did (Human Events, November 1993). 
After the Gulf War, Bin-Laden and his organization (Al-Qaedah) were accused 
of sponsoring a series of attacks against U. S. targets, including the bombings of 
American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Elsalam, Tanzania in 1998 and the 
bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 (United States Bureau of International 
Information Programs, November 1998). 
In 1998, Ayman Al-Zawahri merged his Islamic Jihad organization with Al- 
Qaedah and allied with Bin-Laden. In 1981 Al-Zawahri had been arrested in Egypt 
after the assassination of Egyptian President, Anwar El-Sadat. He was sentenced to 
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prison for three years for possessing a weapon without a license. Later, he went to 
Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and served as a surgeon for an Afghani field 
hospital. He created the first platoon of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. After joining with 
Bin-Laden, the founder of Islamic Jihad in Egypt became the second most important 
person in the Al-Qaedah organization (Mosili, 2004). 
On August 7,1998, Bin-Laden masterminded the devastating bombings of the 
U. S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Elsalam, Tanzania. The attacks marked the 
eighth anniversary of the arrival of U. S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula. The 
bombings caused 224 casualties, dozens of which were Americans (United States 
Bureau of International Information Programs, November 1998). On August 20, 
1998, President Clinton changed the dialogue regarding terrorism- considering it as an 
act of `war' instead of a criminal act. He declared a war on terror and, without waiting 
for `federal indictment' concluded that Bin-Laden was the prime suspect for the 
attacks. On the same day, President Clinton ordered missile attacks on selected targets 
in both Afghanistan and Sudan. President Clinton justified these attacks because of 
the embassy attacks and what he claimed was `compelling evidence' that Bin-Laden 
was preparing more attacks against U. S. targets (Reitman, 1998). However, Clinton 
was preoccupied with scandal. The Lewinsky case was returning to both a grand jury 
and the headlines of the U. S media. For example, the headlines of the New York 
Times on August 18-19th were (President's Explanation Fails to Quiet Republicans or 
Fire Up Democrats, Clinton's Legal Perils Extend Beyond Lewinsky Relationship, 
Clinton Admits Lewinsky Liaison to Grand Jury; Tells Nation 'It Was Wrong, ' but 
Private, Graphic: The Public's Initial Reaction After Clinton's Speech, Prominent 
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Democrats Are Unhappy With Clinton) (New York Times, August 1998). The attacks 
seemed to be a way to take attention away from the Lewinsky case. Bill Sammon 
(2002) recalls that the missile attacks `happened on August 20,1998, the day after 
Monica Lewinsky testified before a federal grand jury in the sex-and-lies case that led 
to Clinton's impeachment' (p. 210). Sammon added that `The President was widely 
accused of `waging the dog, ' contriving a military crisis to divert attention from his 
sexual misdeed' (p. 210). 
Approximately, 75 American cruise missiles were fired at two targets in Sudan 
and Afghanistan. The first target was the Al-Shefa Medicinal Factory in Sudan. It 
was believed to be a chemical weapons plant, but that belief was erroneous (National 
Review, September 1998). Yosif Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005), Assistant 
Editor-in-Chief of the Riyadh daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia described the U. S. air 
missile attack on the medicine factory `Al-shifa' as an example of the U. S. using the 
term `terrorism' as a tool to incorrectly label the medicine factory as a chemical 
weapon site and to justify hostile action. The second target of the American missiles 
was on one of Bin-Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. Twenty-four people were 
killed, but Bin-Laden and his top assistants escaped harm. After the missile attacks, 
one of Bin-Laden's spokesmen declared that `The real battle has not begun' inferring 
that Al-Qaedah had an agenda and reason to move forward (The New York Times, 
August 23,1998). 
On October 12,2000, a small boat filled with explosives ran into the U. S. S 
Cole as it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. The resulting explosion caused the deaths of 
seventeen American sailors and injured thirty-nine others. In different speeches, Bin- 
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Laden justified his attacks against U. S. targets, attributing them as a reaction against 
U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. For example, in one speech, he denounced 
American support for Israel and for its sanctions on Iraq: 
A million Innocent are dying as we speak, killed in Iraq without any guilt. We 
hear no denunciation, we hear no edict from the heredity ruler. And every day, 
Israeli tanks rampage across Palestine, in Ramallah, Rafah, and Beit Jalal and 
many other parts of the lands of Islam, and we do not hear anyone raising his 
voice or objecting .... 
But when the sword fell upon America, hypocrisy raised 
its head up high. (CBS News, October, 2001) 
The speech made by Bin-Laden was directed at Arabs and Muslims, as it 
addressed vital issues of concern, including Palestine and Iraq. It condemned the 
America's double-standards policy. According to the final report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004), Bin-Laden wanted to 
punish the United States for its foreign policy in the Middle East, especially its support 
for Israel. 
In 1998, after the U. S. missile attacks on the Al-Qaedah training camps in 
Afghanistan and on Sudan, A1-Qaedah decided on a plan to attack U. S. targets on 
American soil (Reitman, 1998). The targets were the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D. C. The time was September 
11,2001. It was considered the worst attack on America since the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The event revealed the capability of Al-Qaedah to 
launch attacks on U. S. soil, and revealed the vulnerability of U. S. homeland security. 
Over three thousand people were killed in the attacks (the highest number of 
casualties within the United States since the Civil War). The immediate economic 
damage was $35 billion (Kolko, 2002). According to Sammon (2002), after the 
attacks, 100,000 people lost their jobs. Investors in the American stock market lost 
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approximately one trillion dollars. When the New York Stock Exchange reopened 
four days after the attacks of 9/11, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 684 points, 
the worst one day drop in history. The consequences of 9/11 were economic and 
strategic. A week after the attacks, President Bush signed bills for $40 billion for 
emergency expenditures. That figure doubled to $87 billion when he requested funds 
in September, 2003, to cover military and reconstruction operations in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The Bush Administration's Reaction to 9/11 
After the attacks of September 11,2001, George Bush had to confront a new 
type of terrorism that has not been experienced by a U. S. President: a devastating 
terrorist attack on American land. Middle Eastern experts in U. S. foreign policy like 
Abdulaziz Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004), a former member of the Saudi 
Consultative Council MajlisAsh Shura (Parliament), believe that the reaction of the 
Bush Administration to the 9/11 attacks was exaggerated. Al-Fayez believes that 
previous administrations dealing with the same situation would have reacted less 
aggressively and perhaps more diplomatically. Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 
2004), from the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, asserted that the Bush Administration has harmed the world order with its 
response to September 11. Any other administration, like Clinton's would have, 
arguably, handled the situation better. 
Other Middle Eastern experts, like Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), from 
King Saud University, argue that previous administrations in the same position would 
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have, actually, reacted the same as Bush. If 9/11 had occurred during the Clinton 
Administration, Clinton would have reacted as Bush did. In other words, it is Al- 
Otaibi's position that the character of the state and circumstances influence the 
approach of all American presidents. Regardless of party, the `means' pursued by the 
Bush Administration have made its foreign policy active, and any active foreign policy 
generates dissent. What ever the varieties of opinion, the Bush Administration chose a 
path of revenge. Middle Eastern views will be presented in greater details in 
following chapters. 
George Bush vowed to pursue all terrorist organizations in the world, claiming 
that the war against terror is not aimed only at Al-Qaedah. He proclaimed the United 
States would not stop `until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped, and defeated. ' (The White House, September 2001). Bush told the Congress 
that it was going to be a `whatsoever' strategy. One could only speculate about how 
long the war would last, and what and where the next target would be after 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Sammon, 2002) 
In a press conference on September 16,2001, President Bush used the word 
`crusade' to refer to the war on terror. The `crusade' speech caused worldwide 
criticism, especially by Muslims. In the same day, French foreign minister Hubert 
Vedrine said, `We have to avoid a clash of civilizations at all costs ... One has to 
avoid falling into this huge trap, this monstrous trap' had been `conceived by the 
instigators of the assault' (The Christian Science Monitor, September 2001). Bush 
quickly sought to make amends for the use of this controversial word. He visited the 
Islamic Center in Washington, D. C. the very next day to correct this mistake. In his 
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speech at the Islamic Center, he talked about Islam as a tolerant religion and about 
Muslims as a part of American society. He emphasized in this speech that the war was 
against `terror' not Islam. As he said, `The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. 
That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent 
peace. They represent evil and war. ' (U. S. Department of State, September 2001). 
However, as Abdulaziz Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) states, the word `crusade' 
impacted negatively on Middle Eastern perceptions of the U. S. war on terror. Ali Al- 
Jahni (author's interview, 2005), from the Prince Naif University for Security Science 
in Riyadh, believes that the United States was actually engaging in two battlefronts, 
one against terror and the other against Islam. 
There are problems with using controversial words or those that have negative 
connotations. Noam Chomsky referred to the vagueness of the concept of `global 
terrorism, ' arguing that `the term `terrorism' is restricted, in practice, to the terror that 
affects the US and its clients and allies' (Quoted in Saint-Prot, 2005, p. 68). Gendzier 
(2002) mentioned an informal meeting that took place nine days after 9/11 at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D. C. Participants at the 
`Campaign against Terrorism, ' including former national security advisors Zibgniew 
Brezinski and Brent Scowcroft made comments regarding the U. S. war on terror. 
Berzinsiki admonished against `the notion of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as 
synonymous' (Quoted in Gendzier, p. 596). He and Scowcroft cautioned against 
expanding the number of states identified as sponsoring terrorism, predicting that this 
would increase the number of enemies. Brezinski and Scowcroft also urged the 
administration not to use the word `war' but, instead, to refer to a `prolonged, 
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international campaign against terrorism' (p. 597). Despite this advice, the White 
House was determined to use the word `war' (war against terror) and expanded the 
number of states it identified as sponsoring terrorism. 
Initially, two approaches to the war against terror were considered by the Bush 
Administration. The first one was a unilateral approach led by Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld. The second one was a pro-multilateral approach led by the former 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell. In the White House, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(now the World Bank President) Paul Wolfowitz argued that the United States should 
engage in war against both Afghanistan and Iraq because Saddam already had WMD 
(weapons of mass destruction), as exemplified by his use of poison gas on his own 
people in the 1980, s. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, opposed Wolfowitz, explaining 
that launching a war against both Afghanistan and Iraq would cause the U. S-led 
international coalition to collapse (Daalder& Lindsay, 2003). Powell lacked support 
for his position. In his first term, Bush was influenced by the American Neo- 
Conservatives in the White House. (Now in his second term, current Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, Bush's former National Security Advisor, has significant 
influence on Bush). 
As part of the war on terror, on September 20,2001, before the U. S. invasion 
of Afghanistan, President Bush gave the Taliban regime an ultimatum. To avoid war, 
the Taliban had to hand-over Osama Bin-Laden and close all terrorist camps (The 
White House, September 2001). The Taliban refused. On October 7,2001, the United 
States began the war on Afghanistan. President Bush emphasized that the war on 
terror would not end in Afghanistan, `Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is 
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broader' (The White House, October 2001). Sammon (2002) believes that this speech 
by President Bush was a veiled threat that Iraq was next. During the war in 
Afghanistan, the United States began to raise the issue of WMD in Iraq. In his State 
of Union speech on January 29,2002, President Bush said, `Iraq continues to flaunt its 
hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to 
develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. ' (The White 
House, January 2002) 
In a joint news conference with the French President Jacques Chirac, President 
Bush used a phrase that became known as the `Bush doctrine' in the war on terror- 
'You are either with us or against us' (The White House, November 2002). Bush's 
proposal for the formation of an international coalition against terrorism and the later 
speeches that addressed the war on terror, such as Bush's `Axis of Evil' speech, were 
unacceptable to some countries and publicly criticized by many governments, like 
France (Palmer, 2003). The French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, reacted to the 
`Axis of Evil' speech in an interview with the French Radio, saying, `Today we are 
threatened by a simplistic quality in US policy that reduces all the problems of the 
world to the struggle against terrorism. It is not properly thought out. ' (BBC, 
February 2002) 
President Bush was also criticized by some American figures, who disagreed 
with his position that those unwilling to participate with America in its war against 
terrorism were actually on the side of the terrorists. The Democratic, Senator Fritz 
Hollings of South Carolina agreed with Bush's foreign policy but disagreed with the 
way Bush proposed to wage it. 
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The President's policy is correct - but his implementation miserable ... 
One 
would hope that, with an imminent threat, the Congressional leadership is 
corralled quietly, briefed, and allies consulted for whatever action is taken. On 
the contrary, this President started off by threatening friends and foes alike 
blabbing, 'You are either with us or against us, ' 'We are the world superpower, ' 
'I don't need the U. N., ' 'I don't need the Congress. ' He seemed totally oblivious 
to the fact that he is going in two different directions at the same time. 
(Hollings, October 2002) 
There were other ramifications of Bush's strategy. Immanuel Wallerstein 
(2002), a senior research scholar at Yale University describes Europe's negative 
reaction to the `Axis-of-Evil' speech as Europe's strongest negative reaction to U. S. 
foreign policy since the Second World War: 
It should be noted that, since 1945, there has never been so strong a negative 
European reaction to an announced US policy than after the `axis of evil' 
speech. Not only the French, but the Germans, the Spaniards, the Swedes and 
even major British figures spoke out loudly and strongly in negative terms, 
describing the project as folly (Wallerstein, 2002, p. 97). 
The European reaction can be attributed to concerns over the extension of the 
U. S. war on terror to many places around the world. Crockatt (2003) referred to 
concerns over Bush's unilateral and aggressive (preemptive strike) foreign policy. 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia adopted a position which was opposed to 
American unilateralism. Ambassador Al-Tayeb (author's interview, 2004) from the 
Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs speculates that U. S. unilateral foreign policies 
would lead to an emergence of a European power to counter U. S. hegemony. Since 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, most of the countries of that region 
have come under American influence; most of the countries in Western Europe have 
become, over time, critical of U. S. unilateralism and intervention in European affairs. 
In the Middle East, there were very specific understandings of the effects of 
Bush's foreign policy. Abdulkarim Al-Dokhayel (author's interview, 2004), from the 
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Politics Department at the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia considers 
Europe as the only bloc that can possibly dissuade the United States from conducting 
unilateral actions and, instead working within the framework of the United Nations, 
especially after the war in Iraq. The potential role of Europe is of utmost importance 
to the Arab states in the Middle East as they believe that the region has been the focal 
point of the U. S. war on terror. Al-Dokhayel described two different approaches of 
European elites toward the U. S. war on terror. The first one is based on morality and 
international law. The European ethical perspective of the war on terror requires 
adequate evidence before accusing or taking action against any states and any action 
taken should be sanctioned by the United Nations. The second approach is based on 
the sense of Europe's duty or loyalty to support its partnership with the United States. 
The advocates of this approach view the European relationship with the United States 
as a substantial one, exemplifying America's role in Europe after the Second World 
War. The United States helped Western Europe to recover and restore their 
economies through the `Marshall Plan' and stood up against the Soviet threat (Al- 
Dokhayel). Therefore, they believe that Europe should support the United States in its 
war against tenor, even without U. N. authorization. 
Raed Gonnoly (author's interview, 2004) from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs indicates that U. S. unilateralism has made it subject to internal and 
international pressures. International and domestic pressure on the Bush 
Administration increased after the war started in Afghanistan. The goal was to limit 
the war on terrorism to the domain of the United Nations. International pressure was 
applied mainly by France, Germany, and Russia. Domestic pressure came from some 
55 
prominent U. S. politicians, mainly Democratic Senators, such as Patrick Leahy, 
Edward Kennedy, and Tom Daschle. Senator Leahy, urging U. N. support for war in 
Iraq, warned against weakening the United Nations. 
The President also failed to address a key concern that divides Americans, that 
divides us from many of our closest European allies, that divides our allies 
from each other, and that divides the UN Security Council ... without the 
support of key allies on the UN Security Council, we risk seriously weakening 
the Security Council's future effectiveness and our own ability to rally 
international support- not only to prevent this war and future wars, but to deal 
with other global threats like terrorism (U. S. Senator Patrick Leahy, March 
2003). 
While the Bush Administration focused on the war in Afghanistan, a series of 
anthrax attacks were apparently took place in Washington D. C., New York, and 
Florida, killing five out of 19 people who were infected (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). 
This time, unlike the expectations that jumped to conclusion accusing Arabs and 
Muslims of being behind the anthrax attacks, the investigation had found that a native 
American who had access to the Pentagon's high-grade biological weapons was 
behind the attacks. According to Arasli (2005), since 9/11, the activities of the right- 
wing militants in America have increased, where the numbers of arms are being 
heaping up. The `Citizen Militants' organization has the largest number of followers 
among all right-wing militants in the United States. In the early 2004, it was estimated 
that `Citizen Militants' has approximately 50,000 members distributed in `structural 
units' in 50 states. Moreover, approximately 137 of these units have connections with 
other radical groups in America like Ku-Klux-Klan and Aryan Nations (Timothy Mc 
Veigh who committed the Oklahoma bombing in 1995, which caused the death of 168 
people and over 500 injuries, was a member of the Aryan Nations) (Arasli). That is to 
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say, that in the time the Bush Administration excessively focuses on the external phase 
of the war on terror, it almost omits the internal phase. 
The Middle East is the focal point of the American war on terror because of the 
high degree of anti-American ism and anti-secularism that exists in the region. The 
United States seems determined to reform the entire region to satisfy its interests. This 
was launched by former U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and later reiterated in the 
U. S. initiative for `The Greater Middle East. ' The main goal is democratic reform in 
the Middle East. This will be discussed in chapter four. 
Saudi perceptions of the war on terror vary. However, Saudi commentators 
like Alghmadi, Al-Tayeb, Al-Shamlan, Fadel, and Mogaiad (author's interviews, 
2004-2005) believe that the Bush Administration has actually failed in the war on 
terror. According to them, the world has become less secure than it was before 9/11. 
Al-Tayeb, considers the U. S. failure to restore security and stability in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq as a failure of the American model that the Bush Administration 
sought to apply and promote in the region. Mogaiad argues that Bush's foreign policy 
has failed to quell terrorism. Iraq has become another Afghanistan, a breeding ground 
for terrorist groups which export terrorist cells to neighbouring countries. In the 
bombings that took place in Jordan in November 2005, one of the culprits admitted 
coming from Iraq. Mogaiad added that terrorist groups have found it easier to recruit 
terrorists from the countries around Iraq, indicating that the number of terrorist 
operations has increased. 
Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) asserts that the Bush Administration has, 
along with fighting terrorism, (Al-Qaedah in particular, promoted for social change, 
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economic development, and democracy in the Middle East as the administration 
believes that reform is one of the important means to fight terrorism. Reform will 
defeat what the administration calls the culture of `intolerant violence. ' However, Al- 
Rawaf believes that reform and developments cannot be imposed by the United States. 
Changes will require the willingness of the people of the Middle East. Saudi 
perceptions of Bush's foreign policy and American foreign policy in general will be 
presented in greater detail in Chapter Six (the findings) and Seven (reflections on U. S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East). 
The Bush wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have provoked anger in the Arab and 
Muslim world. The people in that world are religiously tied to the Middle East which 
is the homeland of the Muslim holy cities. Bush's immediate reaction to the events of 
9/11, with his focus on the Middle East, has exacerbated the emotions and ideology 
that fuel terrorism. His `heavy-handed' approach has seemingly failed to accomplish 
an end to terror. 
The next chapter presents a background of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East. In order to understand the complexities of U. S. /Middle East politics, one must 
consider U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East since the beginning of its engagement 
in the politics of the region. Evaluating the broader contours of U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East provides a unique perspective through Saudi eyes. Has the U. S. 
approach contributed to the growth of terror in the style that we have witnessed since 
9/11? There is considerable literature on the subject of U. S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East, but scholars are divided over the reasons why terrorism has emerged in 
the 9/11 context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
American foreign policy is of course complex, as it seeks to address competing 
interests and trends, which span different parts of the globe. However, one constant 
has been the support for the state of Israel. This in turn has made Israel and U. S. 
support for it a key factor in Middle East politics. It is U. S. foreign policy at that 
region that is to be investigated in this chapter. 
Any contemporary research on such foreign policy requires reflection on the 
historic conduct of America since the beginning of its direct involvement in the region 
after the Second World War. After 1945, the Middle East became one of the most 
important arenas in world politics. It was an area into which the United States was 
inevitably drawn as a superpower. There are numerous correlations between previous 
and present American policies. One must consider the events taking place since the 
early 20`h Century - the role of Washington in the creation of the state of Israel, 
support for Israel during the wars against its Arab neighbours, and the use of the U. S. 
veto in the United Nations against resolutions condemning Israel. The actions of the 
United States established a base for the current negative perceptions of Bush which 
exist throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
This chapter examines American foreign policy in the Middle East, analyzing 
the actions and positions taken by the United States and how U. S. conduct have 
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seemingly impacted upon contemporary terrorist groups. Scholars, like Sardar (2002), 
An Nairn (2002), and Gendzier (2002) believe, albeit in different ways, that the past 
conduct of American foreign policy has actually been responsible for the growth of 
radical terrorist organizations. 
Currently, the American-Saudi relationship may be considered as one of the 
strongest in the region, after that of the Israeli relationship. The United States has 
seemingly picked and chosen its partners for the purpose of maintaining its hegemony 
throughout the region. In this respect again the Saudi case is central to my argument. 
The period in which the most obvious anti-Americanism took root in the Arab 
and Muslim worlds was after the Second World War. The Truman Administration 
played a significant role in the creation of the Jewish state of Israel in the land of 
Palestine. Since that time, the level of anti-Americanism has increased in reaction to 
American support for Israel against its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians during a 
series of wars in 1948,1967, and 1973. The United States has also been blamed by 
Arabs and Muslims for adopting a `double standard' in the way it condones Israeli 
action against Palestinian civilians and yet condemns the actions of Palestinian 
militants. The level of anti-Americanism in the region has increased sharply after 9/11 
in reaction to the U. S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The current Bush Administration is aware of this trend in anti-Americanism. 
The issue has been the subject of intense debate by policymakers and is widely 
discussed in the American media. In June 2003, the Department of State assigned an 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy to visit some Arab and Muslim countries to 
recommend new approaches for U. S. public diplomacy. Part of the task of this 
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Advisory Group was to conduct interviews and surveys about public diplomacy in the 
Middle East, where many of the participants' answers were seen as critical to an 
understudy U. S. foreign policy. The report stated, 
Surveys indicate that much of the resentment toward America stems from real 
conflicts and displeasure with policies, including those involving the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq. But our mandate is clearly limited to 
issues of public diplomacy, where we believe a significant new effort is 
required. (Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and 
Muslim World, 2003, p. 9) 
The report of the Advisory Group was submitted to the Committee on 
Appropriations in the U. S. House of Representatives in 2003 and, it should be noted, 
included results which help support some of the claims investigated in this thesis. The 
report stated that `Hostility toward America has reached shocking levels ... In our 
trips to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, France, Morocco and Senegal, we were struck by the 
depth of opposition to many of our policies' (pp. 15,18). The report indicated that in 
a survey in 2002, only 6% of the people in Egypt `had a favorable view' of the United 
States, and in the same year, a survey conducted by Gallup found that only 7% of 
Saudi Arabians had a `very favorable view' of the United States. This official report, 
in part, reflected the negative perceptions of the United States in parts of the Middle 
East and provides some evidence that Saudi perceptions are a useful case study and 
may be taken as a valid representation of attitudes in the Arab states for the shared 
features which were elaborated in the methodology. 
Very negative Middle Eastern perceptions of the United States (as the 
American Advisory Group found on the trip) were not formed in reaction to a single 
U. S. action or a specific U. S. Administration. Many people in the Middle East believe 
that, even before the war on terror, there were a series of policies that generated anti- 
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Americanism. However, the post-9/11 period, including the war on terror, seem to 
have inflamed and added to the existing host of negative perceptions. Kolko (2002) 
considers the relationship between the historic and current conduct of American 
foreign policy. For example, he argues that: 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has reacted to events 
and crises as they occur and wherever they arise, without reflection or wisdom, 
and it has gone from one blunder to another. Yet it has never been more 
confused or dangerous, both to itself and to the world, than at the present 
moment .... 
The inevitable legacies of a half century of U. S. policies and 
adventures in the Middle East have returned both to haunt the United States 
and to plunge it into a crisis (pp. 85,137). 
The United States had inherited from the British Empire a tumultuous situation 
in the Middle East. The British had ruled the Middle East during the 19`h and first half 
of the 20th centuries and controlled the routes to the British colonies on the Indian 
peninsula. After the Second World War, particularly, the end of the British mandate 
in Palestine in 1947, the United States inherited the Anglo-French `hegemonies' in the 
Middle East because both countries were ravaged by the war. The United States and 
the Soviet Union emerged as the post-war superpowers, seeking to extend their 
influence in the Middle East. After Suez crisis of 1956, the United States became the 
predominant power in the Middle East. Since that time, according to Ambassador 
Mohammad Al-Tayeb from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (author's interview, 
2004), the Middle East has been a vital zone for the United States. It has become 
committed to three pillars in the region: Israel, oil, and regional stability. 
The Middle East became a crucial arena for two reasons. First, U. S. 
policymakers supported the creation of Israel (which was achieved in 1948) and then 
acted to ensure the security and stability of the newborn state as it faced war with the 
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surrounding Arab states which were struggling to nip the Jewish state in the bud. 
Second, in 1948, the United States began to import oil, and the government became 
increasingly concerned about `oil resources. ' At that time, American and European oil 
companies were exploring huge oil reserves in the Gulf region while the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was inflamed by the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 (Leonardo, 2003). The 
situation required frequent intervention by the United States in order to soothe 
tensions between the Arabs and the Israelis. The goal was mostly to accommodate the 
Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) 
and in to prevent the opportunity for a Soviet presence. For example, in reaction to 
the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, the Soviet Union threatened to 
engage militarily using air missiles (Shlaim, 2004). The United States wanted to quell 
any Soviet military intervention. President Eisenhower condemned the invasion and 
demanded a ceasefire and quick withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian lands by all 
occupation forces. In his memoirs, The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), President 
Eisenhower said, 
Secretary Dulles will warn the Ambassador that while, of course, we would 
hate to create misunderstandings and needless passion in this country over this 
question, at this moment he should inform his government that no 
considerations of partisan politics will keep this government from pursuing a 
course dictated by justice and international decency in the circumstances, and 
that it will remain true to its pledges under the United Nations (p. 332). 
It is worth saying here that, since President Eisenhower, the United States has 
exerted influence, not control, over the Israelis. This is an important distinction. For 
example, during the Second Gulf War, the United States used its influence to deter 
Israel from retaliating after a series of air missile attacks by Iraq in order to prevent a 
crisis within the international coalition and an expected uprising in the Arab and 
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Muslim world. However, this was unusual situation. All pressures made by previous 
American administrations did not overstep Israeli national interests, especially in 
security issues (Crockatt, 2003). 
One of the reasons of the frequent intervention to soothe the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was to prevent a substantial Soviet presence in the Middle East. In 1958, Iraqi 
Arab Nationalists, led by Abdulkarim Qasim overthrew the monarch of Iraq who was 
a member of the Baghdad Pact- joining with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to prevent the 
expansion of communism into the Middle East. Qasim came to power with an anti- 
American and anti-British agenda. While the Qasim regime was pro-Soviet (but not 
Communist), the Iraqi Communist party was very powerful and imposed its influence 
upon Qasim (Slater, 1990). In 1963, Qasim was killed in coup d'etat and his regime 
was overthrown by the Ba'ath party led by Abdulsalam Arif. King Hussein of Jordan 
mentioned later that he, along with the CIA, had supported the Ba'athist coup d'etat 
(Ali, 2004). 
Abdulaziz Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004), the Saudi Ambassador in 
Kuwait and former member of the Saudi Consultative Council Majlis Ash Shura 
(Parliament), believes that the geo-strategic importance of the Middle East is an 
influential factor in U. S. foreign policy for three reasons. First, the Middle East 
contains approximately 70% of the world's oil reserves (90% of it in the Gulf region). 
Second, the Middle East is considered the geographic centre of the world, with 
geodetic lines between the east and the west intersecting as do the world trade lines, 
passing through the Suez Canal between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. 
Third, the region has geo-military importance for the United States, providing strategic 
64 
locations that enable the movement of troops and supplies for any action in Africa, 
Europe, or Asia, such as during the war in Afghanistan (AI-Fayez, author's interview, 
2004) 
In late 2001, Qatar granted the United States a military base at Al-Odaid, one 
of the best facilities in the world. Qatar is a Gulf state. In September 2002 and before 
the war in Iraq, the United States moved its Central Command Headquarter from 
Tampa, Florida to the Al-Odaid base in Qatar. Ambassador Jameel Merdad (author's 
interview, 2004) from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that the Al-Odaid 
base was one of the major factors that had led to a U. S. victory in the war against Iraq 
in 2003. The presence of U. S. troops in the region guarantees quick action against any 
threat to American interests in the region, especially the security of Israel and oil. The 
security of Israel requires an American guarantee of Israel's superiority over its Arab 
neighbours, like the arms airlift to Israel during the 1973 War against Egypt and Syria 
which will be addressed later in this section. Oil, on the other hand, requires a smooth 
flow of the resources. 
Ambassador Merdad (author's interview, 2004) asserted that all U. S. 
administrations had input into the Arab-Israeli conflict because Israel itself is 
`American made, ' referring to the American role in the creation of the Israeli state. 
Thus, according to Merdad, the United States has been a key player. The U. S. role in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict has been shaped and utilized by pro-Israeli and Zionist 
lobbies within America. According to a number of specialists, including Bamyeh 
(2003), those lobbies have successfully integrated and interplayed within the cultural, 
social, economic, and political fabric of the United States. Critics believe that those 
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lobbies have a major influence on the American media and hence public opinion 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Hence, criticism of Israel by officials was deemed 
unacceptable. The highly organized Zionist and pro-Israeli lobbies consider any anti- 
Israeli position to be one of anti-Semitism (Curtiss & Hanley, 2005). Among these 
lobbies is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), considered as one 
of the most powerful pro-Israeli lobbies in the United States. It was described by 
Congressional members and their staffs, according to study by Fortune magazine in 
1997, as the second most powerful lobby in America only after the American 
Association of Retired People (AARP). In March 2005, another study sponsored by 
the National Journal, ranked AIPAC second `tied' with AARP in a hierarchy of 
influence (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). 
Zionist and pro-Israeli lobbies seek in this version of politics to discredit 
officials who attempt to criticize Israel or American support for Israel. These include 
former Congress members, Paul Findley, Cynthia McKinney, and Earl Hillard. In his 
book They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby (2001), 
former Congressman Paul Findley (Illinois) mentioned how the pro-Israeli and Zionist 
lobbies mobilized opposition against him inside the Congress and in Illinois in 
reaction to his demand for a balanced American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This, 
according to him, led to his defeat in the election of November 1982 (Findley, 2001). 
Whatever the nuances of the Findley case, historically, Zionist lobbies have 
played a major role in gaining support for a Jewish state in the land of Palestine. 
According to Ahmed (1990), the efforts of Zionist leaders in America and Britain led 
to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Zionism was founded by Theodor Herzl after the 
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First Zionist Congress in 1897 which launched the World Zionist Organization 
(Berger, 1991). In 1991, the United States and Israel succeeded in abolishing the 1975 
U. N. General Assembly resolution 3379 that equated Zionism and racism. According 
to the United Nations website (1991), the resolution stated that the General Assembly 
`Decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 
November 1975. ' Abdulati AI-Sayad (author's interview, 2004) from the Prince Naif 
University for Security Science in Riyadh attributes anti-Americanism in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds to `an American partiality to Zionism. ' 
The strategy of the predominant Israeli and Zionist lobbies in the United States 
are different than the strategy of other ethnic lobbies in America because they promote 
what they believe are mutual interests between the United States and Israel. In fact, 
they discuss issues relating to Israel as `internal' U. S. issues instead of those of foreign 
policy, portraying the security and the mutual interests and values between Israel and 
the United States as one undivided entity. The discourse of the Israeli and Zionist 
lobbies tend to present Judaism and Christianity as the only religious bases of the 
American culture. For example, in his article, Israel American and the Arab Delusion 
(2001), Daniel Pipes said, `As Muslims, these Middle Easterners fail to understand the 
emotional resonance of a common Bible and a host of Judeo-Christian features' (p. 
28). 
Zionists and pro-Israeli lobbies in America played a major role in promoting 
Israel as an American ally who could `save' U. S. interests in the region, especially 
after the Israeli victory in the Six Days War against its Arab neighbours in 1967. 
Since the Six Days War, relations between the United States and Israel shifted from 
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that of a superpower state and a lesser state to that of two partner states (A1-Ghamdi, 
author's interview, 2004). This change can be attributed to the overwhelming victory 
of Israel against the Arab nations engaged in the Six Days War, proving as argued by 
some American policymakers after the war, that Israel had the ability to defend itself 
and protect American interests. This notion of Israel became widely supported by 
American policymakers after Israel defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Days 
War. However, as explained by Saleh Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), from 
the King Saud University in Riyadh, the security and superiority of Israel has been 
sustained and guaranteed militarily by the United States in order to maintain the 
balance of power in the region. After the Israeli success in 1967, unlike before where 
American supplies to Israel had been limited to `defensive weapons, ' the United States 
began to supply Israel with offensive weapons, like Phantom jets (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
1998). 
The oil crisis in the 1970s after the Arab embargo following the 1973 War 
consolidated the notion of American reliance on Israel as a major ally in the region. 
Because it was only after this crisis that the United States created emergency plans to 
seize the oil fields in the Gulf region. Israel was a central base in the Pentagon plans. 
After the oil crisis (the issue of oil will be dealt with in the next chapter), keeping a 
smooth flow of oil supplies with reasonable prices became an important issue for all 
U. S. administrations. To achieve this goal, they sought to maintain stability in the 
region by ensuring Israel's superiority and protecting `friendly' regimes from the 
threat of regimes that antagonize the United States, such as Nasser's regime in Egypt 
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in the 1960's-1970's and the Khomeini regime that came to power in 1979 (Crockatt, 
2003). 
Some Saudi experts, such as (Al-Khathlan, author's interview, 2004) argue that 
both oil and the security of Israel have been the main reasons for the American 
presence in the Middle East. Abdullah Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), from 
King Saud University, argues that a clash of interests in the United States between the 
pro-Israeli lobbies and the oil lobbies regarding U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
would never happen due to `mutual' interests. However, the oil lobbies have always 
pressured administrations, to seek `appeasement' between the Arabs and Israelis to 
avoid the escalation of animosity. The U. S. oil industry would be a major loser in any 
further wars between the two parties. 
During the Cold War, Washington sought to maintain regional allegiance to 
the United States. Many Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, played a major 
role in keeping communism at bay, defeating the Soviet army in Afghanistan. In that 
struggle, the Arab and Muslim Mujahidins played a leading role in the guerilla war 
against the Soviets. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning 
of American uni-polarity, the United States began engaging in clashes with regimes 
that had been considered `friendly' during the Cold War (Al-Jahni, author's interview, 
2005). 
After the end of the Cold War, Washington became concerned about 
consolidating and insuring American hegemony in the region. While using different 
strategies, the main approach was that of the `Carrot and Stick' as elaborated upon by 
Ambassador Merdad (author's interview, 2004). According to Middle Eastern and 
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Western specialists in American foreign policy, such as Othman Al-Rawaf (author's 
interview, 2004), former member of Ash Shura (Parliament) in Saudi Arabia, in some 
influential circles and among some theoreticians in the West, like Samuel Huntington 
the author of Clash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order (2002), 
suggestions were made about Islam being a threat to the western world order, 
replacing the previous threat of the Soviet Union (This issue is discussed in greater 
details in Chapter four). 
So, we have identified the themes of oil and Israeli security as predominant 
themes in U. S. foreign policy. This is at least, an Arab perception, let us explore these 
further and the general history of U. S. -Middle East relations. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a major cause of anti-Americanism in the 
Arab and Muslim world. The United States has been a significant variable in the 
equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, playing a major role in the creation of Jewish 
state, helping it survive, and condoning its expansion at the expense of Arab 
neighbours. 
Jewish emigration to Palestine started in the 19 `h century with the full support 
of Great Britain and the United States. Those countries exerted pressure on the 
Ottoman Empire to facilitate the emigration process. Jewish and Zionist lobbies in 
both countries played a major role in the making of the British and U. S. foreign 
policies toward Palestine, demanding a homeland in Palestine based on Biblical 
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claims. The United States actually went beyond that by helping finance the Jewish 
emigration (Heikel, 1996). 
When the First World War broke out, the British government promised the 
nationalistic Arab movements in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon (except Iraq, those 
were Arab states coming out of the area known as Greater Syria) to help them restore 
the Arabic national Khilafa over the Arabic lands, if they allied with Britain and 
staged a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. When the war was over, however, Britain 
broke the promise. Immediately after the First World War, Britain and France divided 
the Arabic lands according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916: Syria and Lebanon 
were placed under French mandate, and the Palestinian land was placed under British 
mandate along with Egypt (Kubursi, 1996). In 1917, Britain announced the Balfour 
Declaration, promising the Zionists that Britain would `view with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' (Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004). The declaration caused a massive Arab uprising in Palestine 
and led to clashes between them and the British-backed Jewish minority. At that time, 
the Palestine population was 91% Arab and 9% Jewish. Approximately half of the 
Jewish population consisted of new immigrants. The United States backed the Balfour 
Declaration and publicly announced its support for the creation of a Jewish 
`homeland' in Palestine. 
On May 27,1916, President Woodrow Wilson announced that, `every people 
has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they live' (Ahmed, 1990, p. 1). In 
his address to the U. S. Senate on January 8,1918, Wilson stated his Fourteen Points 
regarding the issue of self-determination. In point five, Wilson said, `The interests of 
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the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined' (Ahmed, p. 2). Point twelve stated, `The 
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development' (p. 2). Of course, Palestine was one of the nationalities under the 
Turkish rule. 
The first direct intervention by the United States was made by President 
Wilson in 1919. He demanded a leading role for the United States in the Middle East 
after the First World War. The Zionist lobbies in both England and America sought to 
gain support for a Jewish state in the Palestinian land. The drafting of the Balfour 
Declaration was the product of mutual efforts by Zionist leaders in America and 
Britain. President Wilson sent the `King-Crane Commission' to Palestine to find out 
about the wishes of the Arab people for `self-determination. ' The Commission 
recommended against the creation of a Jewish state as it would interfere with the 
national rights of the Arabs in Palestine. The legal adviser to President Wilson, David 
Miller, told the President that `self-determination' in Palestine would fail if a Jewish 
state was created because the Jewish people constituted only 10% of the population 
(Ahmed, 1990). On March 2,1919, after a meeting with the delegation of the Jewish 
Congress in Chicago, President Wilson denied any commitment to the `self- 
determination' of an existing population in the land of Palestine. Moreover, he 
announced that he was `persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence 
of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the 
foundations of a Jewish commonwealth' (Ahmed, 1990, p. 15). On June 30,1922, the 
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U. S. House of Representatives passed the Fish Resolution, advocating for the Balfour 
Declaration. Several months later, on September l1 `h, the U. S. Congress passed 
Resolution 322 in favor of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. This was then 
approved and signed by President Warren Harding (Ahmed). 
On September 29,1922, the League of Nations approved the British mandate 
over Palestine. The Palestinians opposed this action. On December 3,1924, during 
the Anglo-American Convention, the United States announced its recognition of the 
British mandate over Palestine. Most importantly, it was agreed (as stated in article 
seven) that Britain would consult with the United States in regards to the status of 
Palestine. Later, in the 1940's, U. S. policymakers referred to the Anglo-American 
Convention of 1924 as a legal basis for the U. S. involvement regarding the Jewish 
emigration to Palestine and the creation of the Jewish state (Ahmed, 1990). 
During the large Jewish migrations of the 1940s, many wanted to migrate to 
America. The U. S. Department of Labor announced that 400,000 immigrants could be 
absorbed, but Jewish people were excluded. A Jewish U. S. Congressman, Chaplain 
Klausner, backed the exclusion, saying that they `must be forced to go to Palestine' 
(Bennis, 2003, p. 31). The United States paid $130 million for the costs of the Jewish 
migration to Palestine. These two actions, excluding Jewish immigrants from the 
United States and financing their relocation to Palestine are indicative of America's 
crucial role in creating the Jewish state in Palestine (Bennis, 2003). 
At the beginning of the Second World War, and as a consequence of the 
Palestinian Arab uprising in 1936, the British government declared in a White Paper in 
1939 the termination of the Jewish migration and land purchases in Palestine. In 
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reaction, Zionist organizations helped Jewish immigrants to get into Palestine illegally 
(Berger, 1991). 
In opposition to the British shift, Israeli and Zionist terrorist organizations like 
Irgun (whose leader Manheim Begin, later became a Prime Minister of Israel) and 
Stem began to launch attacks against British targets in Palestine. The King David 
Hotel was bombed on July 22,1946, causing the deaths of 91 people, including 28 
British officials. Lord Mayone, British Minister of State was assassinated in Cairo in 
1944. U. N. special envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte, was killed in 1947, and there were 
other attacks and kidnappings against British troops. 
Israeli terrorist organizations also attacked Palestinian villages and suburbs. 
Irgun massacred the unarmed people of Deir Yassin on April 9,1948, causing the 
deaths of approximately 250 people, including women and children (Dumke, 2005). 
As a result of the escalated violence and the high cost of casualties, the British 
government announced on December 3,1947 its plan to end its mandate over 
Palestine by May 15,1948. It asked the United Nations to take over its 
responsibilities in resolving the conflict (Habib, 2003). 
During these times, American political intervention in the Middle East was 
increasing. Immediately after the Second World War, during the Potsdam meeting, 
President Truman sent a memorandum to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
where he asked for a meeting to discuss the issue of Palestine. In the memorandum, 
Tnunan said the following: 
There is a great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic 
restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of 
May, 1939, continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most 
interested in Palestine and in the Jewish problem (Truman, 1956, p. 143). 
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On April 2,1947, the British Government presented a request to the U. N. 
General Assembly to resolve the Palestine problem. On May 14`h, the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) created in response to the British request, 
`agreed' that the British mandate over Palestine should be ended before declaring the 
independence of two separate states (Arab and Jewish). The committee also agreed to 
keep Jerusalem under the `trusteeship' of the United Nations (Truman, 1956). After 
British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, the United States replaced the British as 
guardian and supporter for the establishment of a Jewish state. It backed U. N 
Resolution 181, dividing the land of Palestine into two states, 55% to become a Jewish 
state, and 45% to become a Palestinian Arab state. At that time, Jews owned only 7% 
of the land of Palestine (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). President Truman's support for 
Israel was opposed by Secretary of State George Marshal, who believed that a biased 
role would negatively affect the U. S. image in the region and its relations with the 
Arab regimes (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998). According to Bennis (2003), in November 
1947, President Truman ordered the U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations to ensure 
that countries who received U. S. financial aid voted for the resolution. Among those 
countries was the Philippines, which, through its representative in the United Nations, 
opposed the proposed resolution. 
We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United 
Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is 
clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspiration of the people of Palestine. 
The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept 
such responsibility. (Bennis, p. 32-33) 
Within two days of that statement, `a phone call' from the U. S. President to the 
head of the Philippines government resulted in their being called home and the 
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Philippines government backed the U. N. partition resolution on November 29,1947. 
The Philippines government was dependant on economic aid, and the United States 
used that leverage. In his memoirs, Years of Trials and Hope (1956), President 
Truman complained about the heavy pressures exerted on him by Zionist leaders. 
I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White 
House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist 
leaders- actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats- 
disturbed me and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure 
sovereign nations in favorable votes in the General Assembly (Truman, 1956, 
pp. 168-169). 
In May 1948, the Jewish people in Palestine declared Israel to be an 
independent state. Eleven minutes after that proclamation, the United States was the 
first country to recognize the newborn state with full diplomatic relations (Truman, 
1956). Since then, the United States has been considered by some Arab leaders as an 
`enemy' and by other leaders as the holder of the key to solving the conflict. The 
Unite States remains to this day in the paradoxical position of being part of the 
problem and part of the solution (Pipes, 2001). 
Arab leaders in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan reacted to Israel's declaration of 
independence by sending their armies to Palestine. Also, many Arab states sponsored 
and financed groups of Mujahidins from the Arab world. The Arab armies faced the 
Israeli army, which was more advanced and better armed, and the Arabs lost the war. 
As a result of the 1948 War, the Israeli army occupied 78% of the Palestinian lands, 
not 55% which was part of the original plan. This forced 750,000 Palestinians to leave 
their homes land. Most of the displaced Palestinians still live in refugee camps 
(Bennis, 2003). 
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After the war, U. N. Resolution 194 declared the `right of return' and 
compensation for the 750,000 Palestinian refugees. The Israelis did not accept the 
`right of return' or withdrawal to the boundaries of the U. N. 55% plan. In 1949, (a 
year after the Arab-Israeli War), the U. S. government allowed tax-exempt status for 
donations to the state of Israel, encouraging the American people to donate generously 
to Israel (Bennis, 2003). 
The creation of the Israeli state in Palestine created a geographical partition 
between the Arab states. It became a barrier between the Arab states of Asia and the 
Arab states of Africa, undermining any effort to unite the Arab states, like the unity 
between Egypt and Syria `The United Arab Republican' that was created in 1958 and 
dissolved in1961 (Heikel, 1990). 
The Cold War and Its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Coincidentally, the Arab-Israeli conflict (which was virtually a response to the 
creation of Israel) and the Cold War began in the same period. In 1992, the Madrid 
Conference was the first direct negotiations that gathered all parties of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (all the Arab neighbors of Israel) and witnessed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union before the end of the conference. That is to say that, for any reader, the issue of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict would not be understood without the appreciation of the 
impact that the Cold War had upon the conflict. Therefore, it is important here to 
discuss both issues together, as they are, closely correlated. 
The Cold War actually played a major role in shaping American foreign policy 
in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Middle East was subject to the influence 
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of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers sought to have 
great influence in the region (Garthoff, 1994). In opposition to the U. S. position, the 
Soviet Union supported many Arab countries in the region- Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Syria, and the Palestinians- against the Israelis. Their support was financial and 
military (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004). In response, U. S. strategies used in the 
region comprised the so-called `polarization policy. ' That policy was used to bring 
friendly governments in the region under the American umbrella in order to limit the 
expansion of communism (Merdad, author's interview, 2004). The Cold War required 
the United States to look for allies, especially in the Middle East, to contain 
communism and limit Soviet influence in the region. 
Israel adopted a (i-hisdahut) `non-identification' policy at the beginning of the 
Cold War. Since its creation in 1948 and until after the British-French-Israeli invasion 
of Egypt in 1956, Israel did not align openly with the United States or the Soviet 
Union. However, after 1956, Israel established `close alignment' with the West. The 
USSR joined with the United States in supporting the U. N. resolution for the partition 
of Palestine. After its creation, Israel sought to maintain good relations with the 
USSR in order to maintain the flow of Jewish immigrants from the USSR and eastern 
Europe and because the Israeli Army was using Soviet weapons (Shlaim, 2004). Israel 
had used its `non-identification' policy to exploit support from both the United States 
and the Soviet Union. However, when it came to the point that Israel had to align with 
the United States, it abandoned the `non-identification' policy. In the early 1950s, the 
numbers of Jewish immigrants from the USSR had dropped and the Israelis feared 
losing American sympathy as the Cold War tensions escalated (Shlaim, 2004). 
78 
The first sign of Israel's readiness to abandon the `non-identification' policy 
was its support for the United States during the Korean War in 1950. Since that time, 
the Soviet Union began reshaping its policy toward Israel, leading to a decline in 
relationship and a temporary disconnect for several months in 1953. Relations 
resumed after the death of Stalin in the same year (Shlaim, 2004). The decline in 
relations between the USSR and Israel occurred as a long and strong relationship 
between Egypt and the USSR was developing. The USSR became a major weapons 
supplier to Egypt, especially during the War of 1973, in which Egypt was able to 
recapture parts of the Israeli-held Sinai with the use of the Soviet weapons. 
In 1954, the United States was instrumental in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey 
joining together in a mutual defense alliance which became known as the Baghdad 
Pact (Pinto, 1999). Eisenhower believed that the alliance of the largest states in the 
Middle East would prevent a Soviet presence in the region and secure the oil fields in 
the Gulf. However, it was not long before the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by 
Abdulkarim Qasim and the Iraqi Arab Nationalists. They came to power with an anti- 
American and anti-British agenda. While the Qaism regime was pro-Soviet, it was not 
Communist, but the Iraqi Communist party was very powerful and imposed its 
influence upon Qasim (Slater, 1990). With the backing and influence of the Soviets 
and the Arab Egyptian Nationalist President Jamal Abdulnasser, Iraq withdrew from 
the pact (Pollack, 2003). In 1963, Qasim was killed and his regime was overthrown 
by the Ba'ath party led by Abdulsalam Arif. King Hussein of Jordan mentioned later 
that he and the CIA backed the Ba'athist coup d'etat (Ali, 2004). 
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The Baghdad Pact was not the only American defensive structure against 
Soviet expansion in the region. Indeed, for the United States, Israel was more reliable 
and effective than the members of the Baghdad Pact. Professor Edward Said of 
Columbia University in New York described Israel as `a device for holding Islam- and 
later the Soviet Union, communism - at bay' (Edward Said, quoted in Pipes, 2001, p. 
27). Indeed, the United States had multiple strategies in the Middle East and a number 
of allies. 
During the period of the Shah's regime, Iran was considered by the United 
States to be a first line of defense and a barrier against any Soviet expansion 
threatening the Gulf region. The United States benefited from Iran's strategic location 
for monitoring the Soviet Union. In exchange for the American support needed to 
sustain his regime, the Shah of Iran allowed the United States to set up and use 
intelligence facilities in the northern part of Iran for the purpose of monitoring the 
Soviet Union. During the era of the Shah, Iran was also one of the U. S. 's largest 
sources of oil and one of the world's largest markets for the U. S. weapons industry 
(Leonardo, 2003). The Shah's regime also established relations with Israel. The 
Israelis trained the suppressive Iranian intelligence service (SAVAK), while the 
United States provided training to the Iranian police to protect and sustain the Shah's 
regime from ongoing internal turmoil in Iran. Iran was also a major oil supplier for 
Israel. In fact, Iran was the only Muslim state to have such relationship with Israel 
(Leonardo). 
The Shah's relationship with Israel was one of the factors that led to the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. The relationship with Israel created support for the Shah 
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within the U. S. Congress, boosted by the pro-Israeli lobbies (Habib, 2003). The Shah 
received advanced U. S. weapons, ranking Iran the second military power in the region 
after Israel. The Shah was described by the Nixon Administration as the `policeman 
of the Gulf' d by President Carter as a `pillar of stability' in the region. However, 
the Shah's regime was plagued by internal unrest (Gerges, 1999). After 1971, 
SAVAK members began to receive intensive training courses from the CIA and the 
Israeli Mossad, seeking to sustain the Shah's control. In September 1978, the CIA 
predicted that the Shah's regime would remain in power for at least another decade, 
but the prediction was invalidated a few months later when the Shah was sent into 
exile and replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in early 1979. He 
came to power with anti-American foreign policy and oil prices increased thirty to 
forty percent (Kolko, 2002). 
Not wanting the United States to go unpunished, 52 diplomats from the 
American Embassy were seized as hostages. They were held hostages for 444 days 
and not released until a secret deal was made between the Reagan Administration and 
the Khomeini regime. In what became known as `Iran Contra, ' the CIA secretly sold 
weapons to the Khomeini regime through the Israelis and used the money from the 
sale to aid the Contra rebels in Nicaragua (Berger, 1991). In an interview in the 
Boston Globe in 1982, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States confirmed `that 
Israel's arms shipment to Iran ... coordinated with the 
U. S. government at almost the 
highest of levels' (Quoted in Berger, 1991, p. 5). 
In reaction to the Khomeini revolution, the Carter Administration created the 
`Rapid Deployment Force' to counter a potential Iranian threat against the other Gulf 
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states. All U. S. administrations since Carter have refused to normalize relations with 
the revolutionary regime in Iran. Saudi Ambassador Mohammed Al-Tayeb (author's 
interview, 2004) speculates that the United States will never normalize relations with 
the current Islamic regime in Iran because the ambition of this regime is to improve its 
military capabilities (including its nuclear program) and to export the revolution. 
Since 2002, the Iranian nuclear program has been subject to coflict with the United 
States and Europe. The Iranian government has asserted that the program is only to 
develop the capacity for peaceful nuclear power generation. On April 11,2006, 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad announced that Iran had successfully 
enriched uranium. Washington believes that the Iranian ambition threatens U. S. 
interests in the region and threatens Israel. 
Before the peace agreement Israel was considered by Egypt as the major threat 
to its existence. Thus, the Israeli government sought to influence American-Egyptian 
relations in the early 50's. For example, when the U. S. Information Service at the 
U. S. Embassy in Cairo was bombed in 1954, the Egyptian government announced that 
the attack was orchestrated by Israelis. The Israeli government denied this and 
accused the Egyptians of being anti-Semitic. Later the same year in Israel, the Lavon 
Affair scandal (referring to Defense Minister Penhas Lavon) forced the resignation of 
Lavon as he was accused of authorizing the terrorist attack on Egypt. The Israeli 
Intelligence Service admitted its responsibility in the bombing (Habib, 2003). 
On February 28,1955, the Israeli Army launched `Operation Black Arrow' 
against the Egyptians military headquarters in Gaza City, causing the deaths of 38 
Egyptian soldiers and wounding 31. The attack put pressure on Nasser's regime, 
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leading to a September 1955 arms deal with the Czech government. This was done 
after the U. S. refusal to sell `defensive' weapons to Egypt. According to Shlaim 
(2004), the Israeli operation in Gaza unintentionally led to a new special relationship 
between Egypt and the USSR. The Egyptians realized that they were in `indirect 
confrontation' with the United States, who was supporting Israel. Thus the USSR 
became Egypt's inevitable source of weapons and power against the United States. 
This served the Soviets, who were seeking to extend their influence in the Middle East 
against the United States. 
In response to the Egyptian deal with the Czechs, the U. S. government 
withdrew its financial support for building the High Dam at Aswan. In reaction to the 
decision, the Egyptian President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company. The Egyptian decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company 
prompted the British, French, and Israelis to invade Egypt in 1956 (Pinto, 1999). 
In 1956, the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt was condemned by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. They demanded a ceasefire and quick withdrawal 
from the Egyptian territory. The Soviet Union threatened to engage militarily, using 
air missiles. British motivation for the attack was to prevent the Egyptian government 
from nationalizing the Suez Canal Company because both Britain and France were 
major shareholders. The French government was motivated by the desire to put an 
end to Egyptian support of the nationalist revolutionaries in French-contro lied Algeria. 
Israel took advantage of the British-French military intervention in order to gain 
victory against Egypt. In his reaction to the invasion, President Eisenhower was the 
first and only U. S. president to take a strong position against Israel in the United 
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Nations (Shlaim, 2004). He threatened to suspend Federal Internal Revenue tax-free 
status to donations that pro-Israeli and Jewish organizations sent to Israel if the Israeli 
government refused to comply with U. N. demands to withdraw from the Egyptian- 
occupied lands. The Americans may have taken this position because the Soviets 
threatened to intervene and, more importantly, because the United States wanted an 
end to the British and French hegemony in the region. 
After the war in 1956 war, the United States developed explicit pro-Israeli and 
anti-Arab and Muslim policies, especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Gendzier (2002) indicates that the turning point in American-Israeli relations came in 
1958 when the Israeli lobbies began to have a direct affect on U. S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East. Before the 1956 Suez war, the Israeli government tended to look 
with dissatisfaction toward Jews who preferred to live in America rather than 
migrating to Israel. However, post-1956, the policymakers in Israel realized the 
influence of Jewish-American lobbies and that they could be utilized in the interests of 
Israel. In one year, the contribution of world Jews to the state of Israel increased 5- 
fold- from $100 million in 1956 to $500 million in 1957 (Heikel, 1990). 
President Kennedy was the first U. S. president to describe the `special 
relationship' that existed between America and Israel. He told Israeli Foreign Minister 
Golda Meir that the `special relationship with Israel is comparable only to that which 
it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs, ' and added that `in case of 
invasion the United States would come to the support of Israel' (President Kennedy 
quoted in Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998, p. 1,3). President Carter confirmed the `special 
relationship' and added, `It's absolutely crucial that no one in our county or around the 
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world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the 
right of Israel to exist' (President Carter quoted in Reich, 2003, P. 233). Bar-Siman- 
Tov believes that the American-Israeli relationship has `soft' and `hard' factors. The 
soft factor is based on what Jewish-American and pro-Israeli lobbies in the United 
States tend to describe as mutual values and ideas between the people of United States 
and Israel. The hard factor is based on `strategic interests, ' mostly in favor of the 
security of the Israeli state. The hard factor was consolidated after Israel's 
overwhelming victory against the Arabs in the Six Days War in 1967. After that war, 
the United States began to look at Israel as a reliable U. S ally in the region, in a 
`patron-client relationship, ' and a powerful base against the expansion of communism 
in the Middle East. 
In 1967, the Six Days War was launched against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 
The Israeli government action to invade Sinai was in response to Egypt prohibiting of 
Israeli ships from passing through the Red Sea. As a result of the war, Israel occupied 
East Jerusalem (home to Islam's Third Holiest), the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip 
(which constituted all of the remaining unoccupied Palestinian territory), the Golan 
Heights (from Syria), and Sinai (from Egypt). The Israeli invasion and occupation of 
East Jerusalem intensified the conflict, moving it from an Arab-Israeli issue to one that 
engaged both the Arab and Muslim worlds (Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem is the Third 
Holiest spot in Islam). After a ceasefire agreement was reached, the United Nations 
passed Resolution 242, demanding Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories 
(Gerges, 2003). 
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According to Heikel (1990), U. S. President Lyndon Johnson knew about 
Israel's plan to launch a war against its Arab neighbors. Before the 1967 War, 
communications between the White House and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 
referred to the action using the code-phrase `hunting the turkey' (the `turkey' being 
Egyptian President Nasser). The Johnson Administration believed that the Nasser 
regime in Egypt was a threat not only to Israel but to U. S. interests in the region. On 
May, 25`h, ten days before the war, the United States sent a battalion of Marines to the 
Sixth Fleet for military support of the Israelis. By June 4`h, while a U. S. delegate was 
in Egypt, President Johnson telegraphed the Israeli Defense Minister, giving him the 
green light to start. On June 5th, the Israeli Army began the war. After the war, a State 
Department memo noted: 
Israel has probably done more for the US in the Middle East in relation to 
money and effort invested than any of our so-called allies and friends 
elsewhere around the world since the end of the Second World War. In the Far 
East, we can get almost nobody to help us in Viet Nam. Here, the Israelis won 
the war single-handedly, have taken us off the hook, and have served our 
interests as well as theirs (State Department quoted in Bennis, 2003, p. 39). 
Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict and up until Six Days War in 
the 1967, the United States was committed to an arms embargo of both parties. 
However, according to Bar-Siman-Tov (1998), the United States supplied Israel with 
what it called `defensive weapons, ' and helped them obtain weapons from France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. This shifted after the Israeli success in the 1967 
war. In January 1968, the United States began to look at Israel as a major reliable ally 
in the region, recognizing Israel's military capability to stand up against the dual threat 
of communism and the Arab national movement in the Middle East. The United 
States abrogated its embargo and began to supply Israel with advanced weapons, such 
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as Phantom jets (Bar-Siman-Tov). At the same time, U. S. economic aid to Israel was 
increasing. General U. S. aid to Israel in the four years after the 1967 war was ten 
times more than the aid total from 1947 to 1967. Yearly U. S. aid to Israel reached 
$600 million in 1971, over $2 billion in 1973, and $3 billion at the present time 
(Kolko, 2002). According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), between 1948 and 2003, 
Israel received over $140 billion in U. S. aid. 
The 1967 War was a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Between 1948 
and 1967, all the Arab states opposed recognition of the state of Israel. They 
demanded the return of all Palestinian land and the deportation of the Israeli 
immigrants back to the states from which they had come. After 1967, some Arab 
governments realized that such demands were unattainable and began to demand 
Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders of 1967. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
concerning the borders and the land is very complicated. For example, some Zionists 
and Israelis seek an expansion of the land of Israel, defining Greater Israel as the area 
between the Nile in Egypt and the Euphrates in Iraq (Habib, 2003). 
On October 6,1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched swift attacks, 
Egyptian army crossing into Sinai and the Syrians regaining parts of the occupied 
Golan Heights. U. S. support to Israel during the 1973 War ($2.2 billion of military 
aid) had significantly repaired the coasts and boosted the Israelis. The United States 
provided an arms airlift to Israel, sending the weapons that the Israeli government had 
requested (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). In his book Does America Need a Foreign 
Policy (2002), former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that without the airlift in 
the 1973, `Israel's position would have been much more precarious' (p. 180). In his 
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memoirs, In Search of Identity (1978), former Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat 
stated that during the war, the United States used the Ariesh base in Sinai to supply 
Israel with tanks filled with fuel and ammunition. He also said that the United States 
supplied Israel with satellite pictures, enabling it to launch counterattacks to re-seize 
the Golan Heights and break through the west side of the Suez Canal. 
After American and Soviet intervention on the Israeli and Arab sides, a 
ceasefire agreement was reached. U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put 
pressure on Israel to accept the terms after his crucial negotiations with the Egyptians. 
The Israelis sought to recapture the land liberated by the Egyptians before a ceasefire 
was reached, but the United States, wanting to prevent further Soviet intervention, 
applied heavy pressure upon the Israelis to accept the ceasefire (Kissinger, 2002). The 
Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, admitted that Israel had acquiesced to 
American pressure to sign the ceasefire, saying, `How can you oppose a country that 
sends you ammunition in the morning that you fire in the afternoon? ' (Bennis, 2003, 
p. 44) 
As a consequence of the war, the Israeli economy suffered, and the American 
government offered an increase in economic aid to Israel totaling $8 billion over the 
next four years. Total U. S. aid to Israel between 1948- 1973 had been only $3 billion 
(Bennis, 2003). America's siding with Israel during and after the war provoked the 
people of the Arab and Muslim countries. In reaction to the U. S-Israeli `alliance, ' the 
Arab states launched an oil embargo against the United States and the other countries 
that supported Israel during the war. Immediately, oil prices jumped from $3 a barrel 
to $12, leading to economic recession in the United States and Europe. Also, the Arab 
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states (Arab League) launched a boycott against goods produced and sold by 
companies that dealt with Israel (Fennell, 2002). Because of the U. S. support for 
Israel was unconditional, which negatively impacted upon American interests in the 
region, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were convinced of the 
necessity of alleviating the conflict in the Middle East by playing the role of 
`mediator. ' The goal was to prevent the Soviets from extending their influence in the 
region and to convince the Arabs to lift the oil embargo against the United States (Bar- 
Siman-Tov, 1998). 
The 1973 War revived the Palestinian problem within the United Nations. In 
November, 1974, the United Nations voted 105 to 4 (only the United States, Israel, 
Bolivia, and the Dominican Republican opposed the resolution) to recognize the 
Palestinians' right to `self-determination' and to give the PLO (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization) an observer seat in the United Nations (Bennis, 2003, p. 45). 
In a surprising move in 1977, Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat announced 
in a speech at the Egyptian Parliament that he was willing to go to Israel `for the sake 
ofpeace. ' In his memoirs, In Search of Identity (1978), El-Sadat said that he did this 
to break what he called the vicious circle ` X11 vylall' of the conflict and to prove to 
the world that not only Israel seeks peace, but Arabs as well. That was the first and 
most significant breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict by any Arab leader engaged 
in the peace process. The Israeli government immediately responded by inviting 
President El-Sadat to Israel. In 1978, President Anwar El-Sadat and the Israeli Prime 
Minster, Manheim Begin, accepted an invitation to peace negotiations at Camp David 
in the United States. A peace agreement was signed in the White House in 
89 
Washington, D. C. in 1979 (Jimmy Carter Library, 2003). All the Arab states opposed 
the treaty as it was a unilateral, not a multilateral, agreement between the Egyptians 
and the Israelis. El-Sadat was opposed by many of his people who felt that Egypt had 
been neutralized in the Arab-Israeli conflict by signing a separate peace agreement 
with Israel instead of a comprehensive one between all of the Arab states and Israel. 
Many Egyptians believed that the wars in 1948,1956, and 1967 were over the land of 
Palestine, not the Sinai Peninsula (a main issue in the peace agreement between the 
Egyptians and the Israelis) that has been occupied in 1967. On October 6,1981, El- 
Sadat was assassinated by military members affiliated to an Islamic militia during a 
parade memorializing the 1973 war (Crockatt, 2003). The assassination of El-Sadat 
led to years of unrest in Egypt, which witnessed a trend of terrorism by radical 
militants between the 1980's and 1990's. Several terrorist operations took place 
during these years, such as the assassination of Parliament Speaker Rifaat Al- 
Mahgoub in 1990 and the assassination attempts on former Prime Minister Atif Sedky, 
Minister of Information Safwat Al-Sharif in 1993, and several former interior 
ministers (Al-Nabawy Ismael, Zaki Badr, Hassan Abu Basha, and Hassan Al-Alfy). 
In 1978, the Israeli Army occupied parts of southern Lebanon, to secure its 
territory against attacks by Palestinian militants, mainly the PLO. In reaction, U. N. 
Resolution 425 was passed, demanding `an immediate and unconditional withdrawal' 
from the occupied lands. Israel did not withdraw until the year 2000, after an 
exhausting guerilla war with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon (Bennis, 2003). 
In 1982, the Israeli Army, using American tanks, aircraft, and missiles, 
invaded Lebanon and devastated its capital city, Beirut. Despite an American law 
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forbidding any country to use American weapons for other than defensive purposes, 
the United States continued to supply Israel with weapons, increasing their supply 
50% (Bennis, 2003). Bar-Siman-Tov (1998) stated in his article, The United States 
and Israel Since 1948: A 'Special Relationship? 'that Israel had actually received a 
green light from the Americans `after sharing its plans' with them (p. 11). The Israeli 
Government claimed that this invasion was an act of self-defense against the PLO 
leadership that was leading the resistance from the Lebanese territory. According to 
Robert Fisk, (Middle East correspondent for the British newspaper The Independent) 
who was there at that time, nearly 17,500 civilian were killed in that invasion (Fisk, 
quoted in Findley, 2002). 
After the horrible and prolonged bombing of Beirut, a ceasefire agreement was 
reached by the United States, which guaranteed safe passage for the PLO from 
Lebanon to another Arab state (Tunisia). The PLO accepted the offer, stipulating 
American surety for the safety of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps in 
Lebanon. On September 11,1982, two weeks before the agreed time, the United 
States withdrew its troops from Lebanon, breaching its agreement with the PLO. Five 
days later, on September 16th, the Israeli Defense Army shelled flash bombs and 
allowed the Christian Phalangists (the most anti-Palestinian militants) to move into the 
Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in the west suburbs of Beirut. The 
Phalangists killed between 2,000 and 3,000 Palestinians, mostly women, children, and 
elderly people. Most of the Palestinian leaders and fighters had left Lebanon 
according to the agreement reached with the United States. The Red Cross announced 
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that `it would be impossible to know the exact number who died. ' (The Red Cross 
quoted in Bennis, 2003, p. 53) 
Spurred by international condemnation and outrage within the Arab and 
Muslim worlds, the Israeli government formed a `high-level' commission (Kahan), 
which found that Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, was `indirectly responsible' 
for the massacre. The United States denounced the massacre but voted against a U. N. 
resolution condemning the massacre. The United States was indirectly blamed for the 
massacre as it had pulled out its troops earlier than the agreed upon time. On 
September 19,1982, President Reagan decided to send American troops back to 
Beirut to mend the mistake. Approximately one year later, a truck bomb in Beirut 
destroyed the U. S. Marines headquarters and the French Paratroop center, killing 241 
Americans and 58 French paratroopers (Pincus, 1994). Three months later, the United 
States pulled out its troops, ending its mission in Beirut. 
In 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear power reactor. 
Israel justified the attack, claiming that the reactor was used to produce nuclear 
weapons that would be used against Israel. After the attack, the United States 
announced that it would veto any U. N. resolution to impose sanctions on Israel, but 
accepted a U. N. resolution to condemn the attack (Bennis, 2003). Merdad (author's 
interview, 2004) described Israel as the `U. S. long-hand in the region, ' noting the U. S. 
endorsement of Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor (Osirak) in 1981. The 
Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor was one of a series of Israeli actions against 
Iraq. Iraq was targeted as it constituted the only potential threat against the state of 
Israel once Egypt signed the peace agreement with Israel in 1979. Another of Israel's 
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operations to destabilize Iraq was Mossad's (Israeli Intelligence) support of the 
Kurdish fighters seeking to gain independence in the northern province of Iraq. In 
1988, senior Israeli official Moshe Arens said, `Israel, in principle ... will continue 
in 
the future to support the rectification of the grievances of the Kurdish people [against 
Iraq]' (Moshe Arens quoted in Berger, 1991, p. 5). 
In December 1987, the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) broke out. Started 
by a group of children who stoned an Israeli patrol, it turned into a widespread 
uprising all over the Palestinian-occupied territories. The Palestinian Intifada 
accomplished what the PLO had sought to gain for forty years- international attention. 
Television networks broadcasted pictures of Palestinian children who rose up against 
the Israeli occupation. They also broadcasted pictures of Israeli soldiers using stones 
to break the bones of those children. This was the strategy adopted and announced by 
Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. According to `Save the Children' 
Organization in Sweden, among the children who were injured in the first year of the 
Intifada (estimated between `23,600 to 29,900') one-third of the injured children had 
broken bones, and one-third were under the age of eleven (quoted in Mearsheimer & 
Walt, 2006). A year after the beginning of the Intifada, the Israeli Army Research 
Institute advised the Prime Minister and Defense Minister that the Intifada required a 
political solution, not a military response. When Rabin acknowledged that his strategy 
had failed, he told the Israeli cabinet that he did not want to turn the Israeli Army into 
a police force with the duty of running after children in poor cities in the third world. 
After the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada, the PNC (Palestinian National 
Congress) met in exile (Algeria) and declared the independence of the state of 
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Palestine, a state that included East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Many 
countries around the world responded to the declaration by offering full diplomatic 
relations to the Palestinian state. This included all the Arab states. The United 
Nations, on the other hand, invited the former Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat, to 
address the U. N. General Assembly, but the United States refused to provide a visa. 
American Secretary of State George Shultz justified his decision based on evidence of 
PLO engagement in terrorist activities. As a result of the American refusal, the U. N. 
General Assembly decided to meet in Geneva to give Arafat the opportunity to address 
them. In the General Assembly, Arafat announced, for the first time, the Palestinian 
recognition of the state of Israel, the acceptance of U. N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and 
the condemnation of all kinds of aggression and terrorism. In response, the United 
States announced that it would establish a channel of dialogue with the PLO 
(DiGeorgio-Lutz, 2003). 
On October 31,1991, an international conference took place in Madrid. It 
included all parties involved in the Middle East conflict: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine (under the Jordanian delegation), and Syria (Reich, 2003). The conference 
was, sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, but during the conference, 
the Soviet Union collapsed (November, 6,1991). 
It is interesting to discuss the wider debate over who serves who in the Israeli- 
American relationship. Mohammad Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004), member of 
Ash Shura (Parliament) in Saudi Arabia and member of its Foreign Affairs Committee, 
described Israel as `the head of the U. S. spear in the region. ' Daniel Pipes (2001) sees 
a duality in the relationship between the two countries. In his article, Israel American 
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and the Arab Delusion (2001), he indicates that American-Israeli relations have been 
characterized as either a relationship to serve U. S. interests in the Middle East region 
or as a relationship influenced by powerful Israeli lobbies in the United States. 
However, many experts in American foreign policy, like Saudi Ambassador 
Mohammad Al-Tayeb (author's interview, 2004) argue that the United States and 
Israel serve the interests of each other. The United States exploits its influence in the 
Middle East to support Israel, which it considers the only constant U. S. ally in the 
region. On the other hand, Israel is committed to serving U. S. interests in the region 
based on actions taken during the years of conflict war, the Cold War, and the rise of 
anti-American regimes like the Khomeini regime. Another point of view is held by 
Mohammad Eid (author's interview, 2004) from the Prince Naif University for 
Security Science in Riyadh and former Deputy Minister of the Interior in Egypt. He 
states that the interests of Israel are actually American interests because, from the 
American perspective, Israel represents Western civilization and also acts as a policing 
agent in the region and protector of U. S. oil interests. Israel also has its own national 
interest that America appreciates- that is the security of Israel. The United States has 
insured Israel's superiority over its Arab neighbours by supplying it with advanced 
defensive and offensive weapons. 
The Arab Israeli Conflict in the Post Cold War Era 
Even though the Madrid Conference in 1991 did not accomplish any peace 
agreement between all the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it had brought 
all of them to the same table for the first time. As a consequence of the Madrid 
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Conference, several channels of negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis were 
established (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004). One was a general channel between 
all the Arab states on one side and Israel on the other. There were three separate 
channels between the Israelis and Jordan (the Palestinian delegation under the 
Jordanian delegation), Syria, and Lebanon. In the same year, after the European 
Commission (EC) sessions in Brussels, the Europeans began to call for a major role in 
the peacemaking process in the Middle East (Berger, 1991). 
For the first time, the Israeli government started negotiating with the PLO 
through `secret channels' in the United States. The main obstacles in the Israeli- 
Palestinian negotiations involved the issues of the land, the right of return for 
Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, and the status of Israeli settlements in occupied 
territories in the West Bank (a Palestinian territory captured by the Israeli Army in 
1967 and home to approximately 400,000 Israeli settlers). While the Israeli and 
Palestinian delegates were negotiating in Washington D. C., another secret channel of 
negotiation was established in Oslo, Norway in 1993. In Oslo the approach was 
different, both sides agreed to start with the minor issues and then move forward. 
Some of the minor issues involved security, Palestinian prisoners, creating a 
Palestinian authority, and economic aid (Heikel, 2000). In September 1993, as a result 
of the work done at Oslo, Israeli Prime Minster Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Leader 
Yasir Arafat signed a peace treaty at the White House with the sponsorship of U. S. 
President Bill Clinton. 
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The Oslo treaty did not provide a full and final solution to all problems but 
made a significant start. A year later, in October 1994, Rabin and King Hussein of 
Jordan also signed a peace treaty at the White House (Reich, 2003). 
Unfortunately, not everyone embraced the peace process. In 1995, a right- 
wing Jew killed Yitzhak Rabin, violently registering opposition to the peace 
agreement with the Palestinians. Unlike Rabin, right-wing Prime Minster Binyamin 
Netanyahu came to power with an anti-Oslo agenda which included expanding Jewish 
settlements in the occupied territories (Reich, 2003). 
In August 1996, the Israeli Air Force bombed a shelter in Qana, Lebanon, 
killing approximately 200 women, children, and old people (Findley, 2002). The 
attacks were widely condemned, and the United Nations sent an investigation team. 
They reported that an Israeli drone plane was in the air before the attacks, confirming 
that the Israelis knew that civilians were in the target area. The United States sought 
to keep the report from being released, but U. N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali did 
release it. In reaction, the U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, 
launched a campaign to thwart a second term for Ghali (Bennis, 2003). 
In July 2000, President Clinton called for a summit between the Israeli Prime 
Minster, Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat at Camp David. The 
goal was to break through the main issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and arrive 
at some kind of resolution. Unfortunately, Camp David failed. Barak presented an 
Israeli proposal, giving back 95% of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, and a 
partition of the outskirts of Jerusalem (Kissinger, 2002). Arafat rejected the Israeli 
proposal. The Clinton Administration and U. S. media blamed Arafat for the failure of 
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Camp David, claiming that the Israeli `offer' was unprecedented in relation to any 
previous Israeli peace proposal. In his memoirs, My Life (2004), former President Bill 
Clinton said, `Arafat's rejection of my proposal after Barak accepted it was an error of 
historic proportions' (pp. 944-945). Of course, most of the Arab states had announced 
earlier that they would accept and support any Palestinian alteration to the status of the 
final issues but would not accept any cession of Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem 
(Habib, 2003). 
Arafat was blamed by both the United States and Israel for rejecting Barak's 
offer. But what is the `standard' for the negotiations between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians: Was it a choice between Barak's offer or the U. N. resolutions? Barak's 
offer denied the right of return and compensations to Palestinian refugees in 
accordance with U. N. Resolution 194. The Israeli offer also gave Israel the right to 
retain 70% of the settlements in the occupied territories. It also denied the borders of 
1947 that had been mandated by U. N. Resolution 181 or even the borders that existed 
in 1967. According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), a member of the U. S. team at 
Camp David said after the failure of the summit, `far too often, we functioned ... as 
Israel's lawyer' (p. 3). 
In his book Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (2002), Former U. S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the U. S. position after the failure of 
Camp David as the `worst' it could be. He felt the Clinton Administration was more 
desirous of reaching a conclusion to the conflict than either the Israelis or Palestinians. 
He felt this made the United States look more like one of the involved parties instead 
of a mediator. 
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In the last week of September 2000, after the failure of Camp David, Ariel 
Sharon walked inside the square of the Abraham Mosque Sanctuary, the Third Holiest 
spot in Islam. This was a boldly provocative act. More than 1000 Israeli soldiers 
came with Sharon to guard him from the expected outrage. Six Palestinians were 
killed in a clash with police inside the square, and, this sparked the Second Palestinian 
Intifada, (Bennis, 2003). Shortly after the beginning of the Intifada, Ariel Sharon was 
elected Prime Minister, putting the last nail in the coffin of the Oslo peace process. 
Former U. S. diplomat in the Middle East, John Habib (2003), assessed the Arab 
reaction to the Second `Intifada. ' 
Nothing in my long and close association with the Middle East prepared me for 
the depth of anger that I witnessed in the Arab world from Morocco to Saudi 
Arabia, starting with the first weeks of the second Palestinian uprising, 
intifada, in September 2000 to the Israeli re-occupation of Palestinian cities in 
2002. While the Arabs were deeply sympathetic with the plight of the 
Palestinian, they also felt that the humiliation that Israel and the United States 
inflicted on the Palestinian was directed at them, collectively and individually, 
as Arabs and as Muslims (Habib, 2003, p. 167). 
Many Middle Eastern commentators attribute anti-Americanism in the Arab 
and Muslim world mainly to an accumulation of negative perceptions of U. S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East since the Second World War. A policy that supported the 
creation of the Israeli state in Palestine, backed Israel in its wars against the Arab 
states in 1948,1967, and 1973, and adopted pro-Israeli policies in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. However, anti-Americanism in the Middle East as a theme will be discussed 
in chapter five (roots of anti-Americanism). 
The United States was not the only superpower involved in the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union also sought to influence Middle Eastern politics, and to have in the 
region regimes that were sympathetic towards Moscow. Thus, the Middle East 
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became the site of American/Soviet great power rivalry. This was particularly the 
case in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent 
American support for the Afghan Mujahidin, form part of the background to the 
current U. S. `war on terror. ' 
A Proxy War: `The Soviet-Afghan War' 
The Cold War was a long drawn out encounter for the Soviet Union. During 
these tension-field years, the two `super powers' sponsored a number of `proxy wars' 
against each other. Soviet involvement in Cuba sparked the U. S. -Cuban missile crisis, 
and the U. S. backed the Mujahidin in Afghanistan in the period of the Soviet invasion 
of that country (Merdad, author's interview, 2004). The United States and the Soviet 
Union also sought to overthrow various regimes that did not adhere to their 
philosophies or support their agendas. The overthrown of the Hela Selasy's regime in 
Ethiopia in 1974 by the Marxist pro-Soviet revolutionist Hela Merriam is an example 
of a Soviet-sponsored coup d'etat, and the U. S. support of the Ba'ath party's 
overthrow of the Qasim's regime in 1963 is an example of American-sponsored coup 
d'etat (Merdad). 
Afghanistan was one of the scenes between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the third world. Other confrontations took place in other parts of the world, 
even though to lesser degrees, like Angola and Yemen. However, the invasion of 
Afghanistan as the Carter Administration was complained brought the Soviets closer 
to the Persian Gulf (Garthoff, 1994). The war began a few months after the fall of the 
Shah's regime in Iran, making the geo-strategic location of Afghanistan more crucial 
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to U. S. interests. In reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of 
the Shah's regime in 1979, President Carter `declared the Persian Gulf and Southwest 
Asia to be the third security zone of the West' (Hartman, 2002, p. 471). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25,1979 provided the 
United States with the opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union while avoiding a direct 
confrontation. The United States sought to ensnare the Soviet Union in a quagmire 
like the one America had experienced in Vietnam, exhausting the USSR financially 
and militarily. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski confirmed in 
an interview in 1998 that the Carter administration was aiming `to induce a Soviet 
military intervention ... 
I wrote to President Carter: we now have the opportunity of 
giving to the USSR its Vietnam War' (Kolko, 2002, p. 47). The reason for the Soviet 
invasion was to support the communist government against Islamic militants. 
The USSR was aware of the Islamic revolution in Iran and did not want a 
repeat in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership was concerned that the Islamic 
revolution might extend from Afghanistan to the Muslim provinces of the Soviet 
Union, which would seek to imitate the Afghani version. The Soviet government 
invaded Afghanistan to prevent the Islamic militants from gaining power. The United 
States, on the other hand, wanted to protect its interests in the Gulf region and 
diminish Soviet aid to revolutionary movements in the third world (Hartman, 2002). 
U. S. involvement in Afghanistan actually started eight months before the 
Soviet invasion when the United States supported the rebels fighting against the 
communist government. Immediately after the Soviet invasion, U. S. President Jimmy 
Carter ordered the CIA to funnel more military supplies and humanitarian aid to the 
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rebels through Pakistan (Hartman, 2002). More importantly, the CIA opened and 
financed camps in Pakistan to train the Mujahidin (Muslims who were willing to 
defend the Muslim state). During the Afghan-Soviet War, over 35000 Muslims from 
all over the world were recruited and trained by both the Pakistani military inter- 
security and the CIA to fight in Afghanistan. For many Muslims from around the 
world, the `Jihad' in Afghanistan was not only a defense of Afghani soil but also 
defense of Islam against `the infidel Soviets' (Hartman). In the month following the 
invasion, at an Islamic Conference in Pakistan, thirty-five Muslim states condemned 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Garthoff, 1994). 
According to Garthoff (1994), Brzezinski said that he `consulted with the 
Saudis and the Egyptians regarding the fighting in Afghanistan' (p. 1051). Saudi 
Arabia, which had been a key player in the Muslim world since the Second World 
War, was ready to do every possible to support the `Muslim state' of Afghanistan 
against the communist Soviet. Saudi Arabia, considered in the Muslim world as the 
cradle and defender of Islam (home of the two Holy Shrines of Mecca and Medina), 
had actually played a major role in financing and supporting the Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan in coordination with the United States and Pakistan. The Saudi decision 
to support the Mujahidin in Afghanistan led many Arab and Muslim states to do the 
same (Peterson, 2002). 
Osama Bin-Laden, who later created the Al-Qaedah terrorist organization, was 
the leader of the Arab Mujahidin. Bin-Laden was aided by the United States in 
building facilities and training camps for the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. The `Khost 
tunnel complex' was built in 1981 under Bin-Laden's supervision. Before he came to 
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Afghanistan, Bin-Laden's business was in constructional engineering as a shelter, 
armory, and training camp (Crockatt, 2003). Bin-Laden also had the money to finance 
camps to recruit and train the Arab Mujahidin (Mosili, 2004). In the United States, 
there were thirty recruiting offices among the ones that Bin-Laden had all over the 
world during the war in Afghanistan. Some of these offices had, in a `blowback, ' 
played a major role in recruiting A1-Qaedah members when the organization was 
created in 1989 (Kolko, 2002). According to Crockatt (2003), during the war in 
Afghanistan in 2001, U. S. forces found `CIA training manuals, ' including instructions 
in `a variety of terrorist techniques, ' at some of the Al-Qaedah training camps (p. 103). 
(Ramzi Yousef and his accomplices, who were all convicted of the World Trade 
Center bombing in New York City in 1993, had received their training during the war 
in Afghanistan). 
Even though there was an increase in the defense budget during the Carter 
Administration, the Southern Conservatives of the Democratic Party had labeled him 
weak on defense, and left the Democratic Party. In his article, `The Red Template': 
US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan, Andrew Hartman (2002) argued that the 
Cold War had given the ideological conservative policymakers the opportunity to 
make foreign policies that enabled the United States to control the world. 
Unlike Carter, Reagan started his term with a hard-handed policy toward the 
Soviet Union, which he described as the `Evil Empire. ' Reagan vowed to back all the 
countries around the world which were resisting `Soviet-supported aggression. ' This 
became known as the `Reagan Doctrine' (Hartman, 2002). 
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According to Kolko (2002), the CIA spent $3 billion during the 1980's to aid 
the Mujahidin in their battle against the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration 
sought to prevent any diplomatic solution for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, wanting 
to keep Moscow embroiled in a war of attrition. During the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit in the United States in 1987, Reagan maintained his full commitment to 
support the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, saying that the summit has nothing to do with 
the U. S. attitude toward the war, `our conduct at the summit and the framing of its 
results must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget ... 
and support of the Contras and the Mujahidin' (Hartman, 2002, p. 477). In 1988, the 
Soviet Union was defeated and began to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. After 
10 years of war, the death toll stood at 14,000 Soviet soldiers and approximately the 
same number of `non-combatants. ' Of course, it was the billions of dollars of military 
expenditures which exhausted the Soviet economy (Crockatt, 2003). 
After the end of the Second Gulf War `Desert Storm' and during the Madrid 
Conference, the Soviet Union collapsed. This ended approximately forty years of 
Cold War. Afghanistan proved to be the last (indirect) battleground of confrontation 
between the two superpowers. The War in Afghanistan was one of the so-called 
`proxy wars' that both countries sponsored against each other. The war in 
Afghanistan relates to Middle East policy as some Middle Eastern states were 
indirectly participating in the war. After 9/11, Afghanistan became the first stage of 
the U. S. war against terror with American troops attacking its ex-allies (the 
Mujahidin) and the Taliban regime, the reactionary ruling group, described as a 
backlash against the United States. 
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The End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War had a wide-ranging impact on U. S. foreign policy. It 
has been argued that the world became more destabilized after the end of the Cold 
War (Crockatt, 2003). The notion of this destabilization has generated theses like 
Francis Fukuyama's `The End of History' and Samuel Huntington's `The Clash of 
Civilizations. ' Both have generated wide debate inside and outside of America. 
The end of the Cold War had evoked demands within Europe to review its 
foreign policy and redefine its relation with the United States. After the EC sessions 
in Brussels in 1991, the Europeans began to call for a major role for Europe in 
peacemaking in the Middle East (Berger, 1991). However, the 1990's witnessed an 
increase in American influence, with most of the Eastern European regimes gradually 
falling under the American umbrella. The 1990's also witnessed military intervention 
by the United States in the Balkans. During the first stages of the Balkan problem, it 
appeared that the Europeans were not able to deal with the crisis. The bloody conflict 
and the massacres came to an end only when the United States decided to intervene 
militarily (Kagan, 2003). The war in the Balkans provided an opportunity for the 
United States to prove that an American role in Europe was still needed, even after the 
end of the Cold War. 
In recent years, many Eastern European regimes, formerly Warsaw Pact 
nations, became NATO members and subject to American influence. Some of theses 
nations became more pro-American than some of the Western European regimes, 
especially during the U. S. war on terror. For example, during the U. S. war against 
Iraq in 2003, many Eastern European regimes (former Communist countries) like 
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Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary supported the United States, whereas Western 
European countries like Belgium, France, and Germany refused to participate in the 
war against Iraq without explicit authorization by the United Nations. As argued by 
Ambassador Mohammed Al-Tayeb from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(author's interview, 2004), this is a clear example of how the end of the Cold War has 
impacted the world's balance of power and attitudes about U. S. hegemony. For the 
most part, Eastern European regimes have sought to align with the United States for 
the purpose of gaining American aid to bolster their weak economies. 
After the end of the Cold War, the nature of the American-European 
relationship (especially with the western European states) became the subject of wide 
debate. The previous basis involved the U. S. -USSR power struggle, but that no longer 
existed. In his book, Paradise and Power, Robert Kagan (2003) argued that American 
and European foreign strategies vary in accordance with their international interests. 
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common 
view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all- 
important question of power--the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the 
desirability of power--American and European perspectives are diverging. 
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving 
beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational 
negotiation and cooperation. (p. 3) 
For the United States, power is the necessary mean for upholding international 
stability and the security of the United States; Europeans believe on giving 
international organizations a major role in upholding world security. It appears that 
the Europeans are interested not in an arms race with the United States, but with 
economic competition. The European efforts to restrain the excessive use of U. S. 
power and unilateralism is derived from its own view of a world of laws and rules. 
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Kagan (2003) attributes this view to Europe's inability to carry out unilateral actions, 
and their desire to restrain others from doing it. 
There is an alternative that needs to be considered. Some Europeans and 
Americans, like Samuel Huntington, look positively at Europe as a potential 
superpower. In his article The Lonely Superpower, (1999), Huntington argued that a 
superpower Europe would restore `multi-polarity' in the world arena. 
According to Kagan (2003), intellectuals in Europe entertain the notion that the 
so-called `common strategic culture' shared by America and Europe has vanished as 
the national entities look at the world from different points of view. Americans, seem 
to look at the world as a struggle between `good and evil. ' Since 9/11, American 
officials, especially President Bush, have referred to this notion when explaining 
America's `war on terror' and the threat facing America. Europeans, having suffered 
from the woes of bloody wars in the past century, have their own definition of 
`intolerable threats' to international security. Their concerns are differently defined. 
Modem Europe prefers diplomacy over the use of power and multilateralism over 
unilateralism. This is basically the difference between the Europeans and the United 
States regarding world security. This difference between Europeans and the United 
states, which evolved after 9/11, has opened up gaps between them. 
Steven Everts listed what he called `challenges' that Europeans are concerned 
about like `ethnic conflicts, migration, poverty and environmental degradation' (Everts 
2001, quoted in Kagan, p. 32). The Europeans disagree with concepts and terms used 
by the United States to define threats, such as `rogue states' and the `axis of evil. ' Iraq 
provides a clear example of the American-European disagreement over the definition 
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of `threats. ' The Europeans, especially France and Germany, believed that the 
consequences of the American war in Iraq constitute a greater threat to world security 
than the one posed by Saddam Hussein when he was in power. Indeed, European 
fears about post-war Iraq have proved to be genuine up until the time of this writing 
(April, 2006). It appears that the aftermath of the American war in Iraq will leave Iraq 
a center of terrorism, anarchy, and chaos. According to the Lancet study released in 
October 2004, the estimated number of deaths among Iraqi civilians exceeds 100,000 
people. This is a very controversial figure, but the British government has promised to 
investigate this figure (BBC, October, 2004). 
The Shift of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East after the Cold War 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Soviet influence and communism began 
to decline in the Middle East (Slater, 1990). On the other hand, the United States 
started to recant from supporting many repressive regimes that had become a burden 
upon the United States, such as the Moboto regime in Congo and Marcos in 
Philippines. Gradually, the United States began to raise human rights issues against 
repressive regimes, of whom some had been close allies during the Cold War. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United 
States changed its foreign policy and strategies (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). 
The end of the Cold War weakened and in some cases ended the strategic importance 
that some U. S. allies had. No longer relying on their allegiance, the United States 
began to pursue a heavy-handed policy against some disliked regimes in the region 
(Al-Fayez, author's interview, 2004). The United States abandoned the use of 
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containment and appeasement strategies with countries like Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, 
and used what Abdullah Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), from the King Saud 
University in Riyadh, called an `accommodation' strategy with the Gulf States. The 
United States no longer needed to conciliate regimes it disapproved in the region. 
Instead, some governments in the Middle East sought to court U. S. favor, like the 
Libyan regime. In 2004, Moamar Qadaphi agreed to abandon Libya's nuclear 
program and consented to pay compensation to the families of victims in the Pan Am 
airplane bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. 
There are experts in American foreign policy, like Abdullah Al-Ghamdi 
(author's interview, 2004), from the King Saud University in Riyadh, who argue that 
the United States was not ready to assume the role of unipolar power in the world after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. U. S. policymakers were in a dilemma because, 
logically, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the armaments race meant 
that the United States should be able to decrease military expenditures. That would 
certainly be unacceptable to the weapons lobby in America. There were also 
questions, as described by Daalder and Lindsay (2003), regarding `how the United 
States should engage the world' (p. 12). 
The Clinton Administration came to power with its own ideas on the post-Cold 
War era. It focused attention on the international economy, forming economic 
conglomerates and activating globalization. According to Ambassador Merdad 
(author's interview, 2004), the Clinton era had impact on rules and concepts in 
international relations, especially in the Middle East where, for example, the Gulf 
states (including Iran and Iraq) were experiencing economic recession as a result of 
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the First Gulf War (the 10-year Iran-Iraq war which lasted until 1989) and the Second 
Gulf War (Desert Storm 1990-1991, which was economically devastating for Iraq and 
the Gulf states which helped finance the war). The political landscape in the Middle 
East had also changed. For example, Palestinian Leader Yasir Arafat was isolated by 
the Gulf States (major political and economic supporters of the Palestinian leadership) 
because Arafat had sided with Saddam Hussein during the Second Gulf War when 
Iraq invaded of Kuwait in 1990. Before the International Conference in Madrid in 
1991, Arafat was considered a terrorist by all of the previous U. S. administrations. 
However, after the conference, Arafat became the recognized negotiator for the 
Palestinians and later a man of peace during the Clinton Administration. Ultimately, 
he won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 (Gendzier, 2002). 
The Madrid Conference took place after the overwhelming victory of 
American and coalition forces against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in the Second 
Gulf War (the liberation of Kuwait). The war resulted in an American military 
presence in the region, consolidating its political hegemony in the Middle East. In 
order to fully understand the consequences of the Second Gulf War, it is necessary to 
understand the effects and consequences of the First Gulf War. 
The First Gulf War 
In 1980, the First Gulf War broke out between Iran and Iraq after a border 
conflict over Shat Al-Arab. When the Iranian Islamic revolution gained power in 
1979, Saddam Hussein (the former Iraqi president) expected to have a better 
relationship with the Khomeini revolutionary regime than he had had with the Shah. 
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That was not to be, though, as one of the most important principles in the doctrine of 
the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries was the exportation of the revolution to the entire 
Gulf region, beginning with Iran's closest neighbor, Iraq. In a breach of the Iran-Iraq 
border agreement signed in Algeria in 1975, Iraq sought to regain half of Shat al Arab, 
an area given to Iran during the Shah's era in an effort to appease its more powerful 
neighbor (Ali, 2004). War began in 1980 after what the Iraqi government called a 
number of provocative acts of by the Khomeini regime- stirring up unrest among the 
Shiite Muslims and encouraging the Kurdish population to revolt against the Iraqi 
regime. It also played a role in the assassination attempts made against senior Iraqi 
officials. 
In reaction to the Iranian threat and the Khomeini doctrine of exporting the 
revolution, many countries, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 
gave Iraq strong and public support. For Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, Iraq 
was considered the `eastern gate' that stood solid against Iranian ambitions to `export 
the revolution' to its Arab neighbours (Ehteshami, 2002). The United States 
supported Iraq to counter the threat posed by the Khomeini regime in the Gulf region, 
on area containing more than 60% of the world's oil reserves. The United States 
wanted both sides to engage in a war that would exhaust their military capabilities, but 
realized that the Iranian army was more advanced and more powerful than the Iraqi 
army. Therefore, the United States provided Iraq with intelligence and target 
information. Also, the United States provided Iraq with goods worth more than $5 
billion. In addition to receiving weapons from the United States, the Gulf states, 
mainly Saudi Arabia, realized the threat Iran posed to their security and stability and 
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generously supplied the Iraqi Army with advanced weapons. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait alone loaned Iraq $95 billion (Kolko, 2002). 
During the Reagan Administration, the United States sold the Iraqi government 
seed stock for biological weapons (Anthrax, West Nile virus, and Botulinal Toxin) 
which were used against the Iranian Army and the Kurdish minority in Iraq 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003). U. S. Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld was one of the 
U. S. officials sent to `court' Iraq, even after Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons 
against the Iraqi Kurds. Rumsfeld was Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East at 
that time. In 1989, a year after the Kurdish genocide, the first President Bush signed a 
national security guideline stating that `normal relations between the United States and 
Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and 
the Middle East' (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003, p. 6). At the time, the United States 
turned a blind eye to the issue of the genocide. However, fourteen years later, the 
issue was resurrected in 2002-2003 as part of the U. S. campaign to wage war against 
Iraq. 
In August 1988, after eight years, the war ended without a'winner. ' What was 
accomplished was at least one million casualties and financial costs of around $600 
billion for each country. In 1989, a few months after the end of the war, Iran's 
Khomeini died diminishing the revolutionary regime in Iran and the doctrine of 
exporting the revolution (Kolko, 2002). In December 1990, the United Nations named 
Iraq the `aggressor' state in the Iran-Iraq War, and, Iran made claims for `reparations' 
(Ehteshami, 2002). 
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The end of the First Gulf War in 1989 began the countdown to the Second Gulf 
War in 1990. At that time, Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait and take 
control of the oil fields. This power grab was all the more untenable as Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia were considered major supporters of Iraq during the war against Iran. 
The Second Gulf War (Desert Storm) and U. N. Sanctions against Iraq 
The Second Gulf War in 1991 was a turning point for politics in the Middle 
East, as the United States secured its sustained hegemony in the region. American 
foreign policy in the region changed after the end of the Second Gulf War due to the 
U. S. military presence at several bases in the Gulf region and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union that followed shortly thereafter. The previous strategies of 
`appeasement' and `containment' began to decline. Indeed, it was the beginning of the 
`New World Order' announced by the first President Bush. This vision of a `New 
World Order' had been declared during the Second Gulf War, and was defined by him 
as `a big idea: a new world order where diverse nations are drown together in 
common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind- peace and security, 
freedom, and the rule of law' (U. S. Department of State, February 1991). 
Saddam Hussein provided the impetus for the major shift in the Gulf region. 
On August 2,1990, two years after the end of the First Gulf War, Iraq invaded Kuwait 
after the failure of diplomatic efforts sponsored by Saudi Arabia to resolve the conflict 
between Iraq and Kuwait over the repayment of Kuwaiti loans made to Iraq to fight 
Iran. The Kuwaiti government had refused to waive the Iraqi debts, and the Iraqis 
claimed Kuwait was dumping oil on market by exceeding the quota that had been set 
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by OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2003). The financial issue, however, was only part of the problem between Iraq and 
Kuwait. 
Historically, Iraq has long claimed that Kuwait was actually a district of the 
Basrah province of Iraq and should be annexed to Iraq. King Ghazi of Iraq (1933- 
1939) was the first Iraqi ruler to speak publicly about re-annexing Kuwait, but the 
British Empire prevented him from doing so before he died. A few years after the 
toppling of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, Iraqi President Abdulkarim Qasim began to 
demand the re-annexation of Kuwait. In reaction to Qasim's demand, the Kuwaiti 
ruling family immediately declared the independence of Kuwait. However, three 
decades later in 1990, the Kuwaitis were confronted by Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein who dared to invade Kuwait (Ali, 2004). 
On July 25,1990, during `verbal conflict' between Iraq andKuwait, the U. S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, told Iraqi President Saddam Hussein that the 
United States was aware of the problem between Iraq and Kuwait. `[W]e have no 
opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your broader disagreement with Kuwait. ' 
(Quoted in Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003, p. 3) Bennis (2003) and Ali (2004) considered 
the statement by the U. S. Ambassador to be a green light for Saddam Hussein to 
invade Kuwait, which he did a week later. As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
approximately 6% of the world oil supplies became unavailable, causing oil prices to 
jump from $18 to $40 a barrel (Sterner, 1990). 
Of course, it is important here to emphasize that the relations between the 
United States and the Gulf states are mainly based on the American need of oil 
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supplies, which is considered an influential factor on the U. S. economy. On the other 
hand, the United States in its turn provides security for the Gulf States (Al-Hulwa, 
author's interview, 2004). 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait violated Article 51 of the U. N. Charter (Ali, 2004). 
After intensive efforts within the United Nations, the United States and the Gulf states 
succeeded in passing two resolutions; the first one condemned the invasion, and the 
second authorized the use of force against Iraq. 
In order to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the United States had to convince Saudi 
Arabia to allow U. S. troops to launch the war from Saudi land. The U. S. goal was 
two-fold: the liberation of Kuwait and the defense of Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia, 
allowing U. S. troops to land on Saudi soil and attack Iraq was a difficult and very 
critical decision to make, given that Saudi Arabia is considered the cradle of Islam and 
is home to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Islam does not allow non- 
Muslims to enter the Holy Land of Mecca. U. S. troops and coalition forces were 
stationed in the north east province of Saudi Arabia, at least 1000 miles away from the 
Holy Lands located in the west with the specific mission of liberating Kuwait and 
defending Saudi Arabia. 
For Osama Bin-Laden, who publicly opposed allowing U. S. troops to land in 
Saudi Arabia, the idea of having any non-Muslims troops in the Arabian Peninsula 
was completely unacceptable. To quell debate on the issue, the Cleric's Supreme 
Committee (Ulama: a widely respected group of clerics) in Saudi Arabia met and 
issued an advisory opinion, legalizing the decision to ally with non-Muslims troops to 
liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi soil against Iraq. This decision had a major impact 
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on relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia on one side and Osama Bin- 
Laden on the other (Niblock, 2006). In opposition to the presence of non-Muslim 
troops in the Arabian Peninsula, Bin-Laden took $250 million of his wealth and 
escaped from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan (Sammon, 2002). 
After the Desert Storm war against Iraq was launched, Saddam Hussein 
ordered the Iraqi Army to attack Israel with Scud missiles in an attempt to force the 
Israelis to engage in the war. The United States prepared Israel for a potential attack 
by distributing Patriot anti-missile batteries. The United States put heavy pressure on 
the Israelis not to retaliate, in order to prevent a crisis within the international coalition 
and a massive uprising in the Arab and Muslim world (The United States eventually 
paid the Israelis $650 million as compensation for losses caused by the Iraqi attacks 
(Berger, 1991). After six weeks of air attacks and a few days of ground engagement, 
Kuwait was liberated. 
The Second Gulf War (Desert Storm) resulted in two significant changes. 
After the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the United States gained military bases in the 
Gulf region in agreement with some Gulf States. This was the realization of a long- 
sought U. S. geo-strategic goal. Troops on the ground provide the United States with 
the ability to act quickly and directly against any threat to its interests in the region, 
instead of relying on Israel as the guardian of American interests in the Middle East. 
Second, as a consequence of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Arab states were split into 
two blocs. The first bloc included countries (Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, 
Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen) that stood by Saddam or refused to support 
military action to expel him from Kuwait. The second group included countries 
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(Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Syria, and United Arab Emirates) that opposed the invasion of Kuwait and backed 
military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. As a result of his support for Saddam 
Hussein, the PLO leader Yasir Arafat was isolated from most Arab States who were 
against Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. The PLO was financially cut off by major 
financer: the Gulf States mainly Saudi Arabia. Hence, Arafat had no option but to 
leave isolation by engaging in a peace process, which was explained (in the section of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict) earlier in this chapter (Kissinger, 2002). 
As a consequence for the invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations imposed 
sanctions on Iraq and created `no-fly zones' over the south and north of Iraq. It also 
stipulated the disarmament of what was believed to be Iraqi WMD before sanctions 
could be removed. 
In 1996, an agreement was reached between Iraq and the United Nations in the 
so-called `Oil for Food Program. ' Iraq was allowed to export oil for food, medicine, 
and other necessary items only through the United Nations and under its supervision. 
The `Oil for Food Program' reduced Iraqi purchasing power parity from $3000 to 
$500 per capita, making Iraq, with the world's second largest oil reserves, one of the 
poorest nations in the world (Ali, 2004). The `Oil for Food Program' was a failure, 
even though the amount of purchases went from $2 billion to $6 billion and, finally, to 
an unlimited amount. According to former Congressman Paul Findley (2002), U. N. 
sanctions against Iraq `are widely believed to have caused the death of 500,000 
children' (p. 2). In 1996, when the former U. S. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, 
was asked by Leslie Stahl on the CBS show `60 Minutes' to comment about the 
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number of Iraqis who had died as a result of the sanctions, she said, `We think the 
price is worth it' (Ouoted in Bennis, 2003, p. 101). 
As a result of the sanctions, a lack of food and medicine caused the death of 
many children (Findley, 2002). The sanctions and frequent American-British air 
strikes caused the Iraqi people great suffering. The U. N. General Secretary assistants 
in Iraq, Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, resigned (Halliday in 1998 and 
Sponeck in 2000) as directors of the `Oil for Food Program' in Iraq. Justifying his 
resignation, Halliday claimed that the sanctions caused the death of up to one million 
Iraqis. His successor, Hans Von Sponeck, resigned a year later, asserting `that every 
month Iraq's social fabric shows bigger holes' (Ali, 2004, p. 139). The resignations 
revealed the inhumane aspect of the sanctions, grabbing the world attention, which led 
to an international outcry against the sanctions, mainly among Arabs and Muslims. 
After the resignation of Halliday and Von Sponeck, the sanctions were widely 
challenged by Arabs and Muslims and countries around the world began to send relief 
to the dying people of Iraq. 
The `oil for food program' became a scandal after the war in Iraq in 2003, 
where investigation has showed that executives from the United Nations including 
Kojo Annan (the son of the U. N. Secretary) were actually involved in the corruption 
of Iraq's `oil for food program' (CBC, March 2005). 
Iraqi hatred toward the United States was intensified as the people felt the 
sanctions were punishing them, not Saddam Hussein. Internationally, the United 
States was blamed for the sanctions and the resulting Iraqi tragedy (Ali, 2004). In his 
assessment of the American position, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said, 
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`the United States has maneuvered itself into a position where, in major parts of the 
world- especially in Europe- America, not Saddam appears as the obstacle to easing 
tensions in the Gulf' (Kissinger, 2002, p. 194). Kissinger's assessment of the world's 
reaction, especially in Europe, revealed how American experts and intellectuals were 
aware of international opposition and condemnation of U. S. foreign policy, preceding 
the events of 9/11. Unfortunately, Kissinger failed to address the tragic aftermath of 
the sanctions and consequences on Iraqi people described by many commentators as 
punishment of the people of Iraq, and not Saddam Hussein's regime. Instead, he 
focused on the future of the sanctions to weaken the Iraqi regime and suggested 
America should support internal resistance and covert operations inside Iraq. 
U. N. sanctions against Iraq were widely criticized. Especially so as after 10 
years of Iraqi suffering and intensive work of searching by U. S. experts since 2003, 
the WMD case turned to be inaccurate. In Saudi Arabia (Iraq's adversary in Second 
Gulf War), the majority people were convinced that ten years of sanctions had heavily 
affected the Iraqi people without any significance upon Saddam's regime (Peterson, 
2002). 
Part of the post-war monitoring of Iraq involved U. N. -led weapons inspections. 
In 1998, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Chief Richard Butler 
confirmed that there were no nuclear weapons or long-range missiles in Iraq and was 
about to confirm that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons. However, 
allegations that some UNSCOM inspectors had passed `intelligence materials' to the 
United States and Israel led the Iraqi government to suspend the inspections. 
According to Bennis (2003), some of the `top officials' of the Clinton Administration 
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confirmed that the United States knew about Butler's secret report before it was 
submitted to the Security Council. In response to the Iraqi decision, the United States 
and Britain launched the Desert Fox air strikes against Iraq. The action lasted for four 
days and resulted in 144 civilian deaths. 
Sanctions were not the only major cause of death of Iraqi civilians. The United 
States used depleted uranium weaponry during the Second Gulf War, causing a severe 
increase in the occurrence of cancer. Also, the Pentagon Office of the Special 
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (2004) referred to a document titled Iraq Water 
Treatment Vulnerabilities that was issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency dated 
January 22,1991, but not released until 1995. It speculated that as a result of the 
proposed sanctions, `Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of 
the lack of required chemicals and desalination membranes. Incidences of disease, 
including possible epidemics, will become probable unless the population were careful 
to boil the water. ' 
The end of the Cold War meant the end of the threat of communist expansion. 
The Gulf Wars, both the first and second, shifted the focus of the international 
community, and especially the United States, to the oil-rich Middle East. The 
economic and political importance of the region gained significance. As a result of the 
Second Gulf War, the United States gained a military foothold in the region. While 
the presence of American troops in the Middle East enables the United States to act 
swiftly against any threats toward the region, it has created animosity in the 
Arab/Muslim world, intensified anti-American sentiments, and led to complex 
120 
relationships with some of the Arab states. The relationship between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia is a case in point. 
Soft Power and Hard Power 
In 1990 Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University, introduced a concept in describing American foreign policy: soft 
power and hard power. In May 2004, Nye wrote an article in the journal Foreign 
Policy titled 'The Velvet Hegemon: How Soft Power Can Help Defeat Terrorism. ' In 
it, he sought to clarify what he called a `misunderstanding' of the concept. At first he 
defined power as 'The ability to produce the outcome you want' (p. 1). Then he 
explained `hard power' as 'When someone does something he would otherwise not do 
but for force or inducement, that's hard power-the use of sticks and carrots' (p. 1). 
`Soft power' is `The ability to secure those outcomes through attraction rather than 
coercion. It is the ability to shape what others want' (p. 1). Nye argued that soft and 
hard power can be used together where they sustain and replace each other. 
U. S. 'soft power', as argued by Nye (2004), is based on its predominant culture 
with all the products that it exports around the world, its values of democracy and 
human rights, and foreign policies that show appreciation for the welfare of other 
cultures. The United States uses both `soft power' and `hard power' in its foreign 
policy. In deed, not less than `hard power, ' `soft power' annoys some governments, 
whom some are even considered American allies (Crockatt, 2003). Nye agrees with 
historian Niall Ferguson, author of `ThinkAgain: Power' published in Foreign Policy 
in January/February 2003, who stated that soft power heavily depends on what he 
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called `credibility and legitimacy. ' Nye asserts Fergusson's point of view, 
exemplifying that whereas people in China like Hollywood, Saudis look at it with 
suspicion. The problem is not all cultures and countries share the same perspective on 
values and moral issues. 
The United States and Unilateralism 
According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(2000), `unilateralism' is defined as `A tendency of nations to conduct their foreign 
affairs individualistically, characterized by minimal consultation and involvement with 
other nations, even their allies. ' 
The U. S. use of unilateralism as an approach in foreign policy started after 
World War II, but has become the main approach used since the first Bush 
Administration. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 
November 1991 gave rise to the beginning of American unilateralism (Dumbrell, 
2002). 
After the end of the Cold War, the United States was the remaining 
superpower state in the world. It became more important and difficult for the United 
States to insure and sustain its predominance. The United States has sought to 
maintain its superiority by attempting to create a world with balanced lesser powers. 
The current excessive use of unilateralism by the Bush Administration is a sign of the 
substantial transformation that has taken place in U. S. foreign policy and the power 
gap that exists between the United States and the rest of the world (author's interview 
with Deputy Minister of Information in Saudi Arabia, Saleh Al-Namlah, 2004). Raed 
Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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believes that the mighty U. S. force and the incidents of 9/11 have provided the 
excessive unilateralism of the Bush Administration, restoring to the use of 
multilateralism only when it does not contradict U. S. interests. 
The nature of the unilateral approach in U. S. foreign policy was clearly 
expressed in a U. N. speech by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She 
addressed the U. S. threat to bomb Iraq in 1998, saying `If we have to use force, it is 
because we are Americans. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see 
further into the future' (Albright quoted in Smith, 2002, p. 57). While previous U. S. 
administrations had mostly used a multilateral policy, a unilateral policy was used in 
some cases when needed. Albright said, `We will behave multilaterally when we can 
and unilaterally when we must' (Albright quoted in Booth, 2002, p. 159). In his book 
Paradise and Power, Ropert Kagan (2003) argued that American multilateralism 
during the Cold War was `more instrumental than idealistic in its motives' (p. 78). 
The increasing use of unilateralism by the United States has been highlighted 
by some world leaders. Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin referred to the 
United States as a `hyper-power. ' He said that the unilateral approach of the United 
States is `a new problem on the international scene' (Bennis, 2002, p. 9). French 
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine called for `a system both multilateral and multipolar 
associating all or part of the 185 countries of the world' (p. 9) to challenge 
Washington's `dominant power with its means of influence' (p. 9). 
When the United States moved toward unilateralism has been the subject of 
debate. Dumbrell (2002) claimed that the U. S. move towards unilateralism began 
before the second Bush Administration. 
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The US, of course, was not exclusively unilateralist; that was never an option, 
and was certainly not one after the 1I September attacks. Rather, the US under 
Bush seemed committed to a new mixture of unilateralism and multilateralism 
defined and pursued almost entirely on American's terms (p. 285). 
Dumbrell (2002) argued that the new trend toward unilateralism actually 
started during the second term of the Clinton Administration, exemplified by U. S. 
actions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Sudan. While Bennis (2002), Byers (2002), 
and Dumbrell disagree on when the move toward unilateralism started, they all agree 
that the excessive use of unilateralism by the current Bush Administration as 
unprecedented. 
Byers (2002) argued that the Bush Administration's unilateral approach did not 
stem from the events of 9/11, but was adopted by the administration before that time. 
One need consider other examples of `unilateralism' to see the trend- rejections of 
the Ballistic Missile treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, a protocol for Biological weapons, and a protocol for the sale and 
transfer of small arms. Bennis (2003) agreed with Byers, asserting that unilateralism 
has been excessively adopted by the Bush Administration since the first day in office. 
`From their first moment in office, Bush officials brought to the White House an 
aggressive brand of unilateralism, characterized by disdain for global opinion and 
contempt for international law and institutions' (p. 1). However, Bennis considered 
Bush's excessive use of unilateralism as part of a `pre-existing trend' that was not 
created by the G. W. Bush Administration, exemplifying the U. S. use of unilateralism 
before this Administration, such as the U. S. invasion of Panama during the Bush 
senior Administration in 1989. What support this vision of a `pre-existing trend' of 
unilateralism are the statements that were made by French officials in 1999, 
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expressing dissatisfaction to what they believed to be an excessive use of unilateralism 
by the United States at that time (during the Clinton Administration). 
An examination of American-Saudi relations will shed light on Arab 
perceptions of America and American policies. A review of Saudi Arabian culture, 
religion, and society provide needed background for explaining the multi-faceted 
relationship between east and west. It also creates a better understanding of the basis 
of Saudi foreign policy. The relationship with Saudi Arabia has been long and strong, 
and it cannot be denied that oil has been the central interest in that relationship. There 
have been other interests, thought, that have shaped the American-Saudi relationships 
like security, especially during the Cold War. In the following section, I will explore 
the history of this relation, following a brief history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Then, I will discuss the tension that the relation has witnessed after 9/11 and the war 
on terror based, mainly, on Saudi perceptions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AMERICAN-SAUDI RELATIONS AND THE OIL FACTOR 
The contemporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, founded by King Abdulaziz Ibn- 
Saud, was unified in 1932 after a series of battles beginning in 1901. Ultimately, the 
scattered tribes inhabiting the peninsula came together to form the largest state in the 
Middle East. The government is a monarchy, and the King's title is `Custodian of the 
Two Holy Mosques, ' referring to the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina. The 
Arabian Peninsula, of which Saudi Arabia is the largest part, covers over 3 million 
square kilometres. According to the American Central Intelligence Agency (2006), 
the size of Saudi Arabia is 1,960,582 sq. km. The latest census lists a total population 
of 27,019,731 (including 5,576,076 non-nationals). Virtually 100% of the people are 
Muslim. Saudi Arabia has borders with 11 countries: Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait on the 
north; Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on the east; the Arabian Gulf 
(also known as the Persian Gulf) is shared with Iran; Oman and Yemen bound Saudi 
Arabia on the south; and, on the west, the Red Sea is shared with Egypt, Sudan, and 
Eritrea. 
Located on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia has a strategic geographic 
location on the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is one of two key states 
(the other is Egypt) in the Arab world and one of the most influential states in the 
Muslim world. Saudi influence in the world's political arena is based on its huge oil 
resources, its position in the Arab and Muslim world as the heart of Islam and Arab 
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identity, and the fact that it is the home of the two Holy Shrines of Mecca and Medina. 
In his book Does America Need a Foreign Policy, former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger (2002), mentioned Egypt and Saudi Arabia as major leaders in the Arab 
world. The United States should invite these influential nations to play `a moderating 
role' in the peace process, but with appreciation for their internal pressures. 
Saudi Arabia has been a key player in the Muslim world since the Second 
World War. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudi government took a 
strong position of support for the `Islamic state' of Afghanistan against the `infidel 
Soviets. ' Saudi Arabia provided financing and support for the Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan in coordination with the United States and Pakistan. The Saudi decision 
to support the Mujahidin in Afghanistan prompted other Arab and Muslim states to 
also offer support (Peterson, 2002). During the Afghan-Soviet War, over 35,000 
Muslims from around the world were recruited to fight the invaders (Hartman, 2002). 
Saudi Arabia's leadership position has led to a variety of obligations and to 
responsibilities in Middle East matters. For example, on September 30,1989, the 
Saudi government succeeded in gathering together 62 of the 72 members of the 
Lebanese parliament that had been elected in 1974, before the beginning of that 
country's civil war. After a month of intense negotiations, 58 of the elected members 
signed the Al-Taif Agreement in Saudi Arabia on October 22,1989. The Al-Taif 
Agreement for national reconciliation provided framework for the distribution of 
power in Lebanon between the Christian and Muslim parties (paper presented by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Counter-Terrorism 
International Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 2005). 
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When Egypt signed its peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and was 
neutralized in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia became the leading state among 
the bloc of Arab states that persisted in refusing any kind of normalization with the 
Israeli state. To date, Israel has failed to break through and normalize relations, 
especially with the Saudis. In April 2002, King Abdullah (who was Crown Prince at 
that time) presented a Saudi initiative that was approved by the Arab League at a 
summit in Beirut. The initiative clearly stated the condition which had to be met to 
achieve normalization (withdrawal to the borders of 1967). After the Saudi initiative, 
the U. S. media, which is generally believed to be subject to the influence of pro-Israeli 
lobbies, launched a series of attacks on the Saudi regime (Al-Jahni, author's interview, 
2005). 
While Saudi Arabia has the largest economy in the Middle East with a gross 
domestic product (GDP) of $338 billion, it is considered a developing country. There 
has been slow improvement in the realm of political freedom, but the six five-year 
development plans that began in 1970 have, as former U. S. diplomat John Habib 
(2003) described, `changed the face of the kingdom beyond recognition' (p. 154). The 
2005 U. N. report on world human development ranked Saudi Arabia 3211 among 103 
developing countries (United Nations Development Program, 2005). The Saudi 
economy faces some major challenges. Saudi Arabia's rate of population growth is 
among the highest in the world, with than 45% of the population under 15 years of 
age. As this group matures, they will need jobs. 
One of the most crucial challenges for the Saudi government is diversifying its 
sources of income as the country depends so heavily on oil revenues. In recent years, 
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the Saudi government has taken steps to diversify sources of income- the laws of 
investment and `privatization' for the purpose of encouraging foreign investment in 
Saudi Arabia, which became a Member of the WTO on December 11,2005 (Political 
and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2005). Saudi Arabia does 
have one of the 10 largest stock exchanges in the world. 
The constitution of Saudi Arabia is based on The Holy Book (Koran), the 
revealed word of God, and the sayings and deeds of Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be 
upon Him). As stated in The Holy Koran, Muslims must abide by the teachings of the 
Holy Koran and Prophet Mohammad's sayings and deeds (Sunna). As an Islamic 
state, Saudi Arabia applies The Holy Koran-based Islamic law (Sharia). Failure to do 
so would undermine the government's credibility among Muslims true believers 
(Bahgat, 2004). It contains the rules by which the Muslim nation is governed (or 
should govern itself) and forms the basis for relations between Muslims and God, 
between individuals, (whether Muslim or non-Muslim). 
The Sharia rules are not only in regards to religious practices but address all 
aspects of life: economy, politics, personal behaviour, and etc. The Islamic law 
(Sharia) is applicable at any time and gives the right to the ruling government to 
regulate unprecedented issues. It, also, gives the government flexibility in the 
appliance and interpretation of Islamic law. Saudi Arabia and other Islamic states 
were granted some exceptions from some of the articles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights that contradict Islamic principles. However, Islamic law (Sharia) 
does guarantee human rights according to The Holy Book (Koran) and the Prophet 
Mohammad's sayings and deeds (Sunna). 
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Islamic law is often misunderstood by Westerners. In America, especially, 
many people do not know about Islam and its basic principles. Denny (2002) 
suggested providing educational programs for American citizens that include a 
background on Islam and Islamic culture `We need to encourage and support effective 
educational programs that will inform our citizens about the beliefs, hopes, ideals, 
achievements and aspirations of Muslims and other minorities in our society... 
(Denny, 2002, p. 38). 
Saudi Arabia has adopted a slow, gradual approach to political reform. That is 
also the approach of the Saudi foreign policy, which seeks to avoid rashness and 
precipitancy (Bahgat, 2004). The first municipal elections in Saudi Arabia took place 
in late 2004. The right of women to vote has been considered as part of the political 
development of Saudi Arabia, and some Saudi officials have announced that women 
will be allowed to vote in the next elections. Any political development must be in 
cultural and religious compliance with Saudi society. While the Saudi approach is 
gradual change, it should be noted that the women's right to vote was not acquired in 
the United States until 1920 and in France in 1947. 
In 1992, King Fahad Bin Abdulaziz issued a Royal Decree, revitalizing the 
Consultative Council (Majlis Ash-shura). It started out with 60 members, expanded to 
90 members in 1997, and grew to 120 members who serve a four-year term. The 
Consultative Council (Majlis Ash-shura) is an essential constituent in any Islamic 
state. Prior to 1992, the Consultative Council was inactive (Political and Economic 
Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2005). The Consultative Council's duties 
are as follows: 
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(a) Discuss the general plan for economic and social development and give 
view (b) Revising laws and regulations, international treaties and agreements, 
concessions, and provide whatever suggestions it deems appropriate (c) 
Analyzing laws (d) Discuss government agencies annual reports and attaching 
new proposals when it deems appropriate (Majlis Ash-shura, 2006). 
Ash-shura members are chosen by the King to represent various sections of 
Saudi society. However, some Saudi officials have announced that the Saudi 
government ultimately aims to have an elected Consultative Council (Parliament) after 
a partial election. This would give the Saudi people some role in policy making. This 
is part of the gradual political reform started in Saudi Arabia, beginning with the 
creation of the Consultative Council and the successive expansion of the number of its 
members. 
One of the traditional ways of communication between the rulers and the 
people of Saudi Arabia is at public salons where Saudi citizens can discuss Saudi 
internal and external affairs. Any Saudi citizen can attend and express his opinion. 
The public salons are held on specific days every week by the king, royal prince, 
princes of provinces, and ministers (Peterson, 2002). Saudi citizens are also allowed 
to present oral or written petitions to the King or other ministers and principals in the 
Saudi government. 
U. S. foreign policy is majorly concerned, along with support for Israel, with 
the continuation of a smooth supply of oil from the Gulf region. These contradictory 
national interests have been challenging and provocative for every post-World War 11 
administration in Washington, D. C. Oil has given the Arab states leverage and has 
been used as a weapon by Arab states against the U. S. for supporting Israel. The 
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following section addresses oil as factor that has affected U. S. foreign policy in the 
region. 
The Oil Factor 
In the first half of the 20th century, the United States was the largest supplier of 
oil to Europe. Approximately 90% of the total European oil consumption was 
imported from the United States. In 1948, the United States imported oil, for the first 
time, due a rapid increase in consumption. The United States started to import oil 
from the Middle East: this was possible because of the explorations of the oil fields in 
Saudi Arabia that began in 1933 (Leonardo, 2003). The United States was importing 
31 % of its oil by 1970. This percentage doubled to 62% in 1996. American imports 
of oil from the Gulf region, mainly from Saudi Arabia, went from 10.1 % of its total oil 
imports in 1983 to 23.8% in 2000. The Gulf region contains 65% of the world's oil 
reserves and, as many experts argue, seems to be the only region capable of 
guaranteeing oil supplies for the increasing world market. Between 1998 and 2020, 
U. S. consumption of oil is expected to increase from 18.9 to 25.8 million barrels per 
day (Kolko, 2002). An example of the Gulf states' capability to provide oil markets 
was during the second half of 2004 when oil prices soared along with shortage in oil 
supplies. During that time, Saudi Arabia was the only oil producer to have the 
capability of producing 1.5 million barrel daily extra to the oil market. Saudi Arabia 
increased its production to ensure enough oil supplies for the world market. The Saudi 
government attributed the increase of oil prices to speculations and the shortage of oil 
refineries in the United States. 
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In 1933, the Saudi government granted California Arabian Standard Oil 
Company (CASOC) exclusive rights to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia (in 1944 
CASOC changed its name to Arabian American Oil Company, ARAMCO). In the 
same year, vast oil reserves were discovered in Saudi Arabia. Now, Saudi Arabia 
possesses about 25% of the world's oil reserves (Aramco, 2003). 
Since the explorations of oil fields in the Middle East in the first half of the 
twentieth century, oil became one of the most important pillars of U. S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East (Aramco, 2003). After the Second World War and the discovery of 
the oil in the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East became an increasingly vital region 
to the United States. In 1948, the Truman Administration passed U. S. National 
Security Council Resolution (138/1), which sought to secure oil for `the Western 
world' (Leonardo, 2003). 
In 1951, the Iranian Democratic Nationalist, Mohammad Mosaddeq, came to 
power with a national agenda that included nationalizing Iranian oil, which was owned 
by the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum). The British government 
asked the United States to help remove Mosaddeq from power (Leonardo, 2003). In 
1953, with the authorization of President Eisenhower, the CIA masterminded a coup 
to topple Mosaddeq and restore the Shah, Reza Bahlevi. The United States replaced 
the British as guardian of the Shah's regime, enabling four of the largest American oil 
companies to own 40% of the new oil company in Iran. Restoration of the Shah's 
regime (which lasted for 35 years) and foreign profiteering from Iranian resources 
generated hatred toward the Shah and strong anti-American ism as the United States 
struggled to keep the Shah in power. He employed a repressive intelligence agency 
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(SAVAK), against his own people, especially after 1963 when the Shiite religious 
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, began to gain wide popularity and support among the 
Iranians as an opponent to the Shah's regime (Kolko, 2002). 
The economic pillar of oil is a substantial factor in U. S. foreign policy toward 
the Middle East (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). The United States has tried to 
separate its policy regarding oil and its policy toward the Middle East, but it has failed. 
The United States has become more concerned about the accessibility to Gulf oil, 
especially after U. S. support for Israel in the 1973 War which led to an Arab oil 
embargo against those countries that supported Israel in the war. The 1973 War 
proved that the policy of oil and the policy of the Middle East can never be separated 
(Al-Rawaf, author's interview, 2004). The embargo caused an oil crisis in America 
and an increase in world oil prices from $3 to $12 per barrel. At that time, oil 
consumption in the United States was triple what it was in 1948, and the shock waves 
of the oil embargo rocked the U. S. administration and the American people as oil had 
become so vital to U. S. economy (Leonardo, 2003). 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 introduced a second period of soaring 
oil prices after the Arab oil embargo in 1973. The oil prices jumped from $14.3 per 
barrel to $37.9 (Niblock, 2006). In 1980, a year after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
the First Gulf War broke out between Iran and Iraq, causing oil prices to reach 
unprecedented levels. 
During the Second Gulf War in 1991 (the liberation of Kuwait), oil prices 
reached $40 per barrel. Even though, the first President George Bush `won' the war, 
the high oil prices contributed to a recession in the American economy. Ultimately, 
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this cost him the elections in the 1992 presidential race against Bill Clinton (Fennell, 
October, 2002). 
American Saudi Relations at a Crossroads? 
Since 9/11, Saudi American relations have been the subject of debate inside the 
United States, especially because 15 of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Osama 
Bin Laden seems to have chosen 15 of the 19 terrorists to be Saudi citizens for the 
purpose of spoiling American-Saudi relations. This belief was asserted by King 
Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz on May 13,2003, when he said, `The target of Al-Qaedah 
terrorists is Saudi Arabia and the United States and the 70-year relationship that has 
benefited both our people' (Public Statements by Senior Saudi Officials Condemning 
Extremism and Promoting Moderation, February 2005, p. 16) 
Al-Hulwa believes that the American-Saudi relations does not have any 
political or economic problem, but a cultural gab, where the U. S. media, for instance, 
has portrayed the Saudi Arabian culture as intolerant. Since 9/11, the U. S. media, 
some members of Congress, and some in influential circles in the United States have 
accused Saudi Arabia of being `soß on terrorism, ' portraying the Saudi culture as a 
culture that produces terrorism, is tolerant of terrorism, and does not support 
democracy and human rights (Bahgat, 2004). There have been demands for a review 
of the American-Saudi relationship- a relationship that has stood solid for 70 years 
and been described by both sides as `a special relationship. ' 
In his book, Saudi Arabia and the American National Interest, Professor John 
Habib (2003) of the University of Maryland, and former diplomat at the American 
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Embassy in Saudi Arabia, explained in depth the nature of relations between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. In 1931, the United States recognized Saudi Arabia 
but did not establish full diplomatic relations until 1940. The beginning of the `special 
relationship' between America and Saudi Arabia began in 1945 when U. S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz (founder of the modem Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) met aboard the USS Quincy in waters of Egypt. The meeting mainly focused 
on the convulsions involving the Palestinian land and Jewish emigration. At that time, 
there was a large wave of European Jews emigrating to Palestine with the political and 
financial support of the United States. As a result of the Jewish emigration, clashes 
started between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. King Abdulaziz expressed his 
concern and dissatisfaction with U. S. facilitation and support of the Jewish emigration 
as it undermined U. S. relations with the Arab states and U. S. interest in the region. 
King Abdulaziz insisted that the Jewish immigrants had to be helped by the United 
States to return and resettle in their homes in Eastern Europe. According to John 
Habib, this meeting did affect Roosevelt's attitude regarding the Palestinian problem. 
According to the memoirs of President Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hopes 
(1956), President Roosevelt promised King Abdulaziz that he `would make no move 
hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs' (p. 141). 
On April 5,1945, a week before his death, President Roosevelt sent a letter to 
King Abdulaziz, confirming his promise. Based on the expansive exploration of the 
oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt sought to consolidate the partnership between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia for the sake of the oil industry. Shortly thereafter, 
President Roosevelt died. When Vice President Harry Truman became President of 
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the United States, he pursued policies radically different from Roosevelt and subject to 
the influences of pro-Zionist lobbies (Habib, 2003). He was the first world leader to 
recognize Israel and offer full diplomatic relations on the second day after the state of 
Israel was declared in 1947 (Truman, 1956). He shipped weapons to Israel as the 
Arab states were moving toward Palestine in reaction to the declaration of the new 
Jewish state (Heikel, 1996). Saudi Arabia was among the Arab coalition forces that 
participated in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Despite the pro-Israeli policies 
pursued by Harry S. Truman, King Abdulaziz believed that a relationship with the 
United States was necessary for regional stability. It should be noted that all U. S. 
administrations since President Roosevelt have been committed to the `territorial 
integrity' of Saudi Arabia (Habib). 
Oil has been a crucial factor in the American-Saudi relations for decades. In 
1933, the Saudi government granted California Arabian Standard Oil Company 
(CASOC) an exclusive right for oil exploration in Saudi Arabia. In 1944, CASOC 
changed its name to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). According to 
former U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John C. West, King Abdulaziz chose the 
Americans, not the British or the French, because the United States had no `history of 
colonial exploitation' (Habib, 2003). 
The economic importance of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states is not only 
based on oil. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states are among the world's major 
consumers of U. S. products. Also, Saudi Arabia is one of the U. S. top trade partners 
in the world (Bahgat, 2004). Of significance is the fact that Saudi investors own 
between 5% and 6% of the U. S. stock market (Habib, 2003). 
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At the beginning of American-Saudi relations, the United States was perceived 
by the Saudi government and Saudi citizens as a moral state with more credibility than 
the European colonial states. However, this image has changed. In Saudi Arabia and 
the rest of the Arab and Islamic world, the shift began in the 1940s when Israel 
became an issue and intensified in the 1960s, perhaps in relation to Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the 1967 War. Many Arabs believe that U. S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East is unjust and biased (Habib, 2003). 
Since its unification by King Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia has stood against all 
anti-Islamic ideologies. When the Egyptian leader, Jamal Abdulnaser (Naser), 
adopted socialism in Egypt and sought to export the ideology to other Arab states, this 
led to a schism in the Arab world with one group led by Naser in Egypt and the other 
led by Saudi Arabia (Gerges, 1999). Ideology aside, when it came to matters of Arab 
national interest, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were united- note their position after 
the Six Days War in 1967. At that time, all the Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, 
held an Arab summit in Sudan and declared the `Three Nos: ' no to peace, no to 
negotiation, and no to the recognition of Israel. 
In the 1973 war, Saudi Arabia financed a large portion of the Egyptian and 
Syrian weapons purchases and rallied political support for them within the United 
Nations. As a consequence of the war, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states 
imposed an oil embargo against the United States and the other countries that 
supported Israel during the war. The embargo decision was based on Arab national 
interests and was made for the purpose of punishing the United States for its public 
support of Israel with word and weapons. The oil embargo made it clear to U. S. 
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policymakers that America must maintain agreeable relations with Saudi Arabia or 
bear negative economic consequences (Habib, 2003). 
During the Cold War, the United States sought to contain and diminish the 
spread of communism in the Middle East. That was one of the major pillars of U. S. 
foreign policy in the region. Saudi Arabia played a major role in resisting and 
confronting the threat of communism, advocating for and sponsoring the creation of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969, which had as one of its objects the 
prevention of communism. Saudi Arabia, also, supported the Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet invaders from 1979 to 1988. The Saudi anti- 
communist position was not taken to appease the United States, but was based on the 
tenets of Islam. Thus, American and Saudi national interests actually joined in a 
mutual alliance against the threat of communism. Crockatt (2003) described Saudi 
Arabia as an example of country that is politically `aligned' with the United States but 
maintains a `cultural distance. ' 
Othman Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004), former member of the Ash Shura 
(Parliament) in Saudi Arabia, asserted that after the collapse of the Soviet Union some 
in influential circles and some theoreticians in the West, mainly in America, started to 
speak out about Islam as a threat replacing the collapsed Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia 
was (and still is) considered the heart of the Islamic world, and the United States 
sought to utilize the Saudi position in the Muslim world against the threat of 
communism. The collapse of communism and the beginning of U. S. hegemony in the 
Middle East have had an impact on the nature of the American-Saudi relation. 
American-Saudi relations had lost one of the two pillars that consolidated and 
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strengthened the alliance between the two countries (Niblock, 2006). The only pillar 
left was oil. There was, however, the geopolitical importance of Saudi Arabia for the 
United States. Without Saudi Arabia as a major ally in the region, `the geopolitical 
and military problems confronting the United States would be far greater, ' as argued 
by Kolko (2002, p. 73). 
In 1990, King Fahad made one of the most crucial decisions of his era. He 
agreed to host over 500,000 American soldiers for the liberation of Kuwait and 
defence of Saudi Arabia against any potential Iraqi threat (satellite photos showed 
Iraqi troops massing on the Saudi border). After the liberation of Kuwait, the United 
States convinced the Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia, of the importance of 
maintaining an American presence in the region. Saddam Hussein's threat had not 
been eliminated. Saudi Arabia accepted reluctantly. The Saudi Chief of Staff, 
Lieutenant General Prince Khaled Bin-Sultan had wanted American support to enlarge 
the Saudi Army and supply it with advanced American weapons, but pro-Israeli 
lobbies in the U. S. Congress objected to the proposal to sell Saudi Arabia $28-$30 
billion worth of weapons (Berger, 1991). 
1991 witnessed the conduct of Second Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. 
This was a turning point for American power in the region and a new trend in terrorist 
operations against U. S. targets, mainly in the Middle East. Terrorist operations were 
carried out against the United States in an effort to force it to pull its troops out of the 
Gulf region. Saudi Arabia was one of the states were U. S. targets were attacked. On 
November 13,1995, a car bomb with 200 pounds of TNT exploded at the American- 
run National Guard training center in downtown Riyadh, causing the deaths of five 
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Americans, two Indians and injuring over 30 people. Eventually, four people were 
arrested and convicted of the bombing. They admitted that they were influenced by 
the ideas of Mohammad al-Mas'ari (a Saudi dissident operating from London, UK) 
and Osama Bin-Laden. They confessed to having been trained in Afghanistan. The 
four culprits were executed on May 31,1996 (Mandaville, no date) (Peterson, 2002). 
In 1996, seven months after the Riyadh bombing, a new bombing occurred in 
Al-Khobar city, in the East Province of Saudi Arabia. Ten times stronger than the 
Riyadh bomb, the explosion caused the deaths of 19 Americans and injured 386 
Americans, Saudis, and Bangladeshis. While American investigators believed that the 
two bombing were related, Saudi investigators claimed there was no relationship 
between the two incidents. The Saudi Minister of Interior confirmed that they had 
sufficient evidence against the culprits (Grant, 1998). 
Later, the United States issued an indictment based on undisclosed evidence, 
accusing the Iranian government of sponsoring the Al-Khobar bombing (Stem, 1999). 
This accusation gained more credence when the Canadian government arrested a 
Saudi citizen from the Shiite sect (some Shiites in the Gulf States have a religious 
allegiance to the Shiite regime of Iran). The suspect, Hani Al-Sayegh, was assumed to 
be an accessory in A1-Khobar bombing. The Canadian government handed him over 
to the U. S. government which turned him over to Saudi Arabia (Grant, 1998), 
(Mandaville, no date). The A1-Khobar bombing investigation was never publicized or 
brought to sight and news headlines again after 9/11. 
It is important here to mention that Saudi Arabia had no experience with 
terrorism prior to the Riyadh and AI-Khobar incidents. The whole country was 
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shocked by the incidents. Saudi Arabian society and government define terrorism in 
accordance with Islamic Law, which calls such acts `Heraba' (overt or random acts 
that cause public harm and/or financial damage). Saudi beliefs and attitudes toward 
violence, crime, and wrong-doing are born out of the religious and cultural heritage 
(Bin-Odah, author's interview, 2002). These were the first two terrorist operations 
committed by some of the Afghan Mujahidin who had been supported by the United 
States and Saudi Arabia against the Soviets. The incidents have been described by 
some American and Saudi intellectuals as a backlash against the two countries. 
The incidents at Riyadh and Al-Khobar did not have a negative impact on the 
strong relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, but there were 
complaints about a lack of Saudi cooperation in the investigations (Bahgat, 2004). 
The first serious tensions in the American-Saudi relationship occurred after the second 
Palestinian uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000. At that time, the Saudi Crown Prince, 
now King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, sent a message to President Bush alerting him that 
the special relationship between the two countries was at a `crossroads' due to 
America's position of support for Israeli actions against the Palestinians. The Crown 
Prince urged the U. S. administration to fulfil its obligation to be an honest broker in 
the conflict (Habib, 2003). A year later, there was an incident that caused even greater 
tension between the two countries, the attacks of September 11,2001 (Peterson, 2002). 
It has been argued that 9/11 harmed the special relationship between America 
and Saudi Arabia as 15 of the 19 alleged hijackers participating in the attacks were 
Saudis (Niblock, 2006). However, Saudi Arabia condemned the attacks and warned 
against any attempt to associate Saudi culture with terrorism as the U. S. media and 
142 
some American commentators did. The portrayal of the Saudi culture as a breeding 
ground for terrorism contradicts the facts as Saudi soil itself became subject to a series 
of terrorist attacks after 9/11 (Peterson, 2002). In response to attacks against the Saudi 
culture and its association with terrorism, on June 12,2003, King Abdullah Bin 
Abdulaziz (who was Crown Prince at the time) said, 
I believe that no society is immune from deviants and extremists. This 
situation exists in every country, in every society and in every faith. These 
individuals do not represent their societies. They do not represent the 
prevailing thinking of a society. (Public Statements by Senior Saudi Officials 
Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation, February 2005) 
At the religious level, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and Chairman of the 
Council of Senior Religious Scholars stressed that `Terrorism has nothing to do with 
Islam ... Islam should not be blamed for the acts of other people. People should 
be 
held responsible individually for their own acts' (Public Statements by Senior Saudi 
Officials Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation, February 2005, p. 11). 
It seems that the United States and Saudi Arabia have been `co-victims' of Al- 
Qaedah's operations. The Riyadh attacks of May12,2003, were a blow for most 
Saudis who thought that their country would never be a target of Al-Qaedah. 
According to a study conducted by Salwa Al-Khateeb (2005), from King Saud 
University in Riyadh, over half ofthe 26 terrorists wanted in Saudi Arabia for the 
attack at the Al-Muhaya compound in Riyadh in 2004 were trained in Al-Qaedah 
camps in Afghanistan. After the attacks, the Saudi government and people became 
more aware of the Al-Qaedah threat and more determined to fight it. The threat of 
terrorism was also highlighted by the Grand Mufti who said, [it is] `forbidden to 
justify the acts of these criminals ... You 
have to be vigilant and have strong will in 
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defending the religion and Muslim country against these people' (Public Statements 
by Senior Saudi Officials Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation, 
February 2005, p. 4). 
The U. S. Ambassador in Saudi Arabia at that time, Robert Jordan, described 
American-Saudi cooperation in combating terrorism after May 12`}' as `superb. ' The 
American-Saudi partnership in the war against terrorism `is indispensable and must 
continue to flourish, rising above nuanced counter-terrorism cultures and techniques, 
choosing to emphasize the common concern of security for its citizens rather than the 
religious traditions that distinguish them' (Ranstorp, 2003, p. 1). 
Since 9/11, oil prices and the demand for oil have increased tremendously 
(over $70 a barrel in August 2005), and the United States has became more dependent 
on the Saudi role in the world oil market. This dependency has intensified since Saudi 
Arabia has become the only oil producer with capacity for surplus oil production of up 
to 1.5 million barrel per day. This is very important to meet unexpected world 
demand. Saudi Arabia has played a major role in OPEC to keep oil supplies 
reasonably priced as it increased oil production by almost 25% in 2003-2004. The 
Saudi effort to bring oil prices down succeeded after debate with other OPEC 
producers, like Iran and Venezuela, which opposed the Saudi plan to increase oil 
production. 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Crown Prince Abdullah ordered the Saudi 
Oil Minister to contradict a pre-September 11 decision made by OPEC to cut oil 
production and ship an extra 9 million barrels of oil to the United States within two 
weeks. This was done to insure stability of world oil prices and keep America 
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supplied at reasonable prices. The decision was also meant to bolster the Saudi 
position against the terrorist attacks. In May 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah met with 
President Bush and assured him that Saudi Arabia would not use oil as a political tool. 
This positive move by Saudi Arabia, which went beyond verbal condemnation to 
practical support, was not publicized or appreciated by the U. S. media (Habib, 2003). 
In the era between the end of the Cold War and before 9/11, U. S. interests in 
Saudi Arabia were limited mainly to oil, weapons sales, and trade. After 9/11, the 
American-Saudi alliance against terrorism added to the strength of the partnership as 
both countries had been victims to terrorist attacks on their soil. Both countries have 
shared intelligence and attempted to liquidate the financial resources of Al-Qaedah. 
While many leaders and members of Al-Qaedah have been killed and captured by the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, the alliance of the too countries excludes the U. S. war 
against rogue states or state-sponsored terrorism. Saudi Arabia has refused to 
participate in the war and occupation of Iraq. 
Some people in the United States look at Saudi Arabia as a state that finances 
and supports a culture of terrorism. This is due, in large part, to the way Saudi Arabia 
and Arabs, in general, have been portrayed by the U. S. media even before 9/11. The 
New York Times, for example, accused Saudi Arabia of being tolerant of terrorism, 
describing the relationship between America and Saudi Arabia as `untenable and 
unreliable. ' This accusation by The New York Times is an example of a series of 
attacks against Saudi Arabia by the U. S. media and some members of Congress, which 
have described Saudi Arabia as being soft in the war against terrorism. The White 
House has denied such accusations asserting that America had `excellent co-operation 
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with Riyadh' (Peterson, 2002). Moreover, the Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States in 2004 has found no 
evidence that the government of Saudi Arabia funded Al-Qaedah. The report also 
confirmed that the Saudi government was pursuing Bin-Laden and his Al-Qaedah 
network. It also mentioned full cooperation with the United States before the 9/11 
attacks, noting the Saudi government's revocation of Bin-Laden's Saudi citizenship in 
1994 and its negotiations with the Taliban regime to hand over Osama Bin-Laden in 
September 1998. 
Saudi Arabia together with Pakistan and United Arab Emirates the only three 
countries who recognized the Taliban regime in 1997 before it decided to break the 
relation after the Taliban's refusal to handover Bin-Laden in 1998 (Bahgat, 2004). 
Former U. S. Diplomat John Habib (2003) asserted that most of the people in 
the United States `have only a vague idea about Saudi political, religious and social 
culture and much of that is inaccurate' (p. 5). Habib attributed this distorted image 
about Saudi Arabia to some members of the U. S. Congress and U. S. media who 
... spread misconceptions and express 
inaccurate remarks about the Kingdom 
even though they do have access to factual information. Very often they leave 
the impression of being less interested in serious reporting about the Kingdom 
and more concerned with promoting the agendas of special interests that are 
unfriendly or hostile to it (p. 6). 
One of the consequences of 9/11 that has caused tension in the relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States is the lawsuit filed by the families of 600 
people who were killed in the attacks. The suit names Saudi banks, charities, wealthy 
Saudis, and members of the royal family, `accusing them of financially sponsoring the 
Al-Qaedah and its leader, Osama Bin Laden' (Bahgat, 2004, p. 2). The list included 
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all organizations and people who have made generous donations to poor Arabs and 
Muslims around the world. The list was regarded with contempt as it included, for 
example, Saudi Crown Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz and Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the 
current Saudi Ambassador in Washington and former chief of Saudi Intelligence. 
Such accusations were considered insulting by Saudis, especially since Saudi Arabia 
had been a victim of terrorism before and after 9/11. On February 5,2005, Saudi 
Arabia (Riyadh) hosted the International Conference in Countering Terrorism (which 
was attended by the researcher) to `discuss' the ideology and roots of terrorism. Also, 
over a year earlier, in 2003, Saudi Arabia organized a national forum for intellectual 
dialogue entitled `Extremism and Moderation: A Comprehensive Approach' (Public 
Statements by Senior Saudi Officials Condemning Extremism and Promoting 
Moderation, February 2005). 
Former U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Wyche Fowler, who served there 
from 1996 to 2001, refuted claims by some Americans that accused Saudi Arabia of 
being a financial resource for terrorism. Fowler asserted that Saudi Arabia and its 
officials `are not in the business of funding terrorists against their friends-the United 
States' (p. 5). The Saudi government refuted these claims, saying that the Kingdom 
hosts more than six million foreign workers and professionals, who send billions of 
dollars to their countries every year,. and for which the Saudi government has no 
responsibility. The Saudi government also has made it clear that the Zakat (tithing) 
which Muslims pay annually (2.5 of their net worth goes to specific categories of poor 
people) is one of the five pillars of Islam (Initiatives and Actions Taken by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism, February 2005). 
147 
In a personal interview with Hamad Al-Sayari (2005), the Governor of the 
Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA), it was confirmed that full cooperation does exist 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia regarding the prevention of terrorism. 
They share a common goal of cutting off financial support of terrorism using an 
American-Saudi list of organizations and people who finance terrorism. He described 
the attacks of some influential Americans as attempts to distort the facts in order to 
poison the American-Saudi relations. According to Al-Sayari, their attempts 
contradict statements made by U. S. officials which have praised Saudi efforts to 
combat terrorism. In April 2004, Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for 
Counter-Terrorism at the U. S. Department of State said, 
I would cite Saudi Arabia as an excellent example of a nation increasingly 
focusing its political will to fight terrorism. Saudi Arabia has launched an 
aggressive, comprehensive, and unprecedented campaign to hunt down 
terrorists, uncover their plots, and cut off their sources of funding (Quoted in 
paper presented by Saudi Arabia at the Counter-Terrorism International 
Conference in Riyadh titled Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism, February 2005, p. 12). 
Al-Sayari (2005) spoke of the attacks on Saudi Arabia as `invisible hands' 
inside America seeking to distort the image of Saudi Arabia by frequently fabricating 
issues and cases about the Kingdom. He pointed out how the U. S. media falsely 
portrayed the Saudi `break-fast' aid to Palestinians during the month of Ramadan as 
military aid. Al-Sayari added that after 9/11, all Saudi foreign aid has had to be 
checked by a central board, with all charitable organizations subject to `audit, ' using 
`draconian measures' to prevent any leak of Saudi foreign aid to terrorists. According 
to the paper presented by Saudi Arabia at the Counter-Terrorism International 
Conference in Riyadh (Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia 
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to Combat Terrorism, 2005), Saudi efforts to eliminate financial resources for 
terrorism began before 9/11. For example, the Saudi government froze the assets of 
Osama Bin-Laden in 1994. 
It was no surprise that a series of negative U. S. foreign policy moves and 
attacks on Saudi Arabia by the U. S. media caused Saudi attitudes toward the United 
States to deteriorate. According to the Report of the Advisory Group on Public 
Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World submitted to the Committee on 
Appropriations in the U. S. House of Representatives (2003), a survey conducted by 
Gallup in 2002 had found that only 7% of the people in Saudi Arabia had a `very 
favorable view' of the United States. In reaction to attacks by the U. S. media and 
some members of the U. S. Congress, King Abdullah stated that the special American- 
Saudi relationship may become hard to maintain, asserting that the two states were at a 
`crossroads, ' and each country may have to act in its own best interest regardless of 
the `special relationship' (Habib, 2003). Ali Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005), from 
the Prince Naif University for Security Science in Riyadh, believed that the United 
States has `blindly' supported Israel without any consideration for American political, 
economic, and technological interests in the Middle East in relation to its other major 
allies in the region, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. 
John Mearsheimer from University of Chicago and Stephen Walt the 
Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University 
questioned in their paper `The Israel Lobby and US. Foreign Policy' (2006) why the 
American foreign policy in the Middle East is devoted to serve the interests of the 
state of Israel in contradiction to American national interests in the region. 
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This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United 
States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the 
interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two 
countries is based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral 
imperatives. As we show below, however, neither of those explanations can 
account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the 
United States provides to Israel (p. 1). 
Peterson (2002) diagnosed the tension in relations between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia. He speculated about the long-and short-term effects of this tension 
in the American-Saudi relationship. Regarding Saudi Arabia, he said, 
It has found itself the target of American hostility on a scale never seen before, 
leading to the real possibility that the 60-year American-Saudi alliance (the 
kingdom's closest bond outside the Arab world) will be jeopardized. While 
the long-term damage may be limited, the more immediate impact on Saudi 
policy-makers and general population alike may be to rethink their 
overwhelmingly pro-Western and pro-American attitudes. (p. 7) 
In Saudi Arabia, the U. S. media has been publicly and officially accused of 
being anti-Saudi (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). Some influential U. S. circles, 
the U. S. media and pro-Israeli lobbies, like AIPAC, have pursued an anti-Saudi 
agenda. According to Habib (2003), their reasons for being anti-Saudi include the 
firm Saudi position against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands and 
Saudi efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Another reason has been related to the 
rapid economic advance of Saudi Arabia (the largest economy in the Arab world). 
The economic power of Saudi Arabia has made it more influential in international 
politics and its independence from American financial aid which has weakened the 
policy making and regional influence of other Arab states like Egypt and Jordan. 9/11 
has provided an opportunity for anti-Saudi circles in the United States to attack Saudi 
Arabia. 
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American stereotyping of other cultures present in American society, as well as 
other cultures around the world has been an ongoing phenomenon. It has fostered 
simplistic attempts to solve complex problems. The U. S. media and some American 
intellectuals have fuelled intolerance and misunderstanding by spreading stereotypes. 
An example of some erroneous ideas was found in Breaking the Real Axis of Evil by 
Mark Palmer (2003). The author has claimed that women are not allowed to work in 
Saudi Arabia but have to stay at home in `a sexist prison' (p. 15). Such a claim 
contradicts the fact that literacy, for example, is higher among women in Saudi Arabia 
than men. The report of the Saudi Department of Statistics in 2002 indicated that 
93.2% of Saudi women and 89.2% of Saudi men are literate (quoted in the report of 
Political and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2005). It was also 
stated in that report that females constitute a half of students in Saudi schools and 
more than half the students at Saudi universities. Moreover, Palmer claimed that 
women are not allowed to work when, in fact, they are. 
The attack against Saudi Arabia has been considered by most Saudi elites to be 
an indirect attack on Islam. Saudi Arabia has assumed the role of defender of Islam 
against the attacks that have been launched by Western institutions. Peterson (2002) 
said, `Given its perceived role as the protector of Islam, the kingdom will find it 
necessary to deal with the increasingly pessimistic mood throughout the Islamic world 
that Islam is under attack from the West' (p. 7). Since 9/11, the Gulf Operative 
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arabs 
Emirates) has sponsored several educational programs against terrorism in the media 
and the press, clarifying that Islamic religion deals with terrorism in harsh terms. This 
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campaign was launched in response to what the Gulf Operative Council considered the 
misleading agenda of the U. S. media to portray Islam as a religion that fosters 
terrorism (Al-Jazeera, March, 2004). 
Arabs and Muslims are often labeled terrorists and illiterate by the U. S. media. 
Hollywood has produced movies, before 911, in which Arabs are portrayed as 
terrorists. The images used to represent Arabs have been negative or unattractive or 
morally suspect: wealthy sheiks, terrorists, men with many wives, ignorant, and rich 
with oil money (Gher & Amin, 2000). In the movie `The Siege, ' Arabs and Muslims 
were presented as terrorists who were rounded up by the U. S. government and put in 
camps in order to counter terrorism. Children's television even portrays Arabs as evil, 
silly or thieving lawbreakers. In reality, Arabs have contributed to many aspects of 
civilization, including but not limited to medicine, mathematics, and geography. 
Shusta et al. (2002) addressed that issue saying that some people believe that 'Arab- 
and Muslim-Americans are more prone to violence' (p. 222). The former president of 
the American-Arab Anti-Defamation Committee, Albert Mokhiber, said that Arabs are 
not known to be terrorists but rather victims of terrorism and hate crimes. In the 
aftermath of the TWA flight crash in 1996, a man on the television said, `I hope to 
God it was the work of people from the Middle East' (Gher & Amin, p. 63). Many 
people in the United States perceive terrorism as automatically involving Arabs and 
Muslims. 
Since 9/11, some Americans have focused their attacks against Saudi Arabia 
on what they call `Islamic Wahhabism, ' which they consider a threat to the United 
States. The term `Wahhabism, ' a stereotypical term used in the early 1960's by 
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Nasser's regime in Egypt during the years of conflict between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. It refers to Sheikh Muhammad Bin-Abdulwahhab (1703-1792), a revivalist 
who sought to `purify Islam from alien innovations and to recreate the original 
community of the prophet' (Habib, 2003, p. 257). He did not create a new version of 
Islam but sought to dispel ignorance that had spread among Muslims on the Arabian 
Peninsula, causing them to stray from the right path of Islam. The Saudi Minister of 
Interior, Prince Naif Bin-Abdulaziz, said in an interview with the daily Middle East 
newspaper that Saudi Arabia has been targeted by the American media since the 9/11 
attacks, especially for its adherence to Islamic Law. He added that they think that 
(we) adopted (an) Islamic version that belongs to Saudi Arabia only, which is 
absolutely incorrect. There is only one Islam, Prince Naif said. Finally, he concluded 
that they need to learn more about our system, religion, and culture instead of 
prejudging (Al-Banyan, 2001, p. 1). 
`Wahhabism' has been used by the U. S. media as a reason for the violent 
attacks of 9/11. Many Saudi commentators believed that this was done in an effort to 
distract the American people from the real cause of 9/11- U. S. foreign policy. While 
U. S. policymakers tend to portray 9/11 as an action, people in the Middle East 
condemn the 9/11 attacks which they consider a reaction to negative U. S. foreign 
policy position in the Middle East. The American media and U. S. quasi-officials 
speak in public about the Islamic threat to the security of the United States, but many 
intellectuals and commentators from the Middle East are alert to what they consider an 
`unholy alliance' between Jewish radicals and Christian Evangelicals in the United 
States and their influence on U. S. foreign policy. For religious reasons, they support 
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the Israelis to sustain the Jewish state as it is required for the return of the Christ 
`peace be upon him' (Khazen, 2005). 
The attacks by the U. S. media against Saudi Arabia have negatively inputted 
attitudes in the Saudi government and among many Saudi elites, some of whom were 
once considered pro-Americans. Many of those elites were among thousands of 
Saudis who received their higher education in the United States. Ali Al-Jahni from the 
Prince Naif University for Security Sciences and Mohammad Al-Hulwa, Ashshura 
member (the Saudi Parliament) and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
(author's interviews, 2004- 2005), are among these Saudi elites who appreciated the 
American culture, values, and people. Al-Jahni differentiated between the 
condemnation of U. S. foreign policy and the admiration of the American ideals. A]- 
Hulwa considered U. S. media attacks on Saudi Arabia with suspicion, believing that 
the hostile U. S. media is against the Saudi ruling government and the religion, culture, 
and people of Saudi Arabia. Behind the attacks are anti-Saudi circles and pro-Israeli 
and Zionist lobbies in America. 
There are two perspectives in both America and Saudi Arabia toward the 
relationship between the two countries. In the United States, moralists described the 
Saudi regime as undemocratic, lacking human rights principles, and inconsistent with 
American principles and values; American realists believe that the relationship is 
necessary and serves the interests of the United States regardless of any conflicting 
principles and values between the two countries. In Saudi Arabia, moralists have 
stated that America, which condemns other nations for violating human rights, has 
itself committed series of violations to human rights principles, to international law, 
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and even to the U. S. constitution. Saudi realists consider the relationship with the 
United States as an important alliance with the most powerful state in the world 
(Habib, 2003). 
John Habib (2003), has asserted that thousands of these Saudis who obtained 
their higher education in America and were considered pro-American are now `among 
the most disenchanted' with the American model as they have observed what they 
believe to be unjust and harsh U. S. foreign policies toward Arabs which, in the long- 
term, undermines the interests of the United Sates. They also have a lack of respect 
for U. S. media and the American administration. While the U. S. media has considered 
criticism of U. S. foreign policy by the Saudi media to be act of `incitement, ' calling on 
the Saudi government to prohibit such criticism, the American government looks at 
U. S. media criticism of the Saudi government, religion, and culture as freedom of the 
press and speech. This American double standard contradicts the basic values and 
ideals that Saudi intellectuals learned and experienced while studying in the United 
States. Many Saudi elites and intellectuals have been very critical of U. S foreign 
policy in general, and of the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular. 
They believe that the United States has been dishonest regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, supporting the Israelis against the Arab states militarily, economically, and 
politically. America's commitment to the support of Israel has been evident at the 
United Nations, where the United States vetoed 35 times resolutions condemning 
Israel for the illegal occupation of Palestinian lands and the killing of Palestinian 
civilians (BBC, March, 2003). 
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Internal American pressures to end the special relationship with Saudi Arabia 
have been countered by Saudi pressures to review and reshape the relationship in 
accordance with Saudi national interests. Many Saudi elites believe that the United 
States has failed to fulfil its commitment to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states as 
it continues to pursue a biased policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, all U. S 
administrations, and the Bush Administration in particular, have been subject to 
pressure by pro-Israeli and Zionist lobbies. Those lobbies use their power to promote 
pro-Israeli policies as if they were America's national interests. As a result, many 
Saudi elites demand a revival of Saudi policies that will serve Saudi national interests. 
The next chapter will discuss the U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East during 
the G. W. Bush Administration with a focus on the U. S. war on terror; specifically it 
will try to tie together issues of how we understand the emergence of the war on terror 
and the contours of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Also, the chapter starts by 
reviewing the main themes in the Bush war on terror and what has been written about 
this war, but it also looks at the literature on terrorism. 
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